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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Seven Tests

Between Concert and Unilateralism

Joseph S. Nye

AMERICAN foreign policy has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. Priorities have been altered, several important bilateral relationships recast and, not least, the general tone of the still-new Bush Administration toward multilateral diplomacy has softened. In the President's words, "Just as Pearl Harbor awakened this country from the notion that we could somehow avoid the call of duty and defend freedom in Europe and Asia in World War II, so, too, should this most recent surprise attack erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism or in anything else for that matter."[1] This new tone goes well beyond the White House. The State and Defense Departments, each in their own way, recognize the need to build coalitions. The Treasury, which had earlier rejected international cooperation on money laundering tax havens, rapidly became a proponent of cooperation. The Congress, meanwhile, quickly approved a large dues payment and confirmed a new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations—neither of which had been on its front-burner before September 11.

It would be misleading to suggest, however, that the U.S. government has become, literally over a single night, wedded to full-fledged multilateralism. Some officials and observers, for example, have expressed concern that too wide a coalition against terrorism would shackle the United States, and that invoking the international authority of the UN or NATO would set a bad precedent.[2] In November, the administration elected not to participate in a UN-sponsored conference concerning a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In the Congress, at the same time that our closest ally, Great Britain, was ratifying the treaty creating an international criminal court, Senator Jesse Helms was pressing legislation that would authorize "any necessary action to free U.S. soldiers improperly handed over to the court, a provision dubbed by some as 'the Hague invasion clause.'"[3] So despite the new emphasis on coalitions against terrorism, Americans remain divided on how to engage the world.

Joseph S. Nye is dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This essay is adapted from the forthcoming book *The Paradox of American Power*.

[1]Bush quoted in the *New York Times*, September 19, 2001.

[2]Note the comment of Richard Perle on NATO's invocation of Article V in U.S. support, in "After September 11: A Conversation", *The National Interest* (Thanksgiving 2001), p. 85.

[3]"Britain Ratifies Treaty Creating Criminal Court", *International Herald Tribune*, October 5, 2001.

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This division is well appreciated abroad. Internal debates about how to implement the Bush Doctrine of eliminating terrorism have raised concerns in other countries that the United States would appoint itself the unilateral judge of whether a country is supporting terrorism, and of the appropriate methods of responding to that support. The U.S. rhetoric of coalition building has not assuaged these concerns, and in some instances may have deepened them.

There are three main approaches to this issue: isolationism, unilateralism and multilateralism. Isolationism persists in public opinion, but it is not a genuine strategic option for American foreign policy today. While some have responded to the terrorist attacks by suggesting that we cut back on foreign involvements, most realize that such a policy would not curtail U.S. vulnerability and could even exacerbate it. The main battle lines are drawn between two kinds of internationalists: those who advocate unilateral tactics and those who prefer multilateral ones. In William Safire's phrase, "uni- is not iso-. In our reluctance to appear imperious, we could all too quickly abdicate leadership by catering to the envious crowd."[4]

Of course, the differences between these schools come down to a matter of degree, for there are few pure unilateralists or multilateralists. When the early actions of the Bush Administration led to cries of outrage about unilateralism, the President disclaimed the label and State Department officials described the administration's posture as one of selective multilateralism. But the two ends of the spectrum do anchor different views of the degree of choice that grows out of America's position in the world today. I suggest some rules here for defining a practical middle ground, but first we need to review the debate and its consequences as they now stand.

The Company We Keep

SOME unilateralists advocate an assertive damn-the-torpedoes approach to promoting American values worldwide. They see the "present danger" as a flagging of our internal will and a confusion about our goals which, in their view, should be to turn a unipolar moment into a unipolar era. Robert Kagan and William Kristol have argued that a principal aim of U.S. foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in undemocratic countries such as Iraq, North Korea and China.[5] Our intentions are good, American hegemony is benevolent, and that should end the discussion. Charles Krauthammer has also urged "a new unilateralism", arguing that multilateralism would mean "submerging American will in a mush of collective decision-making—you have sentenced yourself to reacting to events or passing the buck to multilingual committees with fancy acronyms."[6] Kagan and Kristol believe that "the main issue of contention between the United States and those who express opposition to its hegemony is not American 'arrogance.' It is the inescapable reality of American power in its many forms. Those who suggest that these international resentments could somehow be eliminated by a more restrained American foreign policy are engaging in pleasant delusions."[7]

But Americans are not immune to hubris, nor do we have all the answers to the problems of the world. In Robert W. Tucker's view, "new unilateralism" advocacy is dangerous *even if* its premises happen

[4]William Safire, "The Purloined Treaty", *New York Times*, April 9, 2001.

[5]Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The Present Danger", *The National Interest* (Spring 2000).

[6]Charles Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism", *Washington Post*, June 8, 2001.

[7]Kagan and Kristol, p. 67.

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to be true: "For if we were truly acting in the interests of others as well as our own, we would presumably accord to others a substantive role and, by doing so, end up embracing some form of multilateralism. Others, after all, must be supposed to know their interests better than we can know them."[8] As one sympathetic European correctly observed, "from the law of the seas to the Kyoto Protocol, from the biodiversity convention, from the extraterritorial application of the trade embargo against Cuba or Iran, from the brusque calls for reform of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to the International Criminal Court; American unilateralism appears as an omnipresent syndrome pervading world politics."[9] When Congress legislated heavy penalties on foreign companies that did business with countries that the United States does not like, the Canadian foreign minister complained, "this is bullying, but in America, you call it 'global leadership.'"[10]

Other unilateralists, sometimes called "sovereigntists", focus less on the promotion than on the protection of American values, and they sometimes gain support from the significant minority of isolationist opinion that still exists in this country. As Jeremy Rabkin put it, the strongest and richest country in the world can afford to safeguard its sovereignty: "An America that stands aloof from various international undertakings will not find that it is thereby shut out from the rest of the world. On the contrary, we have every reason to expect that other nations, eager for access to American markets and eager for other cooperative arrangements with the United States, will often adapt themselves to American preferences."[11] Americans should resist the encroachment of the new international humanitarian law with its claims of universal jurisdiction. Instead, as David Rivkin and Lee Casey argued in these pages, "the United States should strongly espouse national sovereignty, the bedrock upon which democracy and self-government are built, as the fundamental organizing principle of the international system."[12] Or, as Senator Helms warned, the United Nations can be a useful instrument for America's world role, but if it "aspires to establish itself as the central moral authority of a new international order . . . then it begs for confrontation and, more important, eventual U.S. withdrawal."[13]

Multilateralists and unilateralists often dismiss each other's views with no little derision. We would be wiser to take a more dispassionate, analytical view, because this debate has serious consequences: namely, a kind of schizophrenia in American foreign policy that is often but not only played out in a struggle between the president and Congress. We must remember that the Executive Branch took a prominent role in promoting such multilateral projects as the Law of the Seas Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Mine Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and others, but the U.S. government as a whole has failed

[8]Robert W. Tucker in *Commentary* (January 2000), p. 46.

[9]Harald Muller quoted in Franz Nuscheler, *Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism* (Bonn: Development and Peace Foundation, 2001), p. 5.

[10]Lloyd Axworthy quoted in Stewart Patrick, "Lead, Follow, Or Get Out of the Way: America's Retreat from Multilateralism", *Current History* (December 2000), p. 433.

[11]Rabkin quoted in Peter Spiro, "The New Sovereigntists", *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2000), pp. 12–3.

[12]David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Lee A. Casey, "The Rocky Shoals of International Law", *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01), p. 42.

[13]Jesse Helms, "American Sovereignty and the UN", *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01), p. 34.

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to follow through with congressional ratification on any of them. In some instances, this schizophrenia has given rise to what *The Economist* calls "parallel unilateralism—a willingness to go along with international accords, but only so far as they suit America, which is prepared to conduct policy outside their constraints."[14] For instance, the United States asserts the jurisdictional limits of the unratified Law of the Seas Treaty. It has pledged not to resume testing nuclear weapons but, because of the unilateral nature of the decision, it does not gain the benefits of verification and the ability to bind others. In other instances, such as proposals to ban anti-personnel landmines, the United States has argued that it needs them to defend against North Korean infantry, but it has undertaken research on a new type of mines that might allow it to join by 2006.[15] In still other cases, such as the Kyoto Protocol, President Bush refused to negotiate and pre-emptorily pronounced it "dead." The result was frustration and anger abroad that undermined U.S. soft power and galvanized others to do things they might not otherwise have done.[16]

This seemed to some ironic, for during the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate Bush had aptly described the situation: "Our nation stands alone right now in the world in terms of power. And that's why we've got to be humble and yet project strength in a way that promotes freedom. . . . If we are an arrogant nation, they'll view us that way, but if we're a humble nation, they'll respect us."[17] Yet, of course, our allies and other foreign governments considered the early practice of his administration arrogantly unilateral. In the words of one observer, at the start of his administration, President Bush "contrived to prove his own theory that arrogance provokes resentment for a country that, long before his arrival, was already the world's most conspicuous and convenient target."[18] Thus, as candidate Bush had predicted, within a few months, America's European allies joined other countries in refusing to re-elect the United States to the UN Human Rights Commission for the first time. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in reaction that "gratitude is gone",[19] while Secretary of State Colin Powell explained that "the 'sole superpower' charge is always out there and that may have influenced some."[20] In the less temperate words of television commentator Morton Kondracke, "we're the most powerful country in the world by far, and a lot of pipsqueak wannabees like France resent the hell out of it. . . . When they have a chance to stick it to us, they try."[21] The House of Representatives responded by voting to withhold funds for the UN.

But things are more complicated than such responses acknowledged. It is true that America is resented by some just because it is so powerful and wealthy. But it is also true that American behavior affects the extent of resentment and the ways in which it is expressed. Candidate Bush was right, and so was Teddy Roosevelt. As we all know, at the begin-

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[14]"Working Out the World", *The Economist*, March 31, 2001, p. 24.

[15]James Glanz, "Study Optimistic on Safer Land Mines, but Says Push is Needed", *New York Times*, March 22, 2001.

[16]See Daniel Bodansky, "Bonn Voyage: Kyoto's Uncertain Revival", *The National Interest* (Fall 2001).

[17]Bush quoted in the *New York Times*, October 12, 2000.

[18]See Roger Cohen, "Arrogant or Humble? Bush Encounters Europeans' Hostility", *International Herald Tribune*, May 8, 2001.

[19]Rumsfeld quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, May 7, 2001.

[20]Powell quoted in *New York Times*, May 9, 2001.

[21]Kondracke quoted in *The Hotline: National Journal's Daily Briefing on Politics*, May 8, 2001, p. 4.

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ning of the last century, as America rose to world power, Roosevelt advised that we should speak softly but carry a big stick. Now that we have the stick, we need to pay more attention to the first part of his admonition—and we need not only to speak more softly, but also to listen more carefully, for we do not hold a monopoly on either truth or virtue.

That is why the United States should aim to work with other nations on global problems in a multilateral manner whenever possible. It is plainly in our national interest to do so, most of the time. The recent bipartisan commission on U.S. national security, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, was right to conclude that "emerging powers—either singly or in coalition—will increasingly constrain U.S. options regionally and limit its strategic influence. As a result we will remain limited in our ability to impose our will, and we will be vulnerable to an increasing range of threats." Borders will become more porous, rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities, the United States will become "increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on the American homeland, and the U.S. military superiority will not entirely protect us."[22] This means we must develop multilateral institutions that constrain others and provide a framework for cooperation. In the Commission's words, "America cannot secure and advance its own interests in isolation."[23]

But again, that does not mean—or at any rate should not mean—that multilateralism is always appropriate. Multilateralism can be used as a strategy by smaller states to tie the United States down like Gulliver among the Lilliputians. It is not surprising that France prefers a multipolar and multilateral world.[24] Nor is it difficult to understand why less developed countries see multilateralism as being in their interests, because it gives them some leverage on the United States. Multilateralism does involve costs, but it is still generally in the American interest because in the larger picture such costs are outweighed by the benefits. As Joshua Muravchik put it: "By resting our actions on a legal basis (and accepting the correlative constraints), we can make the continued exercise of our disproportionate power easier for others to accept."[25] International rules bind the United States and limit its freedom of action in the short term, but they serve U.S. interests by binding others as well.

The upshot of all this is that the United States should use its power now to shape institutions that will serve its long-term national interest in promoting international order. Action to shape multilateralism now is a good investment for the future. Problems may arise; as John Ikenberry has observed, "worried states are making small adjustments, creating alternatives to alliance with the United States. These small steps may not look important today, but eventually the ground will shift and the U.S.-led postwar order will fragment and disappear."[26] But these tendencies are countered by the very openness of the American system. The pluralistic and regularized way in

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[22] *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 1999), p. 4.

[23] *Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change* (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, 2001), pp. 2, 5.

[24] Dominique Moisi, "The Right Argument, but the Wrong Tone", *Financial Times*, November 22, 1999.

[25] Joshua Muravchik in *Commentary* (January 2000), p. 41.

[26] G. John Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony Right", *The National Interest* (Spring 2001), p. 19.

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which foreign policy is made reduces surprises. Opportunities for foreigners to raise their voices and influence the American political and governmental system are not only plentiful, but constitute an important incentive for alliance.[27] Ever since Athens transformed the Delian League into an empire, smaller allies have been torn between entrapment and anxieties over abandonment. The fact that American allies can effectively voice their concerns helps to explain why U.S. alliances have persisted so long after Cold War threats receded.

The other element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries is U.S. membership in a web of multilateral institutions ranging from the UN to NATO. Some call it an institutional bargain. The price for the United States was a reduction in Washington's policy autonomy, in that institutional rules and joint decision-making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities. But what Washington got in return was worth the price. America's partners also had their autonomy constrained, but were able to operate in a world in which U.S. power was more restrained and reliable.[28] Seen as a sort of a constitutional bargain, the multilateralism of American pre-eminence is a key to its longevity because it reduces the incentives for constructing alliances against us. And to the extent that the European Union is the major potential challenger in terms of capacity, the idea of a loose constitutional framework between the United States and the societies with which we share the most values makes even more sense.

The Seven Tests

OF COURSE, as we have suggested, not all multilateral arrangements are good or are in the U.S. national interest, and the United States should employ unilateral tactics in certain situations. A presumption in favor of multilateralism need not be a straightjacket. Almost everyone knows and understands this; as we have said, there are almost no pure unilateralists or multilateralists among us. But unless we have before us some general guidelines to determine when unilateralism makes sense and when it does not, we run the risk of oscillating unpredictably between one inclination and the other, moved this way and that by the vicissitudes of political fortune and the surprises of the world. Fortunately, it is possible to devise such guidelines. Here are seven tests to consider.

First, *we should not rule out unilateral action in cases that involve vital survival interests, though when possible we should seek international support for such action.* The starkest case in the last half century was the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. American leaders felt obliged to consider the unilateral use of force, but President Kennedy still sought the legitimacy of international opinion expressed in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The campaign against terrorists and those who harbor them is a current case in point: we will act unilaterally, but again, coalition support provides both help and added legitimacy.

Second, *we should be cautious about multilateral arrangements that interfere with our ability to produce stable peace in volatile areas.* Because of our global military role, the United States sometimes has interests and vulnerabilities that differ qualitatively from those of smaller states with more limited interests—as with, for example, the role of landmines in preventing North

[27]Robert O'Neill, "Working with the U.S.: An Allied Perspective", lecture, All Souls Foreign Policy Studies Program, May 10, 2001.

[28]Ikenberry, pp. 21–2.

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Korean tanks from crossing the demilitarized zone into South Korea. The multilateral treaty banning landmines was easy for other countries to sign because it had little or no practical significance for them—not so, obviously, in the U.S. case.

Similarly, given the global role of American military forces, if the procedures of the International Criminal Court (ICC) cannot be clarified to assure protection of American troops from unjustified charges of war crimes, they might deter the United States from contributing to the public good of peacekeeping. The ICC procedures currently proposed give primary jurisdiction over alleged war crimes by American servicemen to the United States, but there is still a danger of overzealous prosecutors egged on by hostile NGOs in instances where the United States finds no case. We should seek further assurances on such points, such as clarifying declarations by the UN Security Council. While the ICC has problems, helping to shape its procedures would be a better policy than abetting the current trends toward national claims of universal legal jurisdiction that are evolving in *ad hoc* fashion beyond our control.[29]

Third, *unilateral tactics sometimes help lead others to compromises that advance multilateral interests.* The multilateralism of free trade and the international gold standard in the 19th century were not achieved by multilateral means but by Britain's unilaterally opening its markets and maintaining the stability of its currency.[30] America's relative openness after 1945 and, more recently, trade legislation that threatened unilateral sanctions if others did not negotiate, helped create conditions that prodded other countries to move forward with the WTO dispute settlements mechanism. Sometimes the United States is big enough to set high standards and get away with it—witness our more stringent regulations for financial markets. Such actions can lead to a "race to the top" in creating higher international standards. The key, however, is that the unilateral action be designed to promote a global public good.

The Kyoto Protocol, which caused President Bush such trouble at the beginning of his presidency, could have been another case in point had it been handled differently. Many who accept the reality of global warming and support the Framework Convention on Climate Change (the "Rio Agreement" signed by the first President Bush and ratified by the Senate in 1992) believed that the Kyoto agreement was badly flawed because it did not include developing countries in its target for emission cuts and, according to *The Economist*, "could not be done except at ruinous cost, and perhaps not even then." A longer-term plan based on milder reductions at the start, followed by more demanding targets farther out, would provide time for capital stocks to adjust. It would also allow market-based instruments such as tradable permits to lower the costs of emissions reductions

[29]The problems stem not only from foreign courts, but from a new trend in lawsuits brought in U.S. courts to challenge human rights abuses around the world. American lawyers who boast about unilaterally exporting our conception of law—and who argue that "the post-Cold War paradigm is the United States as global attorney"—fail to reckon the costs of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction for the United States. See William Glaberson, "U.S. Courts Become Arbiters of Global Rights and Wrongs", *New York Times*, June 21, 2001; and Henry A. Kissinger, "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction", *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2001).

[30]John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 118. Britain's unilateral willingness to bear the costs (and benefits) encouraged free-riding. American actions have been conditioned on reciprocity.

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and to reduce the trade-off with economic growth (which would benefit a wide range of nations, including the poor).[31] If, instead of resisting the science and abruptly pronouncing the protocol dead on grounds of domestic interest, the Bush Administration had said "we will work on a domestic energy policy that cuts emissions and at the same time negotiate with you for a better treaty", his initial unilateralism would arguably have advanced multilateral interests.

Fourth, *the United States should reject multilateral initiatives that are recipes for inaction, that cater disproportionately to the self-interest of others, or that are contrary to our values.*[32] The "New International Information Order", proposed in the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in the 1970s, would have helped authoritarian governments restrict freedom of the press. Similarly, the "New International Economic Order" fostered by the General Assembly at the same time would have interfered with the public good of open markets. Sometimes multilateral procedures are deliberately obstructive; for example, Russia and China's efforts to prevent Security Council authorization of intervention to stop human rights violations in Kosovo in 1999. Ultimately the United States decided to go ahead without Security Council approval, but even then the American intervention was not purely unilateral, but was rather taken with the strong support of our NATO allies.

Fifth, *multilateralism is essential on intrinsically cooperative issues that cannot be managed by the United States without the help of other countries.* Climate change is a perfect example. Global warming will be costly to us, but it cannot be prevented by the United States alone cutting emissions of carbon dioxide, methane and particulates. The United States is the largest source of such warming agents, but three quarters of the sources originate outside our borders. Without cooperation, the problem is beyond our control. The same is true of a long list of items: the spread of infectious diseases, the stability of global financial markets, the international trading system, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, international crime syndicates, and transnational terrorism. All these problems have major effects on Americans, and their control ranks as an important national interest, but one that cannot be achieved except by multilateral means.

Sixth, *multilateralism should be sought as a means to get others to share the burden and buy into the idea of providing public goods.* Sharing helps foster a commitment to common values. Even militarily, the United States should usually intervene with others. Not only does this comport with the preferences of the American public, but it has practical implications. The United States pays a minority share of UN and NATO peacekeeping operations, and the legitimacy of a multilateral umbrella reduces collateral political costs.

Seventh, *in choosing between multilateral and unilateral tactics, we must consider the effects of the decision on our soft or attractive power.* If we continue to define U.S. power too heavily in military terms, we may neglect investments in other instruments. Soft power is becoming increasingly important in a global information age, but soft power is fragile, and can be destroyed by excessive unilateralism and arrogance. In balancing whether to use multilateral or unilateral tactics, or to adhere or refuse to

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[31]For a careful study of Kyoto's flaws, see David Victor, *The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also Robert N. Stavins, "Give Bush Time on Climate Issues", *Boston Globe*, April 4, 2001, and Bodansky, "Bonn Voyage."

[32]I am indebted to Robert Keohane for help on this point.

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go along with particular multilateral initiatives, we have to consider how we explain it to others and what the effects will be on our soft power.

IN SHORT, American foreign policy in a global information age should have a general preference for multilateralism, but not all multilateralism. At times, we will have to go it alone. When we do so in pursuit of public goods, the nature of our ends may substitute for the means in legitimizing our power in the eyes of others. As the editor of this magazine has put it, "Sometimes, as a matter of discrete policy choices, the United States will, and should, find itself isolated. . . . But auto-isolation as a tenet of strategy is harmful to American primacy at a time when, strange though it may sound, we cannot act selfishly without the cooperation of others."[33]

If, on the other hand, the "new unilateralists" succeed in elevating unilateralism from an occasional tactic to a full-fledged strategy, they are likely to fail for three reasons: the intrinsically multilateral nature of a number of important transnational issues in a global age; the costly effects on our soft power; and the changing nature of sovereignty. The September 11 attacks dramatically illustrated the importance of all three of these factors. How well the lessons will take remains to be seen. □

[33]Adam Garfinkle, "The Present Opportunity", *The National Interest* (Fall 2001), p.160.

Not Being There

I accept that the Bush team has a strong underlying argument about the ABM Treaty's obsolescent features—as it did on the Kyoto treaty, the germ warfare treaty and the Durban anti-racism conference's treatment of Israel. But in each of these cases and many others, the administration has worked itself into a position of having to choose between just saying no—of breaking diplomatic china and leaving it to others to pick up the pieces—and having to accept the obviously unacceptable. . . .

Whether by design or by failing to anticipate the cumulative impact of their actions, Bush and his foreign policy aides have created the theme of America the Absent in world affairs. They seem to ignore that old adage—the one that holds that those who are absent always lose the argument.

—Jim Hoagland, *Washington Post*, September 6, 2001

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God and Mammon

Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?

Daniel Pipes

THE EVENTS of September 11 have intensified a long-standing debate: What causes Muslims to turn to militant Islam? Some analysts have noted the poverty of Afghanistan and concluded that herein lay the problem. Jessica Stern of Harvard University wrote that the United States "can no longer afford to allow states to fail." If it does not devote a much higher priority to health, education and economic development abroad, she writes, "new Osamas will continue to arise."[1] Susan Sachs of the *New York Times* observes: "Predictably, the disappointed youth of Egypt and Saudi Arabia turn to religion for comfort." More colorfully, others have advocated bombarding Afghanistan with foodstuffs not *along with* but *instead of* explosives.

Behind these analyses lies an assumption that socioeconomic distress drives Muslims to extremism. The evidence, however, does not support this expectation. Militant Islam (or Islamism) is not a response to poverty or impoverishment; not only are Bangladesh and Iraq not hotbeds of militant Islam, but militant Islam has often surged in countries experiencing rapid economic growth. The factors that cause militant Islam to decline or flourish appear to have more to do with issues of identity than with economics.

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All Other Problems Vanish

THE conventional wisdom—that economic stress causes militant Islam and that economic growth is needed to blunt it—has many well-placed adherents. Even some Islamists themselves accept this connection. In the words of a fiery sheikh from Cairo, "Islam is the religion of bad times." A Hamas leader in Gaza, Mahmud az-Zahar, says, "It is enough to see the poverty-stricken outskirts of Algiers or the refugee camps in Gaza to understand the factors that nurture the strength of the Islamic Resistance Movement." In this spirit, militant Islamic organizations offer a wide range of welfare benefits in an effort to attract followers. They also promote what they call an "Islamic economy" as the "most gracious system of solidarity in a society. Under such a system, the honorable do not fall, the honest do not perish, the needy do not suffer, the handicapped do not despair, the sick do not die for lack of care, and people do not destroy one another."

[1]Specific citations for all quotations are available at www.danielpipes.org.

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Many secular Muslims also stress militant Islam's source in poverty as an article of faith. Süleyman Demirel, the former Turkish president, says, "As long as there is poverty, inequality, injustice, and repressive political systems, fundamentalist tendencies will grow in the world." Turkey's former prime minister, Tansu Çiller, finds that Islamists did so well in the 1994 elections because "People reacted to the economy." The chief of Jordanian Army Intelligence holds, "Economic develop ment may solve almost all of our problems [in the Middle East]." Including militant Islam, he was asked? Yes, he replied: "The moment a person is in a good economic position, has a job, and can support his family, all other problems vanish."

Leftists in the Middle East concur, interpreting the militant Islamic resurgence as "a sign of pessimism. Because people are desperate, they are resorting to the supernatural." Social scientists sign on as well: Hooshang Amirahmadi, an academic of Iranian origins, argues that "the roots of Islamic radicalism must be looked for outside the religion, in the real world of cultural despair, economic decline, political oppression, and spiritual turmoil in which most Muslims find themselves today." The academy, with its lingering Marxist disposition and disdain for faith, of course accepts this militant Islam-from-poverty thesis with near unanimity. Ervand Abrahamian holds that "the behavior of Khomeini and the Islamic Republic has been determined less by scriptural principles than by immediate political, social and economic needs." Ziad Abu-Amr, author of a book on militant Islam (and a member of the Palestine Legislative Council), ascribes a Palestinian turn toward religiosity to "the sombre climate of destruction, war, unemployment, and depression [which] cause people to seek solace, and they're going to Allah."

Western politicians also find the argument compelling. For former President Bill Clinton, "These forces of reaction feed on disillusionment, poverty and despair", and he advocates a socioeconomic remedy: "spread prosperity and security to all." Edward Djerejian, once a top State Department figure, reports that "political Islamic movements are to an important degree rooted in worsening socio-economic conditions in individual countries." Martin Indyk, another former high-ranking U.S. diplomat, warns that those wishing to reduce the appeal of militant Islam must first solve the economic, social and political problems that constitute its breeding grounds.

Militant Islam reflects "the economic, political, and cultural disappointment" of Muslims, according to former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Former Interior Minister Charles Pasqua of France finds that this phenomenon "has coincided with despair on the part of a large section of the masses, and young people in particular." Prime Minister Eddie Fenech of Malta draws an even closer tie: "Fundamentalism grows at the same pace as economic problems." Israel's Foreign Minister Shimon Peres flatly asserts that "fundamentalism's basis is poverty" and that it offers "a way of protesting against poverty, corruption, ignorance, and discrimination."

Armed with this theory of cause and effect, businessmen on occasion make investments with an eye to political amelioration. The Virgin Group's chairman, Richard Branson, declared as he opened a music store in Beirut: "The region will become stable if people invest in it, create jobs and rebuild the countries that need rebuilding, not ignore them."

Somewhere Near the Stratosphere

BUT THE empirical record evinces little correlation between economics and militant Islam. Aggregate measures of wealth and eco-

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nomic trends fall flat as predictors of where militant Islam will be strong and where not. On the level of individuals, too, conventional wisdom points to militant Islam attracting the poor, the alienated and the marginal—but research finds precisely the opposite to be true. To the extent that economic factors explain who becomes Islamist, they point to the fairly well off, not the poor.

Take Egypt as a test case. In a 1980 study, the Egyptian social scientist Saad Eddin Ibrahim interviewed Islamists in Egyptian jails and found that the typical member is "young (early twenties), of rural or small-town background, from the middle or lower middle class, with high achievement and motivation, upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, and from a normally cohesive family." In other words, Ibrahim concluded, these young men were "significantly above the average in their generation"; they were "ideal or model young Egyptians." In a subsequent study, he found that out of 34 members of the violent group *At-Takfir w'al-Hijra*, fully 21 had fathers in the civil service, nearly all of them middle-ranking. More recently, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service found that the leadership of the militant Islamic group Al-Jihad "is largely university educated with middle-class backgrounds." These are not the children of poverty or despair.

Other researchers confirm these findings for Egypt. In a study on the country's economic troubles, Galal A. Amin, an economist at the American University in Cairo, concludes by noting "how rare it is to find examples of religious fanaticism among either the higher or the very lowest social strata of the Egyptian population." When her assistant in Cairo turned Islamist, the American journalist Geraldine Brooks tells of her surprise: "I'd assumed that the turn to Islam was the desperate choice of poor people searching for heavenly solace. But Sahar [the assistant] was neither desperate nor poor. She belonged somewhere near the stratosphere of Egypt's meticulously tiered society." And note this account by the talented journalist Hamza Hendawi: In Egypt,

> a new breed of preachers in business suits and with cellular phones are attracting increasing numbers of the rich and powerful away from Western lifestyles and into religious conservatism. The modern imams hold their seminars over banquets in some of Cairo's most luxurious homes and in Egypt's seaside resorts to appeal to the wealthy's sense of style and comfort.

What is true of Egypt holds equally true elsewhere: Like fascism and Marxism-Leninism in their heydays, militant Islam attracts highly competent, motivated and ambitious individuals. Far from being the laggards of society, they are its leaders. Brooks, a much-traveled journalist, found Islamists to be "the most gifted" of the youth she encountered. Those "hearing the Islamic call included the students with the most options, not just the desperate cases. . . . They were the elites of the next decade: the people who would shape their nations' future."

Even Islamists who make the ultimate sacrifice and give up their lives fit this pattern of financial ease and advanced education. A disproportionate number of terrorists and suicide bombers have higher education, often in engineering and the sciences. This generalization applies equally to the Palestinian suicide bombers attacking Israel and the followers of Osama bin Laden who hijacked the four planes of September 11. In the first case, one researcher found by looking at their profiles that: "Economic circumstances did not seem to be a decisive factor. While none of the 16 subjects could be described as well-off, some were cer-

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tainly struggling less than others." In the second case, as the Princeton historian Sean Wilentz sardonically put it, the biographies of the September 11 killers would imply that the root cause of terrorism is "money, education and privilege." More generally, Fathi ash-Shiqaqi, founding leader of the arch-murderous Islamic Jihad, once commented, "Some of the young people who have sacrificed themselves [in terrorist operations] came from well-off families and had successful university careers." This makes sense, for suicide bombers who hurl themselves against foreign enemies offer their lives not to protest financial deprivation but to change the world.

Those who back militant Islamic organizations also tend to be well off. They come more often from the richer city than the poorer countryside, a fact that, as Khalid M. Amayreh, a Palestinian journalist, points out, "refutes the widely-held assumption that Islamist popularity thrives on economic misery." And they come not just from the cities but from the upper ranks. At times, an astonishing one-quarter of the membership in Turkey's leading militant Islamic organization, now called the Saadet Party, have been engineers. Indeed, the typical cadre in a militant Islamic party is an engineer in his forties born in a city to parents who had moved from the countryside. Amayreh finds that in the Jordanian parliamentary elections of 1994, the Muslim Brethren did as well in middle-class districts as in poor ones. He generalizes from this that "a substantial majority of Islamists and their supporters come from the middle and upper socio-economic strata."

Martin Kramer, editor of the *Middle East Quarterly*, goes further and sees militant Islam as

> the vehicle of counter-elites, people who, by virtue of education and/or income, are potential members of the elite, but who for some reason or another get excluded. Their education may lack some crucial prestige-conferring element; the sources of their wealth may be a bit tainted. Or they may just come from the wrong background. So while they are educated and wealthy, they have a grievance: their ambition is blocked, they cannot translate their socio-economic assets into political clout. Islamism is particularly useful to these people, in part because by its careful manipulation, it is possible to recruit a following among the poor, who make valuable foot-soldiers.

Kramer cites the so-called Anatolian Tigers, businessmen who have had a critical role in backing Turkey's militant Islamic party, as an example of this counter-elite in its purest form.

Not a Product of Poverty

THE SAME pattern that holds for individual Islamists exists on the level of societies, as well. That social pattern can be expressed by four propositions.

First, wealth does not inoculate against militant Islam. Kuwaitis enjoy a Western-style income (and owe their state's very existence to the West) but Islamists generally win the largest bloc of seats in parliament (at present, twenty out of fifty). The West Bank is more prosperous than Gaza, yet militant Islamic groups usually enjoy more popularity in the former than the latter. Militant Islam flourishes in the member states of the European Union and in North America, where Muslims as a group enjoy a standard of living *higher* than the national averages. And of those Muslims, as Khalid Durán points out, Islamists have the generally higher incomes: "In the United States, the difference between Islamists and common Muslims is largely one between haves and have-nots. Muslims have the numbers; Islamists have the dollars."

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Second, a flourishing economy does not inoculate against radical Islam. Today's militant Islamic movements took off in the 1970s, precisely as oil-exporting states enjoyed extraordinary growth rates. Muammar Qaddafi developed his eccentric version of proto-militant Islam then; fanatical groups in Saudi Arabia violently seized the Great Mosque of Mecca; and Ayatollah Khomeini took power in Iran (though, admittedly, growth had slacked off several years before he overthrew the Shah). In the 1980s, several countries that excelled economically experienced a militant Islamic boom. Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco all did well economically in the 1990s—as did their militant Islamic movements. Turks under Turgut Özal enjoyed nearly a decade of particularly impressive economic growth even as they joined militant Islamic parties in ever larger numbers.

Third, poverty does not generate militant Islam. There are many very poor Muslim states but few of them have become centers of militant Islam—not Bangladesh, not Yemen, and not Niger. As an American specialist rightly notes, "economic despair, the oft-cited source of political Islam's power, is familiar to the Middle East"; if militant Islam is connected to poverty, why was it not a stronger force in years and centuries past, when the region was poorer than it is today?

Fourth, a declining economy does not generate militant Islam. The 1997 crash in Indonesia and Malaysia did not spur a large turn toward militant Islam. Iranian incomes have gone down by half or more since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979; yet, far from increasing support for the regime's militant Islamic ideology, impoverishment has caused a massive alienation from Islam. Iraqis have experienced an even more precipitous drop in living standards: Abbas Alnasrawi estimates that per capita income has plummeted by nearly 90 percent since 1980, returning it to where it was in the 1940s. While the country has witnessed an increase in personal piety, militant Islam has not surged, nor is it the leading expression of anti-regime sentiments.

Noting these patterns, at least a few observers have drawn the correct conclusion. The outspoken Algerian secularist, Saïd Sadi, flatly rejects the thesis that poverty spurs militant Islam: "I do not adhere to this view that it is widespread unemployment and poverty which produce terrorism." Likewise, Amayreh finds that militant Islam "is not a product or by-product of poverty."

Providing a Decent Living

IF POVERTY causes militant Islam, broad-based economic growth is the solution. And indeed, in countries as varied as Egypt and Germany, officials argue for a focus on building prosperity and fostering job formation to combat militant Islam. At the height of the crisis in Algeria during the mid-1990s, when the government pled for Western economic aid, it implicitly threatened that without this aid, the Islamists would prevail. This interpretation has practical results: for example, the government in Tunisia has taken some steps toward a free market but has not privatized for fear that the swollen ranks of the unemployed would provide fodder for militant Islamic groups. The same goes for Iran, where Europe and Japan mold policies premised on the notion that their economic ties to the Islamic Republic tame it and discourage military adventurism.

This emphasis on jobs and wealth creation also transformed efforts to end the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Oslo era. Prior to 1993, Israelis had insisted that a resolution would require Arabs to recognize that the Jewish state is a permanent fact of life. Achieving that was

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thought to lie in winning acceptance of the Jewish state and finding mutually acceptable borders. Then, post-1993, came a major shift: increasing Arab prosperity became the goal, hoping that this would diminish the appeal of militant Islam and other radical ideologies. A jump start for the economy was expected to give Palestinians a stake in the peace process, thereby reducing the appeal of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In this context, Serge Schmemann of the *New York Times* wrote (without providing evidence) that Arafat "knows that eradicating militancy will ultimately depend more on providing a decent living than on using force."

The Israeli analyst Meron Benvenisti agreed: Islam's "militant character derived from its being an expression of the deep frustration of the underprivileged. . . . Hamas's rise was directly linked to the worsening economic situation and to the accumulated frustration and degradation of the ongoing occupation." Shimon Peres weighed in as well: "Islamic terror cannot be fought militarily but by eradicating the hunger which spawns it." Guided by this theory, the Western states and Israel contributed billions of dollars to the Palestinian Authority. Even more remarkably, the Israeli government fought against efforts by pro-Israel activists in the United States to make U.S. aid to the PLO contingent on Arafat's fulfilling his formal written promises to Israel.

At this late date, one hardly needs to point out the falsehood of Oslo's assumptions. Wealth does not resolve hatreds; a prosperous enemy may simply be one more capable of making war. Westerners and Israelis assumed that Palestinians would make broad economic growth their priority, whereas this has been a minor concern. What has counted instead are questions of identity and power, but so strong is the belief in the militant Islam-from-poverty thesis that Oslo's failure has not managed to discredit the faith in the political benefits of prosperity. Thus, in August 2001, a senior Israeli officer endorsed the building of a power station in northern Gaza on the grounds that it would supply jobs, "and every [Palestinian] working is one less pair of hands for Hamas."

A Different Argument

IF POVERTY is not the driving force behind militant Islam, several policy implications follow. First, prosperity cannot be looked to as the solution to militant Islam and foreign aid cannot serve as the outside world's main tool to combat it. Second, Westernization also does not a provide a solution. To the contrary, many outstanding militant Islamic leaders are not just familiar with Western ways but are expert in them. In particular, a disproportionate number of them have advanced degrees in technology and the sciences. It sometimes seems that Westernization is a route to hating the West. Third, economic growth does not inevitably lead to improved relations with Muslim states. In some cases (for example, Algeria), it might help; in others (Saudi Arabia), it might hurt.

Could it be, quite contrarily, that militant Islam results from wealth rather than poverty? It is possible. There is, after all, the universal phenomenon that people become more engaged ideologically and active politically only when they have reached a fairly high standard of living. Revolutions take place, it has often been noted, only when a substantial middle class exists. Birthe Hansen, an associate professor at the University of Copenhagen, hints at this when she writes that "the spread of free market capitalism and liberal democracy . . . is probably an important factor behind the rise of political Islam."

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Moreover, there is a specifically Islamic phenomenon of the faith having been associated with worldly success. Through history, from the Prophet Muhammad's time to the Ottoman Empire a millennium later, Muslims usually had more wealth and more power than other peoples, and were more literate and healthy. With time, Islamic faith came to be associated with worldly well-being—a kind of Muslim Calvinism, in effect. This connection appears still to hold. For example, as noted in the formulation known as Issawi's law ("Where there are Muslims, there is oil; the converse is not true"), the 1970s oil boom mainly benefited Muslims; it is probably no coincidence that the current wave of militant Islam began then. Seeing themselves as "pioneers of a movement that is an alternative to Western civilization", Islamists need a strong economic base. As Galal Amin writes, "There may be a strong relationship between the growth of incomes that have the nature of economic rent and the growth of religious fanaticism."

Conversely, poor Muslims have tended to be more impressed by alternative affiliations. Over the centuries, for example, apostasy from the religion has mostly occurred when things have gone badly. That was the case when Tatars fell under Russian rule or when Sunni Lebanese lost power to the Maronites. It was also the case in 1995 in Iraqi Kurdistan, a region under double embargo and suffering from civil war:

> Trying to live their lives in the midst of fire and gunpowder, Kurdish villagers have reached the point where they are prepared to give up anything to save themselves from hunger and death. From their perspective, changing their religion to get a visa to the West is becoming an increasingly more important option.

There are, in short, ample reasons for thinking that militant Islam results more from success than from failure.

The Elevator to Power

THAT BEING the likely case, it is probably more fruitful to look less to economics and more to other factors when seeking the sources of militant Islam. While material reasons deeply appeal to Western sensibilities, they offer little guidance in this case. In general, Westerners attribute too many of the Arab world's problems, observes David Wurmser of the American Enterprise Institute, "to specific material issues" such as land and wealth. This usually means a tendency "to belittle belief and strict adherence to principle as genuine and dismiss it as a cynical exploitation of the masses by politicians. As such, Western observers see material issues and leaders, not the spiritual state of the Arab world, as the heart of the problem." Or, in Osama bin Laden's ugly formulation, "Because America worships money, it believes that [other] people think that way too."

Indeed, if one turns away from the commentators on militant Islam and instead listens to the Islamists themselves, it quickly becomes apparent that they rarely talk about prosperity. As Ayatollah Khomeini memorably put it, "We did not create a revolution to lower the price of melon." If anything, they look at the consumer societies of the West with distaste. Wajdi Ghunayim, an Egyptian Islamist, sees it as "the reign of *décolleté* and *moda* [fashion]" whose common denominator is an appeal to the bestial instincts of human nature. Economic assets for Islamists represent not the good life but added strength to do battle against the West. Money serves to train cadres and buy weapons, not to buy a bigger house or a late-model car. Wealth is a means, not an end.

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Means toward what? Toward power. Islamists care less about material strength than about where they stand in the world. They talk incessantly of this. In a typical statement, 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the leading Iranian hard-liner, predicts that "ultimately Islam will become the supreme power." Similarly, Mustafa Mashhur, an Egyptian Islamist, declares that the slogan "God is Great" will reverberate "until Islam spreads throughout the world." Abdessalam Yassine, a Moroccan Islamist, asserts "We demand power"—and the man standing in his way, the late King Hassan, concluded that for Islamists, Islam is "the elevator to take power." He was right. By reducing the economic dimension to its proper proportions, and appreciating the religious, cultural and political dimensions, we may actually begin to understand what causes militant Islam. □

It's the Clash, Not the Cash

It is quite astonishing how little we have understood, or empathised with, the huge crisis that has faced that vast and populous section of the world stretching from the Mahgreb through the Middle East and Central Asia into South and South-East Asia and beyond to the Philippines: overpopulated, underdeveloped, being dragged headlong by the West into the post-modern age before they have come to terms with modernity. This is not a problem of poverty as against wealth, and I am afraid that it is symptomatic of our Western materialism to suppose that it is. It is the far more profound and intractable confrontation between a theistic, land-based and traditional culture, in places little different from the Europe of the Middle Ages, and the secular material values of the Enlightenment.

—Sir Michael Howard,
speech to the Royal United Services Institute,
October 30, 2001

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The Risks of Victory

An Historian's Provocation

Paul W. Schroeder

IF IT is true, as so many pundits rushed to tell us after the events of September 11, 2001, that everything is different, all is changed, and nothing will ever again be the same, then it follows that the study of history is unlikely to provide any guidance as we navigate our suddenly more uncertain future. But, of course, it is not true. The essential structure of contemporary international politics has not changed, and neither has human nature. That said, there are more and less intelligent ways to engage historical knowledge in service to the present.

The historical analogy most commonly heard after September 11—between the attacks of that sad day and the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor—is worse than useless. It is not just superficial but misleading. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise first blow in what the Japanese government knew would be a conventional war about power and territory. It was informed not at all by the strategy of terrorism, a strategy in which the weak attempt to goad their target into counterproductive reaction. The only thing that the attack on Pearl Harbor and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have in common is that both were directed against the United States.

There is another historical analogy, however, of far greater utility—as long as in using it we know the history cited well and, even more important, that we value differences as well as similarities between past and present circumstances. After all, knowledge of history can never tell us exactly what to think or do in a given situation—it only offers a richer reservoir of possibilities to think about. That more useful analogy is to the events of June-July 1914, the beginning of the Great War.

Three lessons emerge from reasoning by historical analogy from the early summer of 1914 to the late summer of 2001. The first is that a great power must avoid giving terrorists the war they want, but that the great power does not want. The second is that a great power must reckon the effects of its actions not only on its immediate circumstances, but with regard to the larger structure of international politics in which it clearly has a significant stake. The third is that a great power must beware the risks of victory as well as the dangers of defeat. If it is not careful and wise, the United States could find itself enmeshed even deeper in the Middle East and Southwest Asia than it is today, and risk generating greater prospective dangers in the process of containing smaller near-term ones.

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After sketching the logic of the analogy between July 1914 and September 2001, I will pass lightly over the first two of these lessons but dwell more on the third. Let me say only before pressing on that the analysis presented here is (by temperament, not ideological formulae) a conservative one, and yet it is most likely to challenge—and perhaps even to annoy—those who think of themselves as conservatives. That this is so may bear another kind of lesson for us to ponder.

The Analogy

THE EASIEST way to present the analogy between what happened in June-July 1914 to the events of September 11, 2001 is simply to describe what happened roughly 88 years ago in language germane to what happened about three months ago.

The 1914 crisis and war resulted directly and immediately from a terrorist action: the assassination in Sarajevo, Bosnia (then part of Austria-Hungary) of the heir-apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by a group of terrorists—mostly Bosnian students—led by Gavrilo Princip.[1] A widespread network of organizations, agencies and governments was connected directly or indirectly to this conspiracy. In varying degrees of involvement and complicity, these included: secret revolutionary organizations both within the Habsburg Monarchy and in Serbia; the Serbian military intelligence apparatus led by Col. Dragutin Dimitrijevic, which trained, supported, and armed these terrorists; the Serbian government headed by Nikola Pasic, who knew something about all this but chose to remain officially ignorant; the nationalist organization in Serbia promoting pan-Serbism and its goal of Greater Serbia, now aimed principally at the destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy and at the Serbian annexation of large tracts of its territories; the Serbian press, parliament, and political public that supported this radical ideology; and the Russian government, which supported Serbia as part of a policy of isolating and paralyzing Austria-Hungary, and whose minister to Serbia actively encouraged anti-Austrian irredentism and subversive-revolutionary activity until his death just before the assassination.

The Austro-Hungarian government knew a good deal about this, though not all the details. It considered the assassination the final outrage in a series of Serbian provocations and attacks directed against the monarchy; believed that the heart of the conspiracy lay in Belgrade; was convinced by experience that combating Serbian state-sponsored terrorism and subversion by means other than military force would prove useless because the Serbian government never kept its promises; and therefore concluded that Austria-Hungary's existence as a great power required a direct attack that would, as the phrase went, eliminate Serbia as a political factor in the Balkans.

Yet one cannot simply link the whole terrorist-subversive conspiracy directly to Austria's action and thus to the war. For though several organizations and individuals were complicit to some degree in this terrorist act, the only ones directly responsible for deciding on it and carrying it out were Gavrilo Princip and his small group

[1]If one objects that assassinating a single political leader and potential head of state is not the same as killing thousands of civilians, the answer is that the goal of both terrorist actions was the same: to sow confusion and division within the enemy state and bring it down. Assassination of monarchs and other leaders was the chief method of terrorists in the 19th century and the blow this assassination struck to the existence of the Habsburg Monarchy was much greater than the blow struck against the United States on September 11.

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of co-terrorists. None of the others ordered it, knew precisely about it, or wanted it to happen. Indeed, though others complicit in the act also hated the Habsburg Monarchy, they opposed making war against it at that particular time. Many anticipated the monarchy's downfall with approval, but a gradual downfall caused by internal dissolution was what most had in mind and were working to promote. Some argued and hoped that such a process would not promote an international war but help prevent one. Princip and his fellow conspirators, however, consciously intended to promote an international war through their deed. Princip said during his wartime imprisonment that he had wanted a war because if Serbia won, then Greater Serbia would be achieved; and if it lost, then Austria-Hungary would annex the Kingdom of Serbia—in which case all the Serbs would be united, even though under hated foreign rule. Princip's act was therefore directed also against his own fellow revolutionaries and sympathizers; it was intended to force them to do what they were as yet unwilling to do—follow the ideology of pan-Serbism and the slogan of "Union or Death"—to its logical, mad conclusion.

Finally, the crowning irony in this ghastly scenario is this: though Princip deliberately tried to start a great war, his terrorist action, which succeeded only by luck, could not in itself produce that war. Only Austria-Hungary could do that by its response, and it did. Yet of all the participants great and small in the 1914 crisis, none more deeply and genuinely feared a great war than the government of Austria-Hungary, or had better reasons to do so. Time and again previously (1904–05, 1908–09, 1912–13) it had considered the war option and rejected it, even when the chances for military victory looked good. One can show that in July 1914, too, though it undoubtedly wanted and aimed for a local war against Serbia, its larger aim was general peace. Its forlorn hope was that Russia would accept a punishment of Serbia for the sake of ending the terrorist-revolutionary threat to all thrones, including Russia's, and that then Austria and Russia could settle their other differences (above all the Ruthenian question) and restore both good relations and the old *Dreikaiserbund* (the "Three Emperors' League") as well.

In other words, the terrorists whose action triggered the great war wanted a war but could not start it by themselves; those who helped them prepare the action did not want the war but were to varying degrees dragged into it; and the terrorists' worst enemy, which had the greatest reasons to avoid war, supplied the war the terrorists wanted.

Anyone can see the parallels suggested here, however imperfect they may be. Bin Laden is Princip, and the countries that abet Al-Qaeda's terrorism compose the conspiracy. Only bin Laden and his chief lieutenants plotted and knew about the attacks of September 11 in advance, not the Taliban leadership or the leadership of any other state or sympathetic Muslim group, particularly Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Only bin Laden wanted to touch off a war involving the United States; other fundamentalist groups, the Taliban, the Iraqi, Iranian, Syrian, Sudanese and Libyan governments surely did not. The U.S. government knew plenty about bin Laden and the network of state support for his activities; it had been attacked by bin Laden before, the World Trade Center had been a target, it knew of the existence of Al-Qaeda cells in the United States, and airline hijackings have long been part of the terrorist repertoire—and yet it did little to prevent the terrorist act, which led it in turn to fight a war that it would otherwise not have sought.

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But if the analogy is easy to follow, at least in its broad stripes, anyone can also see that it is nonsense to imply that the two situations are exactly alike and that the present one could lead to World War III. 1914 and 2001 are entirely different. Austria-Hungary was weak, almost isolated, surrounded by enemies and opponents, internally divided, and therefore prone to commit a suicidal blunder. Europe was then a tinderbox, locked in hostile alliances and bitter rivalries and caught in a spiraling arms race. The United States today is extremely powerful, surrounded by allies and friends, internally united, and in an ideal position to take strong rational action in its own and the world's long-range interests. The world is relatively calm, with no hostile alliances or serious great power crises and enmities. Almost every other important government agrees with the American stand against terrorism and wants to support it. They recognize that international terrorism menaces all decent states and societies, and that the current sophisticated, far-flung, fanatical variety is to the crude, primitive organizations and actions of 1914 what atomic warfare is to tribal banditry. Thus, any notion that the United States might provoke another world conflict by declaring war on terrorism—or rather, by recognizing a war that certain terrorists have declared on it and others—is silly.

Do Not Help Your Enemy

BUT THAT is not the point. The point is, if one grants the analogy for the sake of widening our intellectual framework, that there is much to learn about our choice of tactics. Some reflection on this analogy may enable us to see what has happened and what we have done and are doing in response to it in a different light.

So then grant, for argument's sake, that Al-Qaeda planned and organized the September 11 attack independently of the wishes and control of the organizations, movements, and governments, including the Taliban and the ISI, which were in some ways complicit with them, and that this terrorist action was intended among other things to drag them into bin Laden's fanatical campaign. Grant that he wanted a war against the United States while they did not, and also that the actions he took, terrible though they were, could not by themselves achieve his goal of war with the United States, because his organization not only could not declare war as a regular state could, but at first dared not even openly acknowledge the deed. Grant then that he could thus only hope to gain his goal of a great war between the United States and the Muslim world, overthrowing in the process those corrupt governments that supposedly had betrayed Islam by collaborating with the West, if the U.S. government helped by declaring war on him and his cause in response. Grant finally, in the spirit of "know thine enemy", a certain consistency and rationale to this line of reasoning and course of action.

Could this not suggest some questions about the tactics, if not the basic strategy, of the American government's response to this attack from the first moment? That response was to declare immediately that these acts of terrorism were acts of war against the United States, and to answer with a public, solemn, dramatic declaration of war on terrorism, a mobilization for it, a commitment to total victory as the only thinkable outcome, and the demand for total support for this "crusade" (a remarkable, if subsequently retracted, choice of words by President Bush) from every ally, friend, neutral, and even opponent, at the risk of facing the "full wrath" of the United States (Vice President Cheney's phrase) if they declined.

Now, granted that the terrorist action

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was unquestionably an attack upon the United States as a nation, rather than merely on certain individuals or particular authorities; granted that the deed and its perpetrators deserve the execration universally heaped on them; granted that the American government, for fully understandable and justifiable reasons of domestic politics, international policy and normal human sensibilities, had to respond quickly and strongly to the attack; granted that any appropriate response had to include the use of military force. Yet even granting all this, one should also recognize that this response, even if forced upon us by circumstances, may have given the terrorists just what they wanted but could not achieve on their own: an international stature as a formidable enemy of the United States and the Western world that their actual deeds and power do not deserve, and the open wider war they want. If, as seems clear, they are fanatical ideologues and criminals but not fools or madmen in any clinical sense, and show a high degree of purposive rationality in pursuit of their goal, the safest assumption is that they anticipated and desired this reaction from the United States. Their willingness to make martyrs of themselves for their cause should tell us that they also are ready to make unwilling martyrs of many thousands of their fellow believers and countrymen as well by getting the United States and its allies to come after them with military force. This is a standard tactic for terrorist and guerrilla fighters—provoke an enemy into bloody reprisals so as to destroy the vital center and force everyone to choose between them and the national or religious enemy. It was Gavrilo Princip's calculation, and he was far less clever than these terrorists.

The first reflection to be gained from this parallel and from general historical experience is this: "Try not to give your worst enemies what they want but cannot achieve without your help; or, if you cannot help doing so, at least be aware of the danger and try to limit it." In retrospect, it might have been wiser to treat the attack from the outset as a horrible criminal action (which it also was) that had to be answered by a major international police action against the criminals (which the current operation also is), but without declaring war on terrorism and thereby giving an inflated importance to both the threat and the perpetrators. Many countries have had to combat long-term terrorist threats and campaigns more dangerous to their security than this one is to ours without declaring a general war on terrorism as a phenomenon and on all terrorists in general. This latter, more limited tactic may work better, in any case, on behalf of the goal of separating terrorists from whatever base they may enjoy among the general populace.

To be sure, as the first wave of shock and anger has subsided, so has—somewhat at least—the "all-out war for a total victory over international terrorism" rhetoric. The administration now seems clearly aware of this danger and is working to narrow the target of its operations to specific terrorist organizations, or at least to put its targets in a sober sequential order for a methodical and protracted campaign. Its consistent effort not to make the conflict a war against Islam or against the Arab world is also very commendable, but given the nature of Middle Eastern cultures it may also be futile. In any event, the big questions are, can this narrower and more patient strategy be effectively pursued without expanding inadvertently into a wider war and, even if it can, will the American public understand and accept the limits this must place on both the kinds of operations undertaken and the kind of victory possible? Not everyone will agree with this point of view, but few among us will argue that it is not worth thinking about.

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Mind the Structural Impact

A QUESTION that has long puzzled historians is why the Austro-Hungarian government in 1914 made the apparently irrational choice it did (as is often said) of committing suicide out of fear of death, trying to survive by risking a war almost certain to kill it. The answer is simple: the monarchy did not commit suicide out of fear of death but out of fear of the hangman.

Throughout its long existence as a great power the Habsburg Monarchy had never been strong and secure enough to meet the many threats confronting it on its own. It had always relied on the support of allies and, increasingly in the 19th century, on the international system. That system was composed of the rules, practices, institutions and procedures developed over centuries and culminating in the great power Concert of Europe, and the Habsburg Monarchy used it to help protect its interests and to manage the crises and threats it faced through joint international legal, diplomatic, and military-political measures short of war. By 1914, however, and before the assassination at Sarajevo, Austria-Hungary's leaders had concluded that for purposes of protecting the monarchy's vital interests and existence as a great power, this system was worse than useless—that it was no longer part of the solution but part of the problem. No matter what the monarchy did, the system and its procedures were being used effectively by its many opponents to paralyze and isolate it until it succumbed—so, anyway, the Habsburg elite believed. Hence Austria-Hungary's only option, with the support of its ally Germany, was to break with this system and to act decisively and unilaterally in order to restore its great power position and independence, even at the high risk of a general war. Its hope was that after the monarchy had proved its ability to act decisively, and had regained the respect of Europe, the old system might be restored. This analysis of its situation was, in my view, essentially correct, though it does not necessarily justify the policy Vienna chose in reaction to it.

Obviously, America's situation at the beginning of the terrorist crisis was vastly different in almost every respect. The United States entered the month of September 2001 as easily the most powerful country in the world, united, enjoying unmatched prestige, boasting a vast array of allies and friends, and facing no major threat either internationally or internally except (putatively) that of terrorism—in every way the reverse of Austria-Hungary's position. Nevertheless, in one vital aspect the American government's response to the September 11 attack was like the Austro-Hungarian government's response to Sarajevo—a decision for war that ran against the grain of the expected rules and procedures of the international system.

Austria-Hungary chose war out of despair and the exhaustion of alternatives, convinced that there was nothing else to do because the existing international system was broken, offering it no good alternatives. The United States at the outset chose war out of confidence, but knowing at the same time that trying to handle the crisis through the existing international system in the normal ways (the UN, NATO, other allies, and normal international pressure and coercive diplomacy such as has been applied in the Balkans) might defuse the crisis without solving the real problem. It might, for example, make the Taliban regime expel Osama bin Laden and close some terrorist bases, which, while preserving the general peace, would only alleviate terrorism temporarily without getting at its deeper and wider roots. This would not satisfy the U.S. government or the

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enraged American public, and would waste an opportunity for a more radical solution to the terrorist problem along American lines. Thus, for different reasons, Austria-Hungary and the United States both saw the business-as-usual parameters of the international system as a hindrance.

Now, many observers would defend U.S. policy precisely on these grounds. But the point to be understood here is that the American choice of war as a first resort does collide with the rules of the reigning international system, which calls for meeting international threats and crises—including those involving revolutionary, subversive, or terrorist attacks by the subjects or citizens of one country on another—not by the old *lex talionis* but through international action. That action, which can include legal, moral, diplomatic, political, and, where necessary, military pressure, is supposed to prevent a crisis from escalating into war and, wherever possible, to bring about a solution acceptable to all parties with legitimate stakes in the dispute.

This is not just a practice developed since the end of the Cold War or since 1945, but a further evolution of practices and rules developed over centuries and already normative in the 19th century. A recent book by German scholars, for example, shows that 33 instances in which great power conflicts loomed in Europe between 1862 and 1914 were de-escalated and controlled by these means, most often under the aegis of the European Concert.[2] Austria-Hungary's action in 1914, though understandable given its perceptions, unquestionably broke with this tradition.

In our present case, the immediate declaration of war on terrorism may have been more a matter of imprudent rhetoric in the heat of the moment than a carefully calculated decision, and the remarkably successful efforts to build an international coalition in support of American action may constitute in effect an American return to the normal rules. Even the administration's insistence upon reserving its right to act unilaterally does not disprove this interpretation, for that could also be a normal bargaining ploy to recruit allies and keep them up to the mark. (By the same token, the apparently spontaneous rallying to the American cause by so many countries may be in part a normal device to control American action so as to prevent the United States from running amok.) But two points, both easily supported by much history, stand out and need to be taken seriously.

The lesser of these points concerns the integrity of the coalition we are building, which to some degree reflects the integrity and utility of the international system itself. The real struggle going on within the administration and in the press between hawks and moderates is whether the United States—assuming that it succeeds with the help of the international coalition in achieving its more immediate goals of ousting the Taliban regime and destroying the Al-Qaeda network—will go beyond these goals, which are widely supported and agreed on by our allies and associates. Clearly, pursuing the punishment or overthrow of other governments such as Iraq, Syria and Iran in order to get at the supposed roots of international terrorism is a course that even close allies and friends have indicated they would not support, and which may be depended upon to break up the coalition.

Second and of more direct importance, whichever course the United States follows will affect not just the future of the terrorist threat or American leadership and prestige in the world, but also

[2]Jost Dülffer *et al.*, *Vermiedene Kriege: Deeskalation von Konflikten unter der Grossmächte zwischen Krimkriege und Erstem Weltkrieg (1865–1914)* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1997).

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the future of the international system. Success in a minimalist campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, even had it required a considerably greater use of military force, would still have strengthened the existing international system, giving it added prestige and a new vital function. Even an indecisive outcome or relative failure would not necessarily have hurt it. On the other hand, even a successful campaign of the maximalist type directed against other supposed terrorist-supporting states could do major damage to the international system by turning it back to unilateralism and the use of preemptive force. A failed campaign would discredit both the United States and the system with it.

Admittedly, it is hard for many people, particularly realists, to get excited over the fate of so abstract and nebulous a thing as the international system, especially under the impact of dramatic events such as those of September 11. And it is true that no international system is foolproof or adequate to meet every challenge; obviously the international system prevented neither World War I nor II. But the present international system is no more abstract, really, than the physical environment or the rules and practices that constitute our civil society, and in its way no less necessary for purposes of international peace and stability. If the comparison between 1914 and 2001 makes us think more deeply about the long-range impact of what we do on the international system and its rules, then so much the better.

Getting What You Wish For

THERE IS one final way in which the 1914/2001 comparison can help us think about the September events. Put colloquially, it is this: "Look for some key element or elements in the whole situation that those involved in the discussion and decisions are *not* thinking or talking about, either because they are genuinely unaware of them or because they choose to ignore them."

In 1914 that ignored element can be identified precisely. European international politics in the decade before 1914 concentrated intensively on a number of interlocking questions—how to avoid a war if possible, but prepare to fight it victoriously if it came; how to shore up the various alliances; how to protect one's own state interests and prestige; how to capitalize on opportunities for gains and relative advantage; and finally, especially in the Balkans, how to prevent local conflicts and wars from erupting into a great power war that would almost certainly become general. These questions were important, but two even more important questions were never seriously discussed, much less taken up and treated—though everyone knew about them. They were, first, how to manage or solve the Austro-Serbian conflict and, second, what to do about the decline and (many thought) the impending collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This sounds incredible, I know. From 1908 and the Bosnian Crisis through the Balkan Wars to the outbreak of war in 1914, the Balkans were for most of the time the center and obvious flashpoint of European politics, and Austro-Serbian relations and the general problem of Austria's putative weakness and instability were obviously key elements in them. Yet the statement is nonetheless true. All the Concert diplomacy of that era focused not on doing something to solve or alleviate the basic Austro-Serbian problem (that is, the problem of a small state's repeatedly challenging and provoking a neighboring great power with impunity under the protection of another great power), but only on how to keep the Austro-Serbian conflict from erupting into general war.

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The same remarkable myopia prevailed in regard to the oft-predicted demise of the Habsburg Monarchy. Everyone in the chanceries talked about this possibility secretly. Many in the parliaments and press did so openly. But the one thing one cannot find is any serious discussion, much less action, among responsible statesmen to prepare for the inevitable repercussions of such a huge upheaval in the European system. Those officials and diplomats from different countries (there were a few) who warned that Europe needed to pay serious attention to this eventuality and its consequences got nowhere with their own governments. The attitude in St. Petersburg, Rome, Paris, London and (even until early 1914) Berlin, was that this was Vienna's problem.

Historians often fail to sniff out things that are important because they are *not* there but *ought* to be. They are so trained to concentrate on hard evidence that they tend to act by the motto, *Quod non est in actis non est in mundo* ("whatever is not in the documents does not exist in the world"). If the foregoing analysis is right, however, World War I resulted less from what the great powers thought and did than from what they failed to think or do. They failed to address the two problems that, left to fester unattended, were almost bound to lead to war. Historians have debated whether Serbian grievances against Austria-Hungary and vice versa were justified, and devoted even more debate to the question of whether the monarchy in 1914 was staggering toward a deserved demise, or was instead a fairly decent, modernizing state that could have soldiered on indefinitely, managing its insoluble problems without succumbing to them. Both debates miss the point. It does not matter how justified or unjustified Serbia's grievances and claims were, or how sacred its pan-Serb cause. One simply cannot allow a small power to get away with repeated challenges and provocations to a great power neighbor without inviting a violent reaction sooner or later.

It matters still less whether Austria-Hungary deserved to die or not. So central and indispensable a member of the international community, especially in the extremely tense rivalry of the early 20th century, could not conceivably disappear without bringing a great war in its wake, and it was almost bound to decide to fight rather than to die peacefully. The remarkable insouciance of the European powers on the Austrian problem persisted throughout the war and after; the Allies fought the war against Germany, the foe and threat they mainly feared, to defeat it and reduce its power but keep it intact, while in practical terms they fought it to destroy Austria-Hungary, which was not considered a serious menace. It was this latter outcome, far more than the treatment of Germany in the Versailles Treaty, that contributed most to the chaos of the interwar era and to the origins of World War II.

Happily, this kind of wilful absent-mindedness does not prevail in the United States now. The media reflect a lively debate both in official circles and among the educated public over the potential side effects of the war on terrorism—fears about the possible destabilization of fragile regimes in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, for example. The discussion over how to carry on the war and how far to pursue the roots of terrorism includes a heated debate on whether the United States should change its policy in the Middle East and elsewhere (*vis-à-vis* Iraq and Israel/Palestine, for example) in order to decrease the widespread resentment that allegedly feeds terrorism.

These are important issues, but they concentrate on how this campaign can best be waged with a minimum of undesired secondary effects: they still miss deeper aspects that need to be recognized

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and considered. Two of these aspects concern what happens if we win. Put differently, they raise the question of whether and how we can sustain the victory and manage its wider effects. The first concerns the provenance of government, and the second the vicissitudes of hegemony.

As to the former, suppose a military campaign against the Taliban leading to its overthrow. Can we or anyone provide stable government for Afghanistan, or do we leave it and its neighbors, some of them almost equally fragile states, to deal with the mess? The scenario becomes far worse if we include other states targeted for their alleged support of terrorism, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya. What does this region and the wider world do without governments in those states that, although brutal, are stable?

Some people seem to think that states and their governments are somehow fungible, replaceable—that if one is destroyed or overthrown, another can take its place—and that if the state or government overthrown was evil and dangerous, anything that replaces it will be better. Historical experience by and large teaches otherwise. Only in a few instances (Hitler's regime in Germany, Stalin's in Russia, for example) can we confidently say that anything that could have replaced them would have been better. The normal experience is the reverse. Things get worse, at least for a good while, before they get better. Many in World War I thought Imperial Germany was as evil and dangerous as a German government could get. Twenty years later they learned otherwise. Frenchmen in 1789 thought their monarchy was an oppressive regime. In four years they had the Terror. The monarchies of Europe thought the French Jacobin Republic and Directory as aggressive and dangerous as France could become, and welcomed Napoleon's seizure of power. They soon knew better. Nationalists in Eastern Europe and many in the West believed that the downfall of Austria-Hungary would enable the nationalities questions of the region to be solved. These are now mostly solved (except in the Balkans), but only after twenty years of instability and internecine conflict leading to the greatest war in history and to two of the worst instances of imperialism in history, German and Soviet, lasting two generations and attended by massive episodes of genocide, forced shifts of populations, and catastrophic general destruction.

One thing, then, to remember throughout this crisis is that states are not fungible, easily replaceable or dispensable. There have to be powerful grounds for overthrowing any regime effectively governing a state, and a clear idea of how to replace it. This crisis is itself a striking refutation of the current talk among historians and political scientists about the alleged decline and obsolescence of the state and the takeover of its sovereignty and administrative functions by international and supranational organizations, non-governmental entities, multinational corporations, and other transnational groups and movements. When this attack came, the American people rallied overwhelmingly behind their government and expected *it* to act, not any of these other entities. And when the American government sought support abroad for its campaign it also looked to other governments.

It has become clear, moreover, that if this campaign against terrorism in general is to succeed in the long run, it will require strong, effective governments in control of many states where such governments do not now exist. One factor contributing to World War I was the fact that the Serbian government was not in effective control over its military officers. A major concern now is that a wider conflict could arise for the same reason in Pakistan. Part of the intractability of the

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Israeli-Palestinian question is the lack of effective government in the areas ruled by the Palestinian Authority and the extreme difficulty of creating it. Something of the same holds for the whole region and itself contributes to breeding terrorism.

This, like much else said here (and as suggested at the outset), is a highly conservative stance. But, under current circumstances, it is likely to arouse the most ire among certain conservatives because it does not satisfy the American demand for justice and fails to get at the root of the problem of terrorism. The short answer to both objections is that in international affairs order takes priority over justice, and that a determination to get at the root of an evil and destroy it is the precise definition of radicalism, not conservatism.

The Vicissitudes of Hegemony

ONE MORE question needs thinking about, inappropriate and distracting though it must seem amid a military campaign. Suppose that we win, by which is meant the end of Osama bin Laden, the disruption or destruction of his terrorist network, the closing of the training camps, the replacement of the Taliban regime with something at least less driven by Islamist ideology, and the cowing or replacement of other regimes who have encouraged or aided in the promotion of terrorism. Suppose, too, that victory thus defined means at least a temporary cessation of terrorist activity, so that American and other armed forces beyond those normally in the region can be brought home. Suppose, finally, that all this is accomplished with few American and allied losses, no great damage to the American economy beyond the frailty already in train before September 11, and only minimal overt destabilization of other regimes in the region. What would this achieve in the longer run?

In domestic politics, it would doubtless be a great boost for President Bush and possibly for the Republican Party. In world politics, it would produce a great near-term gain in prestige for the United States, cementing its leadership, further heightening its prestige, and making its pre-eminence in the region and in the world even greater and more unchallenged than before. But would that be a good, stable outcome? Would an even greater degree of U.S. hegemony in the Middle East and the world represent a long-term gain for any of the parties?

One prominent theory of international politics, neo-realism, holds that hegemony is inherently unstable because weaker states almost automatically coalesce against an actual or potential hegemon as a threat to their security and thus restore the balance of power. This theory is wrong; sometimes a hegemonic power touches off efforts at counterbalancing, but it can be demonstrated that the main response of smaller powers to actual or potential hegemons has been not to balance against them, but to join them or to try to hide from them. Two other generalizations about hegemony and hegemons are true, however, and have much to say about the stability and desirability even of a hegemony so apparently unobjectionable as that which would be produced by an American victory over terrorism.

First, hegemony does not only or even mainly bring security, power and glory, but difficulty, responsibility and burden. The hegemon may or may not have to defend his leading position against challenges, but he surely will have to deal with all the quarrels into which he is drawn by virtue of being hegemon, to fend off all the demands and pleas for help from those who join his camp hoping to take advantage of it, to provide a disproportionate share of the security for threatened allies, and above all to husband the military force necessary to keep the

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peace in the last resort and to use that force when, but only when, really necessary.

Second, in order to be stable, any hegemony has at least to be perceived as natural, invulnerable and tolerable, if not wholly benign. It has to be natural in the sense that the hegemon is seen as belonging where it is as a leader and therefore somehow legitimate; invulnerable not in the sense that no blow can be struck against it, but that no blow will really hurt or overthrow it, and that the consequences will be worse for those who strike it; tolerable or benign in the sense that at least some who live under its hegemony feel that they benefit from it and that others, even if uncomfortable, still feel that they have room to move and air to breathe. These requirements are inescapably vague in the abstract, but they can be applied historically; when they are applied they explain why some hegemonies have proved remarkably stable and durable (that of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, that of Britain on the seas and in the colonial world from about 1750 to the early 20th century, that of the United States in Western and now Eastern Europe since 1945), while others that for a time represented overwhelming power (the Spanish Habsburgs in the 16th and early 17th centuries, that of Louis XIV's France, Napoleon's, Hitler's, that of the Soviet Union) crumbled fairly quickly and disastrously.

The question Americans need to ask themselves now, while this campaign is still in its early stages, is whether, if and when it is victorious, the American hegemony that it will inevitably further promote in the world, and especially in the Middle East, will be natural, invulnerable, and tolerable or benign—and therefore desirable and sustainable—or not. That question must arise; indeed, it is asked already, and bound up with our understanding of the terrorist attacks. There has been endless talk about why these terrorists attacked the United States, and why so many Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere evidently hate us. Do they hate and target us for what we have done, our alleged sins; or for what we are, our alleged values and virtues?

The President and evidently the majority of Americans come down solidly on the latter side, yet this conclusion misses the most obvious and central point: The terrorists attacked us *here* because we are *there*. Yes, they undoubtedly hate us for what we are and for all the values we consider best, but they would not attack us and would not enjoy the sympathy of others in the region for doing so if there were not a powerful American influence and presence in that region that is felt by many as alien, oppressive and corrupting. No one can suppose that the attack was intended somehow to convert Americans from their way of life to that of Islam. It is because these terrorists and their sympathizers see their way of life being corroded and eaten away by secular Western values and customs that we are under attack. They see America at the head of this corrosion, with most Arab and Muslim governments fecklessly collaborating with it. They see this corrosive power and influence exemplified spectacularly in such exercises as Desert Storm and less spectacularly in innumerable links between American and Western business interests and corporations and Arab and Muslim countries. They see it daily confirmed in an ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which, no matter how even-handed the United States tries to be, it is always seen as supporting Israel. The attack comes in the form of terrorism because they have no other more effective means of reprisal.

This is not in any way a defense of the terrorists or an excuse for their attack, and it does not alter what we need to do in

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response to it, except perhaps at the diplomatic margins. It is solely an attempt to understand the meaning of the widespread Arab-Muslim reaction to U.S. power, and to see it as one more indication of what ought to be obvious on the face of things: an American hegemony in this region—at least a direct, intrusive, overt and coercive one—is not and cannot be natural. This is a region where local states are too weak to effectively counterbalance against U.S. hegemony, but where cultural and historical cleavages reduce their propensity to join with it, as well. The obvious truth is that we do not belong there in the same way as we belong in the Western Hemisphere, the Atlantic, central and eastern Europe, and the Pacific. *Yet a victory in this war against terrorism will unfailingly commit us to an even more direct and intrusive hegemony than before.* All the support we are getting from the various governments in the region comes, we may be sure, with price tags and strings attached and explicit or implicit IOU's extracted that will soon be called in. We can already see what these are in respect to Russia (Chechnya), Pakistan (Kashmir, foreign debts, its nuclear arms) and other states. The full total will only become clear with time, but that they will commit us willy-nilly to more active intervention in the region's politics is unmistakable. Even more obvious and important, if victory against terrorism means preventing its recurrence, we will have to stay openly in the region in a major way both politically and with armed forces, interfering in its politics and putting constant pressures on its governments, for an indefinite future.

Such an intensified hegemony would not only be more unnatural than our present one, but also more vulnerable. In that sense it would play again into the hands of our worst enemies. One of the objects of the terrorist attack was to prove that the United States was not invulnerable—that it could be hurt even by small, relatively weak groups of dedicated fighters. The reaction of most Americans to the attack has played into their hands. By endlessly rehearsing the magnitude of the loss, labeling it a national tragedy, disaster, and even catastrophe, by hyperventilating in denouncing the action and demanding vengeance, and by panicking at the fear of still more attacks, we have encouraged the terrorists to believe that the United States really can be badly hurt by actions like these.

In fact, the opposite is true, and should constantly be emphasized. This was a monstrous crime and an individual tragedy of the deepest kind for many thousand of victims and their survivors, a genuine though less direct tragedy for all their friends and for all the businesses and employees more or less directly affected, a blow especially to all New Yorkers and a shock to all Americans—it was all these things and more. But it was not a *national* tragedy, much less a national disaster or catastrophe. On the scale of real national disasters and catastrophes in the world over the last fifty years it would not rank in the top hundred. It was a sneak punch for which we were surprisingly unprepared, but which had the effect of waking us up and making us stronger and more alert than before.

The attack does not prove that the United States is vulnerable and insecure as a nation and a world power until terrorism is destroyed. It simply adds to the existing proofs of two obvious propositions: that the whole Middle East, a region vital to our interests and even more to those of our best and strongest allies and friends, is vulnerable to crises spawned by such attacks, and that our leading position is thereby indirectly threatened; and that American hegemony in this region is not seen by many who live in it as tolerable or benign. It does not matter if this is unfair, the result of

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malicious anti-American propaganda and a grave distortion of the facts. Nor does it matter in the long run (though it certainly does in the immediate crisis) that we have most governments on our side and that any enemy governments are temporarily lying low. In the longer run hegemonies that are not at least accepted as tolerable by the majority of the public in the countries living under the hegemony do not last. If this is true in general, it is even truer for the era of mass politics since the mid-19th century.

This suggests that the wisest course for the United States might be to declare victory at the earliest possible moment and go part way home—that is, to use a victory and the heightened prestige it will bring to reduce rather than expand our hegemonic role in this particular region. We might be well advised to try to devolve the leading roles in managing and controlling its problems upon others nearer to it, more naturally and historically tied to it, and having even more critical interests in its stability—a more mature European Union, perhaps. Doing this would not be easy, and it may not even be practically possible. But a recognition that a heightened hegemonic role in the Middle East for the United States as the result of victory over terrorism could be a danger rather than an asset would at least steel us to do the difficult.

There is nothing particularly objectionable, to my mind, about American hegemony, and plenty objectionable about a return to anything like isolationism. But in drawing on historical experience to distinguish between workable, durable, and tolerable or benign hegemonies (which American hegemony in much of the world since 1945 has mostly been) and unworkable, unstable, and intolerable ones, we may alert ourselves to ways to save, improve and prolong American leadership in the world. Still less has this argument anything to do with excusing the terrorists or blaming America for creating the conditions that led to terrorism, or even criticizing the policies that have made us the target of terrorist malcontents. It is an attempt merely to face facts and to calculate their probable consequences, to correlate means and ends, to know the enemy and oneself—in short, to apply long-term thinking and rational calculation to a field, international politics, that desperately needs it precisely because it is in many respects so resistant to it.

THERE ARE good reasons, to be sure, why this kind of analysis is unlikely to have an effect on policy. Beyond the simple fact that policymakers are too busy to consider these kinds of arguments, this particular one runs counter to the public mood, which still seems concentrated on self-pity over our loss, self-congratulation over our virtues, and calls for dissenters to shut up. There is another reason, too, why policymakers cannot afford to give much consideration to arguments based on long-range historical reflection, even if they had the time to do so. They must act quickly and decisively on the basis of imperfect information in situations full of uncertainty, and having chosen a certain course must stick to it lest a reversal generate even greater costs than those already in store. Too much reflection on all the possible consequences could lead to paralysis. Thus by historical reflection the native hue of resolution would be sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought, and history would make cowards of us all.

Nonetheless, this kind of thinking is neither idle nor worthless, even or especially in wartime. In wartime above all times it is important constantly to reflect on what we are really doing and to calculate what the likely long-range results will be. Two Latin axioms neatly express the tension in wartime between the need for

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immediate decision and the need for long-term reflection: *carpe diem* ("seize the day"), and *respice finem* ("remain mindful of the goal"). One frequently must seize the moment; one always must remain mindful of the goal. A sense of history can be invaluable in balancing the two, not for prescription but for perspective and insight; or, as the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt once said, not to make us more clever for this or that occasion, but wiser for all time.

A final word: One subject on which we could use some wisdom concerns the nature of fanaticism. Our war, insofar as it is a war, is against fanaticism. But one definition of a fanatic is someone (to paraphrase Winston Churchill) who, facing evidence that he has lost sight of his objective or is headed in the wrong direction, redoubles his efforts. We can see that clearly in our enemies. They believe fanatically that they are serving their religion by their actions, where they are only discrediting and dishonoring it. They believe they have struck a powerful blow against us, when in fact it will mean far more powerful blows against them. Even in the face of evidence of this, they can be expected to try harder.

But we have less to fear from their patent fanaticism than from our own latent variety of it. We can do even more damage to ourselves than they can, not because we are worse—for all our faults, we are genuinely far better—but because we are so immensely more powerful. The chief danger for the United States lies in its impulse to use its power to wipe out this evil regardless of the consequences; it inheres in what George F. Kennan has called "the blind egotism of the embattled democracy." In the fight against this tendency, we could do much worse than to appreciate perspectives gained from history. □

INS Rules: Three Strikes, You Walk

For Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a 23-year-old Palestinian and aspiring terrorist, the third time was the charm.

In 1996, agents for the Immigration and Naturalization Service twice caught Abu Mezer attempting to sneak into the United States at the Canadian border. Although he had no identification and a criminal past, he was returned to Canada without being charged.

In early 1997, Abu Mezer was captured a third time, as he boarded a Greyhound bus in Bellingham, Wash. This time, he requested asylum in the United States and was released.

A top INS official later cited the Abu Mezer case as a success because agents nabbed him on three occasions. What he did not say was that Abu Mezer was captured by police a few months later as he constructed a pipe bomb to blow up a New York subway station in the Brooklyn borough. If not for a tip from one of Abu Mezer's roommates, officials said, he might have succeeded.

—Gilbert M. Gaul and Mary Pat Flaherty,
Washington Post, October 7, 2001

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The World of Achilles

Ancient Soldiers, Modern Warriors

Robert D. Kaplan

NOTHING IS great, writes Seneca, "which is not at the same time calm."[1] In contrast to warriors, gladiators, he goes on to say, "are protected by skill but left defenseless by anger."

We should pay attention to Seneca, because the American statesmen of the future will need to control their emotions—for there will be much to be angry about. States and other groups that refuse to play by our rules will constantly be committing outrages.* After all, the terrorism that will arise from increased economic disparities, combined with social and cultural dislocation, will enjoy unprecedented access to technological resources. Overreaction to terrorist outrages will exact a terrible price, as technology allows us to more easily reach, and be reached by, the Middle East than ever was the case between the Middle East and Europe for all the centuries gone before. Every diplomatic move will also be a military one, as the artificial separation between civilian and military command structures that has been a feature of contemporary democracies continues to dissolve. We are reverting to the "unified" leaderships that characterized the ancient and early-modern worlds, reflecting what Socrates and Machiavelli recognized as a basic truth of all political systems: whatever the labels those systems claim for themselves, war and diplomacy are two facets of the same process.

The split between civilian and military commands emerged only in the 19th century with the professionalization of modern European armies. In part because the Cold War went on for so long, it created a military establishment too vast and well informed to retreat to the margins of policymaking. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is now a veritable member of the president's cabinet. The regional U.S. commanders-in-chief in the Middle East, Europe, the Pacific and the Americas are the modern-day equals of Roman proconsuls, with budgets twice those of the Cold War era, even as State Department and other civilian foreign policy budgets have dwindled.

The commingling of military and civilian high-technology systems, which increasingly puts the military at the mercy

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*The following essay was written before the events of September 11. No attempt has been made to alter its contents in light of those events.

[1]See Seneca's "On Anger" in his *Moral and Political Essays*, Cambridge edition, pp. 28, 41.

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of civilian experts and vice versa, will magnify this trend. The short, limited wars, special forces operations and rescue missions with which we shall be engaged will go unsanctioned by Congress and the citizenry; so, too, will pre-emptive strikes against the computer networks of our adversaries and other defense-related measures that in many instances will be kept secret from the public. Collaboration between the Pentagon and corporate America is necessary, and will grow. Short of a response to the occasional outrage perpetrated against us, going to war will be less and less a democratic decision.

In an age when it took weeks to mobilize and transport armored divisions across the seas, it was possible for American presidents to consult the people and Congress about doing so. In the future, when combat brigades can be inserted anywhere in the world in 96 hours (and entire divisions in 120 hours), and with the majority of our military actions consisting of lightning air and computer strikes, the decision to use force will be made autocratically by small groups of civilians and general officers, the differences between them fading as time goes on.[2] Already, the difference in knowledge between generals, the most prominent of whom operate almost as politicians, and civilian specialists, who function in effect as military officers, is often insignificant.

Even if international law should continue to grow in significance through trade organizations and human rights tribunals, it will play less of a role in the conduct of war because war will increasingly be unconventional and undeclared, and fought as often within states as between them. The concept of "international law" promulgated by Hugo Grotius in 17th-century Holland, in which all sovereign states are treated as equal and war is justified only in defense of sovereignty, is fundamentally utopian. The boundaries between peace and war are often unclear, and international agreements are kept only if the power and self-interests of the parties are there to sustain them. In the future, wartime justice will not depend on international law; as in ancient times, justice will depend upon the moral fiber of military commanders themselves, whose roles will often be indistinguishable from those of civilian leaders.

THE TERRORIST nature of future outrages, the collapse of the distinction between military and civilian decision-making, the truncation of democratic deliberation over the use of force, and the vitiation of the laws of war, taken together, promises to make *future* war more like *ancient* war than anything Americans and Europeans have witnessed for many centuries. More specifically, the *ancientness* of future wars has three dimensions: the character of the enemy, the methods used to contain and destroy him, and the identity of those beating the war drums.

National security analyst Colonel Ralph Peters has written that American soldiers "are brilliantly prepared to defeat other soldiers. Unfortunately", he goes on, "the enemies we are likely to face . . . will not be 'soldiers'", with the discipline and professionalism which that word implies in the West, but "'warriors'—erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order."[3]

There have always been warriors who, as Homer wrote in *The Iliad*, "call up the wild joy of war", but the collapse

[2]For the statistics on moving brigades and divisions, see Stephen P. Aubin's "Stumbling Toward Transformation: How the Services Stack Up", *Strategic Review* (Spring 2000).

[3]See Peters, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), p. 32.

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of Cold War empires and the disorder it has engendered—along with the advance of technology and poor-quality urbanization—has provoked the breakdown of families and the renewal of cults and blood ties. The latter includes both a more militant Islam and Hinduism. The result is the rise of new warrior classes as cruel as ever, and better-armed. This phenomenon embraces armies of murderous teenagers in West Africa; Russian and Albanian mafiosi; Latin American drug kingpins; West Bank suicide bombers; and associates of Osama bin Laden who communicate by e-mail. Like Achilles and the ancient Greeks harassing Troy, the thrill of violence substitutes for the joys of domesticity and feasting. Achilles exclaims,

> You talk of food?
> I have no taste for food—what I really crave
> is slaughter and blood and the choking groans
> of men![4]

Today's warriors come often enough from the hundreds of millions of unemployed young males in the developing world, angered by the income disparities that accompany globalization. Globalization is Darwinian. It means the economic survival of the fittest—those groups and individuals who are disciplined, dynamic and ingenious will float to the top, while cultures that do not compete well technologically will produce an inordinate number of warriors. I have seen firsthand the creation of warriors at Islamic schools in Pakistani slums: The children of those shantytowns had no moral or patriotic identity except that which their religious instructors gave them. An age of chemical and biological weapons is perfectly suited for religious martyrdom.

Warriors also include ex-convicts, ethnic and national "patriots", shadowy arms and drug entrepreneurs awash in cynicism, and failed military men—cashiered officers of formerly communist and Third World armies. The wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus in the 1990s featured all of these types reborn as war criminals. Whether in Russia, Iraq or Serbia, nationalism in our age is, Peters notes, simply a secular form of fundamentalism. Both religious and secular fundamentalisms arise from a sense of collective grievance and historical failure, real or imaginary, and preach a lost golden age. Both dehumanize their adversaries and equate mercy with weakness. Thus, while there are enormous differences between, say, a Radovan Karadzic and an Osama bin Laden, neither plays by our rules; both are warriors.

Hitler exemplified the warrior leader, a prototypical skinhead with a moustache who wrested control of an advanced industrial state. Anyone who assumes that rational economic incentives determine world politics should read *Mein Kampf*. None of the warriors we have seen since the fall of the Berlin Wall has presented a comparable strategic threat in part because none has had control over a state like Germany. But that could change: the further development and profusion of smaller, low-tech nuclear devices and of chemical and biological weapons will transform obscure "freedom fighters" into strategic menaces. While the average engagement during the Civil War featured 26,000 men per square mile of battle front, the figure is now 240; it will dwindle further as war becomes increasingly unconventional and less dependent on manpower. Moreover, an economy of scale is no longer necessary to produce weapons of mass destruction, nor can the United States sustain its monopoly over new military technologies, many of which are not expensive and can be acquired by

[4]Homer, *The Iliad*, translated by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), book 19, lines 254–6.

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present and future adversaries through free trade.

We may, of course, face military conflicts not only with warrior groups, but with great powers such as China. But rather than deploy its soldiers against ours, so as to play by our rules, an adversary may prefer to use computer viruses against us, or unleash its warrior-allies from the Middle East, supplied with its military technology, even while it denies any connection with such stateless terrorists. Russia, too, could make strategic use of terrorists and international criminals in order to fight an undeclared war. Precisely because the United States is militarily superior to any group or nation, we should expect to be attacked at our weakest points, beyond the boundaries of international law.

Effective responses to the outrages of these warriors are inconceivable without the element of surprise, making democratic consultation an afterthought. After all, war is subject to democratic control only when it is a condition distinctly separate from peace. In Cold War confrontations such as Korea and Vietnam popular opinion played a major role, but a protracted state of quasi-conflict marked by commando raids and electronic strikes on enemy computer systems—in which the swiftness of our reaction is the key variable—will not be guided by public opinion to the same extent. Such conflict will feature warriors on one side, motivated by grievance and rapine, and an aristocracy of statesmen, military officers and technocrats on the other, motivated, one hopes, by ancient virtue.

Vigilance demands that we remember the Trojans of Homer's *Iliad*. They were the envy of the world: urbane and civilized, surrounded by magnificent buildings and farmlands, wanting only to be left alone, and believing that their wealth and success could always buy a solution. Yet they were besieged by piratical chieftains from across the water who were driven to war by the Greek gods—gods who, with their intrigues and temper tantrums, are timeless reflections of human irrationality. "Three thousand years have not changed the human condition", observes the classicist Bernard Knox, "we are still lovers and victims of the will to violence."[5] And writing in 1939, as her native France was about to be overrun by Nazis, the philosopher and resistance activist Simone Weil celebrated *The Iliad* as the "purest mirror" of our collective experience; it showed, she wrote, how "force, today as in the past, is at the center of all human history."[6]

While the United States is a peaceful, commercial republic that has usually tried to avoid war, its leaders should still be able to appreciate Homer's description of the defenders of Troy, awaiting their dawn attack on the Greeks:

> And so their spirits soared
> as they took positions down the passage ways of battle
> all night long, and the watchfires blazed among them.
> Hundreds strong, as stars in the night sky glittering
> round the moon's brilliance blaze in all their glory . . .[7]

IN ONE respect, at least, ancient war was more civilized than is war in our age. The aim of ancient war was generally to kill or capture the opposing chief and display him in a cage. Because of the primitive state of technology, the only way to get to the opposing leader and his inner circle was to cut through the mass of his people and army,

[5]See Knox's introduction to *The Iliad.*

[6]See Weil, "The Iliad; or, The Poem of Force", translated by Mary McCarthy, *Politics*, Pamphlet No. 1 (New York, 1945).

[7]*The Iliad*, book 8, lines 638–42.

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necessitating bloody battles and great cruelty. Since the Enlightenment, however, Western leaders have exempted themselves from retribution and have sought to punish each other indirectly: by destroying each other's armies and—since Grant and Sherman—by making the civilian populations suffer as well. But is it really more honorable to kill thousands by high-altitude bombing than by the sword and axe? In Kosovo, NATO air attacks were far more effective against civilian targets than military ones. Yet, impending precision-guidance technologies—in which bullets can be directed to specific targets like warheads—will make strikes on the offending chief quite practical. In the future, satellites may track the movements of specific individuals through their neurobiological signatures the way that CAT scans do now from a few inches away. We will reinvent ancient war; it will soon be possible to kill or capture the individual perpetrators of great cruelties rather than harm their subject populations, which in many cases are also their victims.

Would it have been more humane to assassinate Milosevic and his inner circle rather than bomb Serbia for ten weeks? In the future, such assassinations will be possible. Because many of our future enemies may not inhabit a country as technologically developed as Serbia, there may be no suitable targets like electrical and water-treatment plants to bomb. The only target may be the offending chief or warrior himself. In Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden hides out, attacking his "infrastructure" means destroying only a few burlap tents, cell phones and computers, all of which are immediately replaceable. Because future war will feature precision attacks on command posts, hitting those computer nerve centers will often mean killing the political leadership. Either the law against assassinations that sprang from our Vietnam experience will be scrapped, or it will be sidestepped.[8]

Whether or not future wars are bloodless, there will be an undeniable ancientness to the way in which we conduct them. Kosovo, from our point of view, was a bloodless war, but thousands of civilians (mostly Kosovar Albanians) died so that there would be no NATO casualties. But had a dozen NATO planes been shot down, President Clinton might have been forced to call off the war. Our appetite for war is similar to that of the Romans, whose professional and salaried legions had no desire to fight warriors eager for glorious death. Thus, whenever they could, the Romans avoided open field engagements in favor of expensive and systematic sieges in which their own casualties were minimized. The Romans were also protected beneath cumbersome helmets, breastplates, shoulder guards, and foot greaves, even though this reduced their agility. We are not the first great empire to despise casualties.[9]

"If military action is cost-free", Michael Ignatieff asks, "what democratic restraints will remain on the resort to force?"[10] It is only the specter of casualties that engages the public, sparking a debate that has democratic significance because it reaches beyond the media and intellectual communities. When I was in New Mexico and Colorado at the start of the Kosovo air war, televisions everywhere were tuned to entertainment, especially game shows, not to CNN's continu-

[8]For a discussion on the legality of assassination, see Mark Vincent Vlasic, "Cloak and Dagger Diplomacy: The U.S. and Assassination", *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (Summer/Fall 2000).

[9]See Edward Luttwak's prescient essay, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare", *Foreign Affairs* (May/June, 1995).

[10]See Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond* (New York: Henry Holt, 2000), p. 179.

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ous war coverage. The United States could bomb any place in the world for weeks, I thought, and the public might not object, or even be interested, provided there were no American casualties or adverse effects on the stock market.

Left to themselves, most leaders in the post-Cold War West would avoid all non-strategic interventions with the risks that they carry, if not for the media and intellectual communities. Because the elite media is dominated by cosmopolitans who inhabit the wider world beyond the nation-state, it has a tendency to emphasize universal moral principles over national self-interest. "Most newsmen", says Walter Cronkite, "feel very little allegiance to the established order. I think they are inclined to side with humanity rather than with authority and institutions."[11] In the hands of the media, the language of human rights—the highest level of altruism—can become a powerful weapon that can lead us into wars that perhaps we should not fight.

When the media finds a cause it can rally around, it can both shape and replace public opinion, as it did in Bosnia and Kosovo, when the media was overwhelmingly interventionist while the public, as the polls showed, remained unenthusiastic. The media and intellectual communities are professional castes no less distinguishable than those of military officers, doctors, insurance agents and so on—and no more representative of the American population. As with other professional groups, they are often more influenced by each other than by those outside their social network. Faced with an indifferent public, this quasi-aristocracy may shape the views of Western leaders much as the ancient nobles did of their emperors. And the media's arguments will be difficult to resist. Human rights arguments advanced by the media at their most extreme have a distinctly inquisitional air about them.

Television correspondents at the scene of catastrophes, like the Israeli bombing of Beirut in 1982 and starvation in Somalia a decade later, manifest an impassioned tunnel vision in which sheer emotion replaces analysis: Nothing matters to them except the horrendous spectacle before their eyes—*about which something must be done!* The media embodies classical liberal values, which concern themselves with individuals and their well-being, whereas foreign policy is often concerned with the relationships between states and other large groups. Thus, the media is more likely to be militaristic when individual rights and suffering are concerned, rather than when a state's vital interests are threatened.

Of course, there may be times when the undisciplined emotions of correspondents and human rights activists are exactly what political leaders need to hear, as in Sarajevo in 1992 and 1993. Statesmanship is about distinguishing between what is just and what is merely sanctimonious, or impractical. "The side that knows when to fight and when not to will take the victory", says Sun-Tzu. "There are roadways not to be traveled, armies not to be attacked, walled cities not to be assaulted."[12] Indeed, the increasing tendency toward urban warfare—Tuzla, Mogadishu, Karachi, Panama City, Beirut, Gaza and so on—as well as interventions in anarchic territories such as Somalia and Sierra Leone may compel a ruthlessness on our part that the very people demanding intervention cannot bear. As the Athenian general Nicias said, warning in 415 B.C.E. against intervention in Sicily:

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[11]See Cronkite's interview in *Playboy* (June 1973), p. 76.

[12]See Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, translated by Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine, 1993), pp. 80, 131.

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> We must not disguise from ourselves that we go to found a city among strangers and enemies, and that he who undertakes such an enterprise should be prepared to become master of the country the first day he lands, or failing in this to find everything hostile to him.[13]

As with the Americans in Vietnam, the Athenians had been lured into Sicily by their allies. Fearing the domino effect of growing Syracusan power, the Athenians came to believe that the conquest of far-off Sicily was crucial to the maintenance of their empire. Prosperity had made the Athenians arrogant about their chances of success, and too idealistic about their cause. Because they underestimated the great effort and the brutality that would be required to prevail, the expedition ended in tragedy.

Prudence dictates that we approach casualty-free war as a myth, despite technological advances such as bullets that incapacitate without injuring. War is uncertainty, characterized by friction, chance and disorder, as Clausewitz says. According to Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, American forces will have to operate in a range of settings, "from deserts to foliage, to densely populated urban areas with embedded antagonists"—environments not conducive to technological dominance.[14] Laser and electro-optically guided munitions will not track targets through heavy tree cover, and will not preclude civilian casualties in cities. Even when they work well, computer-operated sensors and listening devices may swamp military organizations with undigestible data. As more information accumulates, the difference between information and real knowledge could widen. Robert McNamara's predictive universe, with its quantitative measurements and game theory assumptions, led us deeper into the mire of Vietnam. Exclusive reliance on technology, at once naive and arrogant, takes little account of local history, traditions, terrain and other factors that are essential for making wise judgments.

Luckily for the Clinton Administration, the sophisticated, modern Serbs of Belgrade were not North Vietnamese; they were ready to give up after American bombs disrupted their water supplies and electrical system. Perhaps we in the West would also admit defeat if an enemy stopped our running water, our phones and our electricity. But we should not expect warriors with very few material possessions at risk to be so fragile. Bullets that do not kill and sonic waves that immobilize a crowd by causing a sensation of nausea and diarrhea may facilitate an individual commando operation, but warriors will interpret such an aversion to violence as weakness, emboldening their cause. Therefore, writes Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap, Jr., "Future war may become *more* savage, not less so. An adversary waging neo-absolutist war could resort to a variety of horrific actions . . . of a low-tech variety to offset and divert high-tech U.S. forces."[15] The enemy will take hostages and place critical supplies susceptible to precision bombing beneath schools and hospitals. For such adversaries, our moral values—our fear of collateral damage—represent our worst vulnerabilities. The most sincere and heartbreaking truth of the ancients is the vast gulf that separates political-military virtue from individual moral perfection. It is such a truth that may help define the 21st

[13]Robert B. Strassler, ed., *Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Richard Crawley (New York: The Free Press, 1996), book VI: 23.

[14]Paul Van Riper, "Information Superiority", *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 1997).

[15]See Dunlap, "21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths", *Parameters* (Autumn 1997), p. 34.

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century, as we are forced to choose in the midst of high-tech war between what is right and what is unfortunately necessary.

Another problem will be the unwitting collusion between the global media and our enemies. Many defense analysts envision massive, "vertically integrated" media conglomerates with their own surveillance satellites. One firm, Aerobureau (of McLean, Virginia) can already deploy a flying newsroom: an aircraft equipped with multiple satellite video, audio and data links, gyro-stabilized cameras, and the ability to operate camera-equipped vehicles on earth by remote control. Colonel Dunlap asks, "What need will there be for our future enemies to spend money building extensive intelligence capabilities? The media will become the 'poor man's intelligence service.'"[16]

The media is no longer simply the fourth estate, without which the other three branches of government could not operate honestly and effectively. Because of technology and the consolidation of news organizations—similar to the consolidation of airline and automobile alliances—the media is becoming a world power in its own right. The power of the media is wilful and dangerous because it dramatically affects Western policy while bearing no responsibility for the outcome. Indeed, the media's moral perfectionism is possible only because it is politically unaccountable.

When America became an independent nation, the press was meant to keep government honest. Alerting the public to humanitarian problems overseas is germane to that role; directing policy is not, particularly if officials are forced to operate at a lower level of altruism than the media. A statesman's primary responsibility is to his country, while the media thinks in universal terms. Emotional coverage of Somalia by a world media foreshadowed an American intervention that, because it was ill defined, led to the worst disaster for U.S. troops since Vietnam—a disaster that then helped influence policymakers against intervention in Rwanda. In a world of constant crises, policymakers must be selective about where and when they believe it worthwhile to get engulfed in the Clausewitzian "uncertainty" of conflict—something that the power of the media makes ever more difficult.

JUST AS future wars will, in many ways, be ancient, so will the nature of military alliances and the reasons we go to war in the first place. As in the Peloponnesian War, a world of shifting alliances will once again demonstrate the language of power balancing.

The notion of "just war", advanced by Grotius, echoed St. Augustine and the medieval theologians, who sought to define circumstances under which Christendom could rightfully give battle. Grotius' "just war" presupposed the existence of a Leviathan—a supreme authority in the person of the pope or the Holy Roman Emperor—to enforce a moral code. But in a world without a universal arbiter of justice, discussions of war as "just" or "unjust" carry little meaning beyond the intellectual and legal circles in which such discussions take place. States and other entities—whether the United States or the Tamil Tigers—will go to war when they decide that it is in their interests (strategic, moral, or both) and will, consequently, be unconcerned if others view their aggression as unjust. According to polls, more than 90 percent of voting-age Greeks—citizens of a NATO democracy—thought the air campaign against Serbia was "unjust." But we ignored the Greek public's interpretation of "just war" and did what we felt was right and necessary. The Greek public was using what it thought was a moral argument to justify a national interest: The Serbs were fellow

[16]Dunlap, p. 34.

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Orthodox Christians and historic allies of the Greeks. However, that is what all nations do in wartime: it isn't only the Greeks.

Ho Chi Minh's Communist government killed at least 10,000 of its own civilians prior to the entry of American troops into Vietnam. Did this make U.S. intervention in Vietnam just? Perhaps, but it was still a mistake. The Mexican War was probably unjust—motivated as it was by sheer territorial aggression. But it was a war well worth fighting: The United States acquired Texas and the entire Southwest, including California.

In the 21st century, as in the 19th, we will initiate hostilities—whether in the form of Special Forces operations or computer viruses directed at enemy command centers—whenever it is absolutely necessary and we see a clear advantage in doing so, and we will justify it morally after the fact. This is not cynical. The moral basis of U.S. foreign policy will depend upon the character of the nation and its leaders, not upon the absolutes of international law.

Nevertheless, there is a model that explains how states and other groups are likely to approach war in the future. It is an age-old model based on an ancient code of honor (as explained in an unpublished essay by Michael Lind). Lind says that in primitive societies, lawless frontier towns and the world of organized crime, injustice has always been redressed by the injured themselves, or by their powerful protectors; thus, the safety of the weak rests upon the willingness of their protectors to wield power. Indeed, feudal relationships between stronger and weaker states have marked world politics since time immemorial. Even today, civilian economic powers like Germany and Japan and niche states like oil-rich Kuwait and trading tiger Singapore have specific functions in a quasi-feudal Western world order, in which the United States provides military security.

In places where the rule of law does prevail, one is expected to suffer insults without resort to violence. But in a lawless society, a willingness to suffer insults indicates weakness that, in turn, may invite attack. A world without a Leviathan is somewhat similar: An alliance leader must play the role of barbarian chieftain. In theory, international law governs world politics; in practice, relations between great powers are regulated by a sort of *Code Duello*. Lind notes that "Khrushchev's conception of 'peaceful coexistence' and Third World competition, and the establishment of a Hot Line, were designed to ritualize the struggle for power, not to end it." Such conventions, he continues, "might be compared to the elaborate rules surrounding the aristocratic duel." Such a code may not be Judeo-Christian, yet it is moral just the same. For even in a lawless realm, too extreme a response—killing large numbers of civilians in Beirut for the sake of protecting its northern border, as Israel did in 1982—may be perceived as wanton violence, and thus lack legitimacy. In any age, a reputation for power must be balanced by one for mercy. A barbarian chieftain may occasionally have to defend immoral clients (like U.S. support for some dictators during the Cold War), but if he does so too often to the exclusion of all else, his chieftaincy may lose respect and consequently be toppled. A future in which rival chiefs risk assassination as never before—with surprise attacks on computer command posts—is one perfectly suited for a *Code Duello*.

Systems in which two great powers confront each other in a ritualized struggle—as in the Cold War—tend to be more stable than the present one, in which there are many secondary powers, yet the primary power is still not a Leviathan. In pre-20th-century Europe, when one state became too powerful, others often came together to balance it. But

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there is also the opposite tendency: for weak states to appease a rising power, as when many Third World states aligned themselves with the Soviet Union at the height of its strength in the 1960s and the 1970s. That is happening now, as the ex-communist and developing worlds seek to emulate America's model of democratic capitalism. But we should never forget that such a positive development rests upon our power as a chieftain. Romania and Bulgaria copied fascism when Nazi Germany was ascendant. Now that America is triumphant, they copy our democracy. If we are weak militarily—if we are not able to meet the rising challenge of warriors—our political values may be eclipsed worldwide.

Bernard Knox writes that according to the early Greeks, the past and present, because they are visible, are "in front of us", while the future, "invisible, is behind us . . . ."[17] The future of warfare is already behind us, in ancient times. □

[17]See Knox, *Backing into the Future: The Classical Tradition and its Renewal* (New York: Norton, 1994), pp. 11–2.

When Pushtun Comes to Shove

Historically, the Pushtun tribes, secure within their mountain bastions centered on the Suleiman range and the Safed Koh, have successfully resisted all attempts to subdue them by Greeks, Persians, Kushans, Mongols, Mughals, Sikhs, British, and other Afghans. Most conquerors of the subcontinent were content to bypass these tribes, wherever necessary paying transit tribute and submitting to their raids and lootings. Only Britain, with its inbred sense of the need to impose law and order on subject peoples, felt sufficiently outraged by the persistence of Pushtun rapacity and brigandage to maintain a consistent campaign of pacification. This went on for more than one hundred years of the history of British India and as W.K. Fraser-Tytler says, 'The British did not solve the problem of the tribes, and when in August 1947 they handed over control of India's north-western defences to the untried Government of Pakistan, they handed over likewise a fluid, difficult situation, fraught with much danger to the future of India.'

—Leon B. Poullada,
Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929 (1973)

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Echoes from the Barbary Coast

Rand H. Fishbein

ON THE DAY that United Airlines flight 175 and American Airlines flight 11 lifted off from Boston's Logan airport, bound for a fiery collision with the twin towers of New York's World Trade Center, a lone observer watched from below. That observer was the U.S.S. *Constitution*, the oldest commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy and an early witness to the ravages of Middle Eastern terrorism.

Launched in 1797, the *Constitution* ("Old Ironsides") and her sister ship, the U.S.S. *Constellation*, were built to wage war on the Muslim pirates operating along North Africa's Barbary Coast. It was a wild, untamed region of petty states and warlords whose reach extended deep into the Mediterranean Sea, from Gibraltar to the borders of Egypt. Each owed nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan, who demanded that payment of an annual tribute be made to his treasury in exchange for the protection afforded by his army. This tidy arrangement worked well for those local rulers who knew their place in the imperial social order, and for the Sultan as well. The only thing lacking was an ample source of revenue. The solution was piracy.

For nearly four centuries the Barbary states, and the brigands they employed, prowled the Mediterranean in search of prey. The lumbering merchant vessels of the time were no match for the Muslim corsairs, built for speed and lightning strikes. It was a way of life that took its toll on countless merchant ships and their crews. After seizing their cargo and scuttling the vessels, the pirates would ransom the ill-fated seamen back to their sovereign or the company that had chartered them. Often enough, however, the victims of these maritime hijackings would languish in fetid prisons, unsure of when, or even if, they would ever be rescued. Some were sold into slavery.

It was a lucrative business, one that yielded great riches not only for the pirates, but also for the Muslim states that gave them refuge. For many of the rulers, plunder became a mainstay of their survival. In the parlance of our time, however, this system of piracy was state-sponsored terrorism, pure and simple—an extortion racket in which the pirate, the petty states of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire were all complicit.

Not surprisingly, the merchant nations of Europe took a dim view of the Muslim

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pirates. Even though many had a long tradition of privateering themselves, times were changing, and such practices were now deemed incompatible with a world increasingly dependent on commerce over the high seas. Nowhere was this new sentiment expressed more strongly than in America, where a young Congress, flush with a sense of invincibility after the War of Independence, readily took up the challenge. Having championed the cause of liberty and free trade during years of struggle, members were infuriated that the sovereignty of America's commercial fleet was not being respected. Since the Royal Navy no longer patrolled the sea lanes on behalf of the American colonies, American shipping was now vulnerable as never before; as the cost in lives and property mounted, the government concluded that something had to be done. But what should that something be?

In an effort at peaceful diplomacy, missions were dispatched to the Barbary states of Tripoli, Algiers, Morocco and Tunis with a modest proposal: The United States would pay an annual sum to each of the local Muslim warlords if they, in turn, would protect American vessels traveling in their waters.

To most of the politicians of that time, this seemed a perfectly reasonable and practical solution. In the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, the United States had neither the stomach nor the ability to fight another war, particularly one that would have to be waged so far from American shores. After all, this was the wily Middle East, a region known only to a few intrepid travelers, and plied by adventure-seekers and businessmen for whom kidnapping and ransom were constant occupational hazards. Moreover, paying tribute was a time-honored practice shared by both nation-states and petty kingdoms alike. A clear, business-like approach that did not require the shedding of blood also blended well with the rational sensibilities of the 18th-century mind. Piracy was presumed to be one of the many risks that attended foreign trade. If one could buy protection, even from the rogues themselves, how was this so different from insuring a ship's cargo against a natural calamity? So the logic ran: America's interests could be satisfied, and its honor assuaged, if common ground could be found between the pirates and their victims.

And so it happened that agreements were reached between the United States and the various rulers of the Barbary Coast. In exchange for cash payments, the rulers pledged to guarantee the safe passage of American ships and to put a stop to the practice of maritime kidnapping. As the 18th century came to a close, Americans were cautiously optimistic that they had solved the Barbary problem.

By 1801, however, it became clear that the policy of appeasement had failed. The Pasha of Tripoli, who five years earlier had been satisfied with a payment of $56,000, now demanded increasingly larger sums. When they were not forthcoming, piracy resumed. The same held true for the other Barbary states. The Algerians had received payments from the United States totaling $990,000, plus another $585,000 in 1793 to cover the ransom of eleven American ships. At the same time, the Bey of Tunis received $50,000. These were extraordinary sums for a nation with a budget of no more than $7 million, but the appetites of the Muslim states seemed to grow insatiably. As America soon learned, a policy of accommodation only encouraged the Barbary brigands to seize more ships and to take more captives. Far from providing safe passage to American and other foreign vessels, the North African rulers remained active accomplices to the crime of piracy, taking protection money while at the same time permitting the banditry to continue.

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Things were to change, however, with the election of Thomas Jefferson. In addition to his reputation as an author, scholar and principal architect of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson also was an outspoken opponent of the practice of tribute. He saw it not only as an affront to the nation's dignity, but also as an ineffectual response to an abhorrent practice. He argued that ultimately the policy of appeasement would fail because, in conveying weakness, it encouraged further treachery. He was right.

Jefferson's response to renewed attacks on American shipping was swift and uncompromising. He dispatched a squadron of three frigates and one sloop to the region. They were ordered to observe the deteriorating situation and provide whatever escort was needed to ensure the safety of American merchant vessels. By the time the frigates arrived, Pasha Yusuf Karamanli, the Bey of Tripoli, had declared war on the United States.

For the next two years the U.S. Navy conducted running operations against the Barbary pirates, attacking their corsairs and bombarding the coastal forts that sheltered them. The American battle cry, "millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute" (a slogan first used during the XYZ affair of 1798, but soon taken up in this campaign as well), resonated with a public tired of being held hostage to bandits and oriental potentates. The United States made repeated efforts to bring an honorable end to the fighting, but each was spurned by a defiant Karamanli, apparently convinced that the United States had neither the stamina nor the pluck for a prolonged war. This could not have been further from the truth.

Before long, Jefferson ordered the U.S.S. *Constitution* to the Mediterranean in an effort to force an end to the conflict. Setting sail in 1803, the ship was soon in the waters off Tripoli, where its powerful cannons were trained on the fortifications that protected Tripoli harbor. Buildings housing the Pasha's stores, barracks and powder magazines were razed. His palace was laid waste. The fighting during these days saw many acts of heroism that established the U.S. Navy as a force to be reckoned with. A daring raid by Lieutenant Stephen Decatur and 74 men led to the destruction of the captured frigate U.S.S. *Philadelphia* in Tripoli harbor. In another military action, the U.S.S. *Intrepid* was loaded with gunpowder, sailed into Tripoli harbor and exploded amid a multitude of the Pasha's ships. Then, in 1805, the *Constitution* supported the landing of Marines on "the shores of Tripoli" in an action that was subsequently immortalized in the Marine Corps hymn. The Americans and their allies destroyed the harbor citadel at Derna that served as the headquarters for the pirates.

Ultimately, Karamanli was brought to heel after William Eaton, the American consul in Tunis, hatched a plan to unseat the Pasha and turn over control of the country to his older brother, Hemet. Fearing his imminent demise, Yusuf relented and agreed to a treaty that halted raids on American shipping and led to the repatriation of captured American sailors. It also ended all U.S. tribute to the Barbary warlords. The agreement was signed aboard the deck of the U.S.S. *Constitution*.

For much of the next decade, American merchant shipping passed through the Mediterranean relatively unmolested. A series of raids by the pirates operating out of Algiers led to some minor naval action in 1815, but, effectively, the harassment of American and other Western shipping was ended. Firm action and a determined policy had brought success in America's first war with Middle Eastern terrorism.

AS AMERICANS struggle to make sense of the terrorism that struck New York and Washington on September 11, it is instruc-

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tive to remember the war that first brought the United States into conflict with the countries of the Middle East. Much like today, it was a contest between two cultures, two iron wills and two differing views of the rights of sovereign states. It represented the clash of tribal societies with the emerging global perspective of a modern, democratic nation. Then there was no Israel to cloud the picture, oil had yet to be discovered in the Middle East, and there was no American military presence in the region. Nevertheless, it was impossible for the Muslim states along the Barbary coast to ignore the presence of American merchant vessels innocently plying their way through the Mediterranean.

In the campaign of 1801–05, it was American technology that proved decisive, allowing the United States to defeat a poorly armed foe with no real ability to project and sustain power. Ours was a victory of persistence over defiance, steeled determination over opportunism. In time these were to become the signature traits of a newly minted American character, one that is slow to anger but unrelenting when aroused. In both war and diplomacy, it is an approach that has defined this nation ever since its inception.

Now as then, America has discovered that the appeasement of tyrants never leads to the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is instead an open invitation to would-be aggressors to test the waters, probe for vulnerabilities and strike when the democratic world lets down its guard. It can be a costly gamble in both lives and treasure. When diplomacy backed by the payment of tribute no longer satisfied the warlords of the Barbary Coast, the United States was left with little choice but to go to war. As Jefferson once observed: "Were we to give up half our territory rather than engage in a just war to preserve it, we should not keep the other long."

Two hundred years later, the reality facing the United States is much the same. Successive administrations have worked hard to assuage anti-Western feeling in the Middle East, first with promises of trade and technical assistance and later with offers of foreign aid, security pacts and Arab-Israeli diplomatic mediation. For a time, these efforts succeeded, and Washington found that it could cultivate moderate, pro-American regimes throughout the region. But over time these regimes have become less and less representative of the Muslim street and, as a consequence, more vulnerable to it. In places like Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan, Islamic orthodoxy is once again on the rise, while in Saudi Arabia the ruling family has fallen out of favor with those who believe that their opulent lifestyle and close ties to America have corrupted the traditional Wahhabi faith. Popular disaffection and feelings of resentment against the West have spawned a new Middle Eastern rage, decidedly more lethal and less localized than that of Karamanli.

For the first time, Middle Eastern terrorists, armed with chemical, biological and possibly radiological weapons, can strike the American homeland and inflict mass casualties on its citizens. Horrific though they were, the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11 could be just the prelude to a far more grim future. The pirates of old have become the terrorists of today, seeking to score a Lilliputian advantage over an unsuspecting, vulnerable Gulliver. And once again, America has no choice but to act decisively against an enemy unwilling to accept coexistence on any plane. In fighting this "asymmetrical" threat, gunboat diplomacy, applied pre-emptively if need be, offers the only practical solution.

Not since Saladin defeated the Crusader armies at the Horns of Hattin in

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1187 has any Islamic group felt that it had the ability to drive the infidel from the Middle East. At Al-Qaeda's disposal are tools and techniques that once were the exclusive province of the West. Emboldened by successes in Iran, Afghanistan, the Sudan and, most recently, southern Lebanon, radicals within the Muslim world have had little reason to slow their assault. Rather, they have viewed the West's timid response to their agitation as an opportunity to grow stronger and to act ever more boldly.

For Osama bin Laden and his cohort, the present war is but the latest in a millennial struggle against the West. It is a drama that will continue to play out across the world now that Middle Eastern terrorism has attained a global reach—play out, that is, until the United States and its allies reduce that reach dramatically. That is why, in the fight between tradition and modernity in the Middle East, it is ultimately America's resolve that is being tested.

ON THE DAY that American Airlines flight 77 lifted off from Dulles International Airport, bound for a fiery crash into the west side of the Pentagon, a venerable Washington landmark stood quietly against the dawn. Located just a block from the White House, the residence of Lieutenant Stephen Decatur prepared to welcome visitors as it has since 1818. Here, amid the mementos of an adventurous life, its famed occupant had regaled guests with stories of piracy on the high seas and the heroic deeds he and his crew had performed long ago. Nearly 200 years later, and just two miles away, another drama was unfolding. Only this time, Middle Eastern terrorism had come to America, the pirates were in the skies above, and the heroes were those racing to save their coworkers from an all-consuming darkness. Their efforts, too, will prove not to have been in vain. □



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Couldn't Be Worse?

Iraq After Saddam

Ofra Bengio

THE MAIN working hypothesis, taken almost as an act of faith and embraced by many Western policymakers and pundits since the end of the Gulf War, is that the West's "Iraq problem"—and most of Iraq's problems, too—would be easily solved once President Saddam Hussein disappeared from the scene. Some observers have therefore couched the "Iraq problem" as one of biology—meaning not the threat of Iraqi biological weapons, but rather Saddam's mortality.

Not all delusional thinking is based on ignorance, but this example is. The contention that Saddam's removal through death or incapacitation would solve most of the difficulties at hand is flawed on at least two counts, one having to do with the past, the other with the future.

First, it ignores the far-reaching changes that Saddam and the Ba'athi regime have wrought in Iraqi society and political culture. The havoc wreaked upon Iraq's socioeconomic system will take years to heal. The total castration of the political system will not be easy to repair either, even in the very unlikely event that a liberal-democratic regime were to come to power in Baghdad. Finally, the mending of the fragmented Iraqi polity, now divided between a rump state controlled by the Ba'ath and two fractious Kurdish administrations in the north, will not be a simple matter.

Even more importantly, the "biology" approach ignores Saddam's own plans and preparations for Iraq's future. Saddam is determined to ensure that his legacies and the system he has built are perpetuated after his departure from this life. In this regard, several questions are pertinent: Is Saddam Hussein walking in the footsteps of the late Syrian President Hafez al-Asad, as well as other leaders in this region, in preparing a "hereditary presidency"? If so, what would such a regime be like? In specific institutional terms, what would be the fate of the three pillars on which the regime has been based for the last 33 years: the Ba'ath Party, the security services and the army?

Putting the House in Order

FOR MANY years Saddam has refrained from dealing with the issue of succession, for, like other absolute rulers, he could not imagine his roost ruled by anyone else. However, in the last few years he has plunged into the subject head-on. It is true that Saddam has made some spectacular mistakes, but he has shown a real propensity for anticipating and preparing

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for any venture or eventuality he deems to be important—and securing the succession and his legacy is one of them. Among his most critical tasks, therefore, has been to purge potential threats and rivals from within his own family. He has taken this precautionary measure not only out of fear for his own rule, but also to prepare the groundwork for his heirs.

Initially, Saddam had elevated his relatives to the highest posts in the country in a nepotistic manner that would almost shame a monarchical regime. Over time, however, he has begun to eliminate them, one after the other, not only politically, but in some cases physically, as well. For example, Saddam ordered the murders of his two cousins and sons-in-law, Hussein Kamil and Saddam Kamil, who fled in 1995 to Jordan (together with Saddam's two daughters) and made the terrible mistake of returning to their deaths in 1996.

Suffice it to say that by 2001, the entire family network of brothers, cousins, sons-in-law and brothers-in-law, who had once held key posts in the Ba'ath and constituted an important pillar of support for the regime, was gone except for one person—Saddam's cousin, 'Ali Hasan al-Majid. Majid has demonstrated his unquestioned loyalty to Saddam in repeated brutal acts, from supervising the chemical attack on the Kurds (in Halabja in 1988), to coordinating the elimination of other family members (the Kamils in 1996). Majid appears to have been left "in reserve", possibly to aid Saddam's heir in consolidating power during the transitional period.[1]

Saddam's other important task has been to decide which of his two sons, 'Udayy or Qusayy, should be groomed as heir apparent. He has made no open declaration, but it is clear that, at least for the time being, he has chosen the younger son, Qusayy. His choice is not difficult to understand. 'Udayy has discredited himself by his unruly and literally murderous behavior, his sexual and other excesses, his inflated ego, and his unbridled ambitions—all this in addition to a physical disability which is the result of an attempt on his life in 1996. However, 'Udayy is not resigned to his father's decision. In the last two years a latent struggle for power has developed between 'Udayy, who views himself as the rightful heir apparent, and Qusayy—or, more precisely, between 'Udayy and his father, who is actively grooming his younger son to succeed him.

Saddam has tried to fob off 'Udayy with membership in the National Assembly, the rubber-stamp Iraqi parliament. This does not appear to have worked, however. Mimicking his father's tactics, 'Udayy has unleashed a propaganda campaign and promoted a personality cult via the print and broadcast media outlets under his control.[2] 'Udayy's message to his father, his brother, and the rest of the country is clear: he is entitled to rule Iraq after his father, not only because he is the elder of the two brothers, but also because he is more capable. He portrays himself not simply as a replica of his father, but as better than the original. 'Udayy is said to be smarter than his father (he has a doctorate); more pious (he grew a beard, and claims to know the Quran by heart; certainly, he quotes from it more lavishly than his father); and more popular (winning 99.99 percent of the vote in his election in 2000 to the National Assembly, against the 99.96 percent his father received in the 1995 presidential election). Most importantly, he has portrayed himself as being more liberal, democratic and "clean" than his

[1]The latest victim was Saddam's cousin, 'Ala' 'Abd al-Qadir Sulayman, who sought asylum in Jordan but was refused and had to return to Baghdad. He had been working in Iraqi Intelligence since 1990.

[2]All sources for this essay are available from the editors upon request.

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father. Attempting to appeal to the public over the heads of his father and brother, 'Udayy has intensified in the last two years his criticism of the work of different ministries, calling, for example, for corruption (and corrupt individuals) to be purged from the security and intelligence apparatus. He has pressed for the National Assembly to be granted real legislative powers, and for opening the political and economic systems to public participation. He also carefully calibrates his declarations for self-aggrandizement, even at his father's expense. In one of these, for example, he said: "We will not recognize Israel even if we are kept under an embargo for another hundred years." In another he called for the inclusion of Kuwait in the map of Iraq.

'Udayy's behavior has not endeared him to his father. To the contrary, it seems to have encouraged Saddam to accelerate his promotion of Qusayy to leadership in the centers of real power: the army, the security services and the Ba'ath Party. To emphasize Qusayy's closeness to his father, government media (which are not owned by 'Udayy), make a point of publishing cables of support from the younger son to his father (but only rarely from 'Udayy). And while 'Udayy has bragged about his role as supervisor of the paramilitary force, *Fida'iyyu Saddam* (Saddam's Commandos)—another bone that Saddam had thrown to him earlier on—Qusayy was made supervisor of the Republican Guard, a key post that ensures the very survival of the regime. Saddam has also reportedly granted Qusayy important positions in the military and security apparatuses, including roles as the head of the special security apparatus and as overseer of Iraqi state intelligence, military intelligence and general security. More alarming for 'Udayy has been the juxtaposition of his symbolic post (membership in the National Assembly) with Qusayy's appointment, in May 2001, to membership in the Ba'ath Party Regional Command, one of the regime's three most important pillars. On the same occasion Qusayy was appointed to the key post of deputy chief (to his father) in the Ba'ath Party military bureau. Thus, short of announcing it explicitly, Saddam has signaled the centers of power in Iraq that Qusayy should be treated as the heir apparent.

All the while, Qusayy himself has remained in his father's shadow. His own introversion might account for this, but it is more likely a consequence of his father's effort to shield him from criticism, jealousies and acts of vengeance either from within the family or from outside of it. In the meantime, however, stories published abroad have begun to circulate about Qusayy's own atrocities, such as the execution in 1998 of 2,000 prisoners at his behest. Whatever the truth of such reports, it is certain that if Qusayy wishes to live up to his father's expectations, and to frustrate his brother's ambitions, he must develop a more commanding public persona. In the race between the "self-made" man, 'Udayy, and the "father-made" Qusayy, the latter appears now to have the better chances. But in the struggle for power that may ensue between them after Saddam's departure, anything could happen.

From the point of view of Iraq's abused citizens, its neighbors and other countries, it can hardly be assumed that a regime run by either brother would constitute an improvement on the status quo. Any significant improvement would depend on the state of institutions in Iraq, a matter to which we now turn our attention.

Balancing the Regime's Power Pillars

TO PREPARE the country for his heir and to perpetuate his own legacy, Saddam has reinforced the three pillars on which he has based his rule: the Ba'ath Party, the army,

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and the security apparatus. In so doing, he has produced a new set of balances among and within these three critical institutions.

Of the three pillars, the most intriguing and difficult to assess is the Ba'ath Party. The Ba'ath is, numerically speaking, a large party—with branches in all parts of the country except for Kurdistan. It is a well-knit and well-organized group. In fact, it is the only organized civil institution inside Iraq. In the absence of a strong opposition party, and due to the total lack of a civil society in Iraq, the chances are good that any political vacuum would be filled by members of the Ba'athi ruling elite, especially since it holds the key civilian posts in the country and has vested interests in the continuation of the regime. Still, Saddam has embarked on a "face-lifting" project for the party. Thus, at the beginning of 2000, he required all party members to pass an examination (Saddam's biography was included in the material that had to be studied) with a view to, as he said, "increase the members' political and organizational consciousness and to strengthen their leadership abilities." He also held several meetings with party members to raise morale. In addition, he ordered the establishment of new party branches in different parts of the country to bring new blood into the system—the young, women, Shi'a and others. This is reflected in the new Regional Command of May 2001 which has seven new faces, including Qusayy, an ex-military officer and a woman, which is quite a novelty. In addition, nine out of 19 members are Shi'a—the largest ever in the command.

Ideologically speaking, however, the Ba'ath is a spent force. Aware of this, Saddam is trying to turn it into an "Islamist" party by, among other things, ordering its members to memorize chapters of the Quran. In certain areas, too, the party has been partly superseded by what one might call "new-old forces"—the tribes and the military. This is happening because, after 33 years of rule, the Ba'ath has become a very unpopular, indeed a hated and despised, institution. Its unpopularity has been magnified by the widespread corruption produced by the past decade of sanctions. While leading party members have been enriched, an ever-widening gap has developed between the leadership and the rank-and-file membership.

Yet despite its weaknesses and declining internal cohesion, the Ba'ath seems unlikely to disappear from the Iraqi political map. It may change its name, as the Communist Party did in Romania and elsewhere; or it may retain its name and compete with other forces, as the Communists did in Russia. Even if it is altogether dismantled as an organization, individuals and groups within the Ba'ath will continue to exert influence because the party has become a kind of class unto itself. Bureaucracies have ways of surviving, regardless of changes at the top. The influence of the party in post-Saddam Iraq will be a function of its ability to develop alliances with other power centers, such as the tribes and the military (especially the Republican Guard), before the succession actually takes place.

The security services, the regime's second pillar, play a special role in Iraq. In the entire history of the regime, there has been only one serious attempt to oust the Ba'ath from power, when chief of security Nazim Kzar tried in 1973. While his failure was not pre-ordained, it does point to certain inherent weaknesses within the security services that lessen the chance that they can be utilized to promote regime change. First, the security services, as their name indicates, are not one cohesive group but many organizations which, more often than not, compete with and spy on each other. Second, in order to successfully achieve a regime change, they still must rely on a political-civilian orga-

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nization or group to fill the political vacuum—they themselves have no base among the population. Third, for all the talk of their being the Ba'ath's "institutes of fear", they are hardly a match for the military if a power struggle should ensue between them. Thus, it is unlikely that one security force, or even several of them, can successfully initiate a coup, let alone manage to keep power in the aftermath. Instead, the security services are likely to serve whatever individual and regime comes to power.

This leaves us with the third pillar, the military, as a possible agent of positive change. On this prospect there are opposing opinions among serious observers, including knowledgeable Iraqi dissidents and exiles. On one side are those who think that only the military is capable of masterminding a coup; on the other are those who think that the military is the least capable force in Iraq today.

Those who believe the latter base their argument on three important facts. First, the army is no longer one united body but rather two separate ones, divided between the Republican Guard and the regular armed forces (including the militia). Second, in 33 years of Ba'athi rule the regime has developed different mechanisms for controlling the military and neutralizing its potential to oust the regime, as had occurred regularly in pre-Ba'athi Iraq. Finally, the record is clear: the regime has been successful in nipping all attempted coups in the bud.

No doubt, however, many of those who raise these points do so because they desire to see regime change carried out in a democratic fashion. That may be to their credit, but the fact remains that, despite its problems, the army possesses important assets absent from both the party and the security forces. The army is the only force that can ensure the integrity of the Iraqi state. Relatively speaking, it is not as tainted by corruption or a legacy of oppression as the other two power centers. Moreover, the masses find it easier to identify with the army, which they see as a victim of Saddam's grandiose dreams. The fact that many families lost sons in his futile wars increases rather than decreases popular identification with the army. Notwithstanding its division, the army is still the only force that can initiate a coup and control the aftermath. A coup could be masterminded by the Republican Guard, for example, coordinating with elements within the Ba'ath, or by joining with a popular uprising. What is important is that in the absence of a normal civil society, the growing power of the tribes and the strengthening of centrifugal forces—from the Kurdish and Shi'a communities—only the army can function as an effective national institution.

Saddam is well aware of the army's ability both to protect the regime and to threaten its survival. Therefore, he has cultivated its goodwill by, among other things, appointing ex-high-ranking officers to key posts in the administration, though not to the highest political echelons in the Ba'ath Party. Thus, as of last year nearly all of the 15 provincial governors were ex-high-ranking officers. Similarly, breaking a tradition of secrecy that forbade citing even the chief of staff by name, active high-ranking officers, especially the commander of the air force, are now given a measure of publicity. These changes may be motivated by a need to inspire awe among the population, coupled with Saddam's realization that only military officers can do this. If that is true, and it probably is, then it means that after 33 years of Ba'athi rule Iraq is back to square one: as before, the army is needed for regime survival and, more specifically, for preventing a popular uprising against the chosen new leader—Qusayy Saddam Hussein.

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Alternative Futures for Iraq

WITH ALL this in mind, then, what kind of regime is most likely to develop in post-Saddam Iraq, if the matter were to remain exclusively in Iraqi hands? The answer depends in part on when and how Saddam departs. Saddam could die suddenly or unexpectedly (whether by natural or other causes), or he could remain in power for five to ten more years. In between these options are endless other possibilities: a palace coup launched by one of his sons or other relatives, a military coup staged by the Republican Guard, or a popular uprising that is joined by the military.

If Saddam disappears soon, a power struggle between 'Udayy and Qusayy is likely. Qusayy's chances are better in such a struggle because of his strong links with the army and his membership in the Ba'ath Party regional command, but his success is by no means guaranteed. In this scenario the Ba'ath Party would retain a hold on the country, for its members still hold key posts in the state and because no alternative civilian power centers have developed in the country. Moreover, with the sanctions still partly in place, the Ba'ath retains crucial leverage *vis-à-vis* both civilian society and the military. It still holds the key to the country's oil income and the distribution of food and basic needs for the population at large. The Ba'ath might have to deal with some recalcitrant tribes, hence its need to ally with other more docile ones and, even more importantly, with the army. In short, Saddam's sudden disappearance promises, at least in the short-run, a key role for the army, good chances for the Ba'ath to survive his death intact, a struggle for power between different individuals and groups (especially in the Hussein family), and an ensuing period of considerable instability.

If, however, Saddam survives for another five to ten years and then dies a natural death, then the chances for Qusayy to be his father's heir would increase. A long transition period will enable Qusayy to consolidate his control over the key centers of power and dispose of his opponents while his father is still in a position to assist him. On the other hand, a long transition period may reduce the Ba'ath's survivability. Erosion and fatigue within the organization is likely, thus jeopardizing its ability to function as a leading force. Tribal loyalties or new opposition groupings are likely to increase their influence as the party's power wanes. In this scenario, too, the army is likely to play a key role.

In either of these cases, or most scenarios in between them, several features of a post-Saddam Iraq are clear. First, the army will dominate Iraqi national politics, whether it safeguards the regime from its foes, itself initiates a coup against it, or controls the country by default in the aftermath of an upheaval. Second, the Ba'ath Party may well survive, and no political opposition at home or abroad will be able to match it for a long while. But third, the total stagnation of Iraqi politics, which has characterized the long years of Ba'athi rule, will most likely come to an end. The end of stagnation, however, could as easily lead to chronic and severe instability as to a benign opening up of Iraq's political and economic systems. Fourth, if either 'Udayy or Qusayy prevails after Saddam, the key personality of the regime will be essentially as ruthless and authoritarian as Saddam is today. Particularly since Saddam himself is now deeply engaged in preparing the country for post-Saddam Iraq, the chances are very likely that, even after his departure, we will see "business as usual" in Baghdad.

Therefore, anyone who imagines that, left to its own devices, post-Saddam

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Iraq will become a democracy, or cease to seek weapons of mass destruction, or have qualitatively different relations with its neighbors, or be led by someone significantly less brutal than Saddam himself, has a difficult argument to make. There is simply no evidence for such a view.

This leaves us with no other conclusion than this: If the danger that Ba'athi Iraq poses to its own people, the Middle East and the United States is to end, that end will have to be prompted by forces external to Iraq. This does not mean that the United States and its allies will need to directly conquer, occupy and detoxify Iraq's political culture, for such an intrusive and protracted project may be too dangerous, unworkable or both. But it does mean that the United States must design a plan to influence and to work with the Iraqi army's leadership cadres in order to prevent either of Saddam's sons from continuing his life's work. Such a plan may need to include the use of force in support of lesser evils in a post-Saddam succession struggle. It may have been comforting in past years for some to have thought that such plans, and the risks they entail, would not be necessary. After September 11, however, the civilized world can no longer afford the illusion that the Iraq problem will simply take care of itself. □

Foggy

We are going after terrorism in a comprehensive way, not just in the present instance of Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, but terrorism as it affects nations around the world . . . .

—Secretary of State Colin Powell,
October 2, 2001

◆

The Palestinian/Israeli issues affect the atmosphere of cooperation, but, essentially, these are, on some planes, two different things. One is that there are violent people trying to destroy societies, ours, many others in the world. The world recognizes that and we are going to stop those people.

On the other hand, there are issues and violence and political issues that need to be resolved in the Middle East [between] Israelis and Palestinians. But we all recognize that the path to solve those is through negotiation . . . .

I guess that's about as close as I can come to the kind of sophisticated analysis I'm sure you will want to do on your own. But they are clearly issues that are different, not only in geography but also, to some extent, in their nature.

—State Department spokesman Richard Boucher,
September 27, 2001

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Curtains for the Ba'ath

Michael Eisenstadt

EVEN BEFORE September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration faced difficult challenges and choices as it charted U.S. policy toward Iraq. The period of Iraqi quiescence following Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 was clearly over, the containment regime on Iraq had weakened, and the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian violence had imposed constraints on Washington's diplomatic leeway while creating new trouble-making opportunities for Baghdad. Sensing that momentum was on his side, Saddam Hussein seemed increasingly self-confident and assertive.

From the outset, most of President Bush's senior foreign policy advisors seemed to favor "regime change" over the continued "containment" of Iraq. Yet, a State Department-led effort to bolster containment and to steal a march on the proponents of regime change by "smartening" sanctions—well before the new administration's Iraq policy review was completed—suggested deep divisions in the Bush team. Though the smart sanctions effort failed due to a threatened Russian veto that was, somehow, not anticipated by the State Department, the administration's Iraq policy review still had not been completed before September 11.

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The events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax incidents should have been transformational events. They should have highlighted the dangers of "business as usual" in an age of sophisticated terrorism and weapons proliferation, and the potentially high costs of ignoring the likes of Osama bin Laden and rogue regimes such as that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yet, regarding Iraq, all signs indicate the contrary. The old arguments continue, albeit in slightly different form, inside the administration and out, about whether, when and how to deal with Saddam Hussein and his regime.

Some believe that Iraq is connected to the events of September 11 or to the anthrax terror campaign that followed, and that these events make regime change more important and urgent than ever. Some believe that Iraq's relation to September 11 is irrelevant, that its enormous potential to harm America makes the status quo intolerably dangerous, and that after September 11, more people recognize this. But others argue that attacking Iraq, *even if* it was complicit in the September 11 events, would alienate Arabs and Muslims whose support is vital to the ongoing campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. For this reason, they argue, containment will have to do for now—if not for the indefinite future as well.

The future of containment, however, is increasingly uncertain. Weapons inspec-

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tions have not occurred in Iraq since 1998, and sanctions—a central pillar of containment—have eroded significantly, and will continue to do so. Furthermore, experience has shown that deterrence is an inadequate policy instrument *vis-à-vis* Iraq. Sooner or later Saddam's ambitions will bump up against U.S. interests, and he will again miscalculate in such a way as to generate conflict with the United States. Thus, while containment can limit Baghdad's trouble-making potential, it cannot stop Iraq from stockpiling weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or prevent further U.S.-Iraqi confrontations. And as long as Baghdad possesses chemical, biological and—perhaps in the future—nuclear weapons, a confrontation with a neighboring state or the United States could lead to their use. For this reason, the longer that hard decisions are delayed, the greater the potential costs of a future confrontation. It is simply too risky for the United States *not* to take bold steps to prevent such an eventuality. The case for regime change is more compelling now than ever before—even if it is not clear that the international environment is more supportive of it.

The shortcomings of containment go beyond questions of sustainability, or the risks of complacency. Containment requires an onerous forward U.S. military presence in the region that is clearly counterproductive politically for the United States. And to the degree that sanctions contribute to a sense of Arab/Muslim grievance against the United States and the West, containment stokes political extremism in Iraq and beyond.

Another drawback of containment is that by its very nature it is a *preventive* rather than a constructive policy; it does not hold out the possibility of a change for the better in Iraq. Regime change, by contrast, offers at least a potential path for a better future for the long-suffering people of Iraq, and for achieving long-term U.S. objectives in the Persian Gulf. It is the key to the emergence of an Iraq that can live in peace with its own people and its neighbors, and to stemming further WMD proliferation in the region. At least at the margins, too, a less troublesome Iraqi regime could make an Israeli-Palestinian accommodation easier to achieve. For all these reasons, the risks associated with containment now outweigh those associated with regime change.[1]

If the case for regime change is clear, the way forward is not. The debate in Washington about regime change in Iraq has become highly partisan. Most who favor regime change have become disposed to support the "enclaves" strategy of Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Most who favor containment justify their view on the belief that deterrence can work, and that the "enclaves" strategy is unrealistic—as though this were the only path to regime change. The way the debate has been framed has had the effect of placing controversies about personalities and organizations over substantive discussions of means and ends.

In truth, there is no support for the enclaves approach in the region, and Iraqi opposition groups are unlikely anytime soon to be capable of using liberated enclaves in northern or southern Iraq as springboards for offensive operations against Baghdad—with or without U.S. air support. Even if such an approach were to enjoy unexpected success, it probably could not work fast enough to avert the potentially disastrous use of WMD by the Ba'athi regime, should it feel its survival threatened. By nibbling away at its periphery, rather than by landing crushing blows to the nerve centers of the regime, the enclaves approach eschews the type of devastating and decisive American military

[1]For more on the shortcomings of containment, see Ofra Bengio's analysis just above.

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action that is probably required to unseat Saddam and his regime, without disastrous consequences for innocent Iraqis and the peoples of the region.

Unfortunately, the "containment versus enclaves" structure of the debate over Iraq has obscured the real choices before us. This essay proposes to re-invigorate the debate by offering an alternative approach to regime change. The opposition has a role in it, but so does a significant use of U.S. airpower combined with psychological and economic warfare to create conditions in which a coup or an uprising by domestic opponents of the regime could occur. This alternative is based on several assumptions.

First, regime change offers the *possibility* of a better future for Iraq—including perhaps a less repressive, more broad-based government—though admittedly, the ultimate outcome of either a coup or uprising cannot be assessed with confidence.

Second, even less desirable outcomes might still offer advantages over the status quo. While a coup that would sweep Saddam, his family and his inner circle from power would still likely lead to an authoritarian military government, the head of such a regime is unlikely to possess the combination of personal attributes that make Saddam and his inner circle so dangerous: extreme ruthlessness, unbounded ambition, a propensity to miscalculate and a burning desire to avenge the Desert Storm defeat. And while a military government might still be wedded to WMD, it could be easier to manage the consequences of proliferation in Iraq with a regime less prone to miscalculation and aggression. Alternatively, while an uprising could result in a loss of central government control over much of Iraq, such an outcome would not necessarily be more harmful for the Iraqi people, the United States and its allies than the status quo—with its potential for an Iraqi nuclear breakout and another regional war. (Indeed, the residents of northern Iraq have experienced a net improvement in living conditions during the past decade due to the absence of central government control there.)

Third, it may be possible to achieve regime change without the United States and its allies having to occupy Iraq, and undertake a protracted and intrusive nation-building effort.

Finally, the United States will require access to bases and facilities of one or more regional Arab allies (or Turkey), so that it could commit substantial land- and sea-based airpower to the effort. Such support will not be forthcoming without a major diplomatic push, and unless the United States can convince its allies that it is serious about regime change and can show them a credible, carefully considered plan.

What is proposed here is not a sure thing; regime change could ultimately require a Desert Storm II. It is not clear, however, that domestic or international opinion would support a Desert Storm II. The plan outlined below, then, is put forth in the spirit that it is better to pay less than more to achieve the same outcome, and imprudent to ignore the very real political and military constraints on U.S. freedom of action, even when pursuing key U.S. policy objectives.

The Plan

THE SUCCESS of regime change in Iraq will hinge largely on the ability of the United States to harness the potential inherent in four principal policy levers that it holds, but has hitherto failed to effectively employ in concert: 1) military action; 2) psychological operations and propaganda; 3) economic pressure; and 4) support for the opposition. None of these alone can reliably overthrow the regime

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of Saddam Hussein; taken together, however, synergy among them could create the necessary conditions for a coup or popular uprising that could sweep the Ba'ath from power. Let us take these four elements one by one.

I. Military Action

THE MAIN obstacle to overthrowing the Ba'athi regime is not a lack of desire among Iraqis to get rid of it, but the efficacy of the regime's internal security apparatus and the extraordinary measures taken by Saddam Hussein to ensure his own survival. These security organs include the Presidential bodyguard, the Special Security Organization (SSO), the Special Republican Guard (SRG, a division-sized force located mainly in and around Baghdad), Saddam's Commandos, and the three Republican Guard (RG) armored divisions ringing Baghdad.

Nearly every coup attempt originating inside or outside the country in the past three decades has been compromised beforehand or nipped in the bud. Likewise, the regime succeeded in putting down the 1991 uprising following Operation Desert Storm—the most serious challenge to Ba'athi rule to date—and it has put down several minor outbreaks of violence since then (in Ramadi in May-June 1995 and in Basra in March 1999). The bottom line is that as long as the internal security apparatus remains loyal, intact and alert, coup attempts and uprisings are likely to fail. Consequently, U.S. air strikes that land damaging blows to these organizations and thereby disrupt their functioning are a *sine qua non* for a successful coup or uprising. Recognition of this fact has thus far been missing from U.S. policy.

An air campaign that visits grievous injury upon these security organizations, and that immobilizes them for at least several days, could compromise the survival of the regime. By forcing the units that form the main pillar of Saddam's rule to disperse and lay low, a U.S. air campaign could create a window of opportunity for a successful coup or uprising (though each would require different targeting strategies). This concept is not founded on blind faith in the promise of airpower, for it does not require airpower to do anything that it has not already done in previous wars (e.g., force static ground forces to disperse, and interdict them when they move).

In going after the regime's security apparatus, the United States should strike only essential targets, dealing concentrated blows against the Special Republican Guard, Special Security Organization and the Republican Guard. It should avoid the temptation of using the opportunity to hit other target sets (e.g., conventional military units or WMD-related facilities) that could dilute the impact of its effort. Because the United States pays a political price every time it uses force against Baghdad—even in a post-September 11 environment—the United States must not squander prestige, political capital, and a rare opportunity to achieve key objectives by diffusing its efforts.

Even were such an air campaign not to achieve its primary goal of regime change, it would still weaken Iraq's military capabilities and shake the confidence of the regime, thereby bolstering deterrence and containment. The three RG armored divisions around Baghdad that would be prime targets of such an effort form the backbone of Iraq's conventional military might. And it should be recalled that the four days of strikes of Operation Desert Fox—which targeted some of Saddam's key internal security organizations (the SRG and RG)—shook Baghdad so hard that the regime turned inward for nearly a year and a half afterwards.

There are, of course, major obstacles

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to pulling off a successful coup or uprising. In either case, success will require extensive planning. The few individuals both willing and able to undertake a coup need to be identified, a candidate from among them recruited and his reliability assessed before such an operation begins, in order to avoid falling victim to Trojan horse-type schemes engineered in Baghdad. Here, members of the Iraqi opposition might help identify potential coup-makers, though their potential contribution must be weighed against the risk of compromising the effort by involving oppositionists who might be incapable of keeping secrets or, worse, who are working for Saddam.

There are also practical obstacles to a successful coup. Assuming that a coup plotter could attract support from fellow officers for his effort without being detected (admittedly, a tall order), the ability of coalition airpower to support such an effort could be limited by various factors. It could prove difficult, for example, to distinguish friendly from hostile units involved in close-in fighting during a coup (though "friendlies" could solve this problem by placing aerial identification panels on their vehicles). Washington has also to consider the possibility that should Saddam learn of such U.S. efforts, he might organize a "coup" against himself in order to cause the United States to call off its air campaign, re-emerging once U.S. forces had returned home. He has, in the past, spoken obliquely of such a ploy.[2] Some skeptics may worry, too, that by supporting potential coup-makers, the United States will be tainting them as American stooges and thus doom them to failure. Such risks could be mitigated if the United States were initially to adopt a positive, yet somewhat detached stance toward a new government, allowing the latter to define the parameters of a new relationship with Washington.

Clearly, organizing a successful coup will be difficult. Sparking an uprising would not be easy either, but it is not unprecedented. The 1991 uprising was a direct consequence of Iraq's defeat in Operation Desert Storm. Because it was unexpected and spontaneous in its origins, it has been passed off as a one time event—a missed opportunity never again to be repeated.[3] This need not, however, be the case. Several factors contributed to the 1991 uprising:

•pent-up hatred caused by decades of domestic repression, economic

[2]In December 1991, in a speech to senior military officers, Saddam mocked reports of a coup in Iraq appearing in the foreign press at the time by sarcastically asking his commanders: "They are talking every day about an expected military coup in Iraq . . . [and] how to help the coupists. . . . We need people among you to prepare for a military coup, in which I will take part, so that the West may feel pleased. . . . Nothing remains except that we, you and I, arrange a military coup. Let us write down the names of those who wish to join us in staging such a coup." INA, December 14, 1991, in FBIS-NES-91-241, December 16, 1991, p. 36.

[3]The 1991 uprising erupted spontaneously amid the confusion and tumult of post-war southern Iraq. According to one account, the uprising started when soldiers returning from the front turned their guns on portraits of Saddam in downtown Basra, thereby breaking the barrier of fear that had heretofore paralyzed opponents of the regime, and prompting a mixed mob of soldiers and civilians to storm the offices of the Ba'ath party and the intelligence services there. The unrest spread quickly through much of the south. The Kurds in northern Iraq—watching developments in the south and sensing a perhaps unique opportunity to shake off central government control—joined the uprising, implementing a plan they had prepared for just such an eventuality. However, operational coordination during the uprising between the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north was practically nonexistent.

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hardship (due to the Iran-Iraq War), and the regime's ruinous military adventures;

•the lopsided coalition victory in Desert Storm, which undermined Saddam's image of invincibility and caused many Iraqis to momentarily lose their fear of the regime;

•the disintegration of Iraq's army, which freed large numbers of retreating soldiers—many still armed—from the strictures of military discipline and the watchful eyes of the security services, enabling them to serve as a catalyst for the uprising;

•the defeat in Desert Storm, which paralyzed the regime's supporters with fear, while the disarray and confusion caused by the air campaign limited the ability of the regime's internal security apparatus to follow and respond to events;

•the belief that the United States would provide military support to an uprising, which encouraged and emboldened the rebels.

While it may not be possible to replicate all these conditions today, the United States could recreate some of them. A concerted air campaign against the main pillars of the regime could undermine Saddam's image of invincibility, shake the confidence of his supporters, cause disarray in the ranks of the security services, and embolden its enemies to seize the day. Much would depend on the perception in Iraq that the United States is serious about removing the Ba'athi regime. In light of its mixed track record, producing the necessary perception will not be easy, though an air campaign that focuses on regime targets could rapidly alter popular Iraqi estimations of American resolve. The opposition could play a role in exploiting such altered perceptions and expectations; in accordance with prior plans, oppositionists in southern Iraq (including members of the external opposition inserted into Iraq beforehand to organize such efforts) could engage in acts of sabotage and open rebellion to help spark a wider uprising during a U.S. air campaign. Likewise, oppositionists outside of Iraq might succeed in convincing commanders of units they are in contact with (either regular military or RG formations) to join in an uprising; the participation of ground units in such an undertaking would greatly enhance the odds of success.

A future attempt to foment a coup or uprising would also benefit from the fact that the United States would be dedicating all available assets toward achieving this goal—whereas past efforts to target Iraq's leadership were unfocused, and not supported by other policy instruments. In Operation Desert Storm, the United States devoted only 260 out of nearly 36,250 strike sorties against "leadership" targets. (Even so, it reportedly came close to killing Saddam Hussein once or twice). American planners at the time, moreover, had only a vague understanding of how the regime's internal security apparatus worked. We have a much better picture today. Finally, these 260 strikes were not carried out in accordance with a detailed concept of how to bring about either a coup or an uprising, and there was no supporting psychological operations (psyops) effort to speak of. Even so, the United States succeeded in fomenting an uprising that might have succeeded in overthrowing the regime had not the United States withheld crucial support for the rebels. Presumably, Washington would not make that same mistake again.

In considering the relative advantages of a coup versus an uprising, policymakers

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face a conundrum. While a coup offers the possibility of a relatively swift, smooth transition, limited bloodletting, few if any adverse consequences for regional stability, and the possibility of regime change without the use of WMD, it is very hard to do. On the other hand, while an uprising is more "doable" and offers the possibility of fundamental political change in Iraq, it carries several major liabilities, including the possibility of a messy denouement that leads to chaos, massive bloodletting, or the use of chemical or biological weapons against the rebels and America's allies in the region. The risks associated with these outcomes, however, are still less daunting than those associated with the survival of the present regime: a revanchist Iraq armed with biological and nuclear weapons, perhaps provoking another regional war.

II. Psyops and Propaganda Activities

PSYOPS AND propaganda activities that aim to diminish Saddam in the eyes of his supporters, exacerbate existing strains between his inner circle and the military, stir up popular discontent, and embolden opponents of the regime are a *crucial* component of any policy that seeks regime change in Baghdad. Such efforts could keep Saddam on the defensive and create an atmosphere of crisis and tension, forcing the regime to divert assets to deal with internal security, and leaving fewer resources available for clandestine technology procurement or trouble-making elsewhere. Such efforts could transform the psychological environment in the country, creating an atmosphere in which a coup or uprising might occur.

Saddam understands this well. He devotes enormous energy to efforts that make him appear larger than life and invest him with an aura of invincibility. This explains the huge posters and murals of Saddam found everywhere in Iraq. The importance Saddam attaches to the psychological dimension can be gauged from a speech he delivered to senior Ba'ath officials from Basra in June 1999 in which he exhorted them to "strive to defeat the enemy's plans" and to "stand firm in the face of the influence of hostile media and information", which has an "influence bigger than that of bombs."[4] Saddam realizes that psychological domination of his subjects is the key to their physical subjugation, and that losing the propaganda and psychological warfare battle could threaten his regime.

For this reason, the United States should support opposition radio and television propaganda efforts that seek to diminish Saddam through ridicule, and by planting doubts and raising questions about the stability of his rule and the long-term prospects of his regime. Such propaganda—especially on the eve of a crisis or in tandem with U.S. military action against Saddam's internal security organizations—could help undermine his carefully cultivated image of omnipotence and erode the climate of extreme fear that paralyzes his opponents. It could help create—at least briefly—the necessary conditions for a coup or an uprising.

Relations between Saddam and the military have never been warm. Saddam distrusts the military and has consolidated his control over them by fear. Moreover, the army quietly resents his interference in military affairs, and many officers are bitter at the ruinous impact that his rule has had on the country and its armed forces. American propaganda should play on this distrust and resentment, emphasizing the risks incurred by the armed forces as a result of continued Ba'athi rule. Such propaganda, along with the adoption of more aggressive rules of engagement for coalition aircraft

[4] *Al-Hayat*, June 18, 1999, p. 2.

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patrolling the no-fly zones (e.g., allowing them to strike Iraqi ground forces, especially RG units), might encourage members of the armed forces to turn on the regime if given the opportunity to do so.

Finally, Washington needs to rebuild its credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people. In particular, it needs to convince them that it is serious about removing the Ba'athi regime. Average Iraqis are unlikely to join another uprising if they believe that the United States will once again abandon them in midstream. The way to do this is by speaking out against human rights violations by Baghdad, supporting the opposition (the INC as well as other groups), and most importantly, by using massive force against regime targets. The bombing of organizations responsible for repressing the Iraqi people and ensuring the survival of the regime would be the most effective way to convince Iraqis that the United States is serious about ridding Iraq of the regime of Saddam Hussein.

III. Intensified Economic Pressure

SANCTIONS ARE a crucial component of containment: they prevent Iraq from rebuilding its conventional military capabilities and recouping much of the political and economic clout it enjoyed before the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Nevertheless, Baghdad has been able to generate a stream of unsupervised income through illicit oil sales to Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran, and by manipulating the "oil for food" program. The amount earned through smuggling amounts to $1–2 billion a year (depending on oil prices)—sums that Saddam uses to assure the loyalty of his largely Sunni Arab power base and to insulate them from the effects of sanctions. Intensified efforts to reduce the flow of unsupervised oil income in order to reduce the amount of money Saddam can disburse to his power base might make some of them more receptive to regime change.

In modern Iraq, conflicts among members of the regime's inner circle and popular political unrest have often had an economic dimension: the 1920 nationalist revolt against the British; the tribal rebellions of 1935–36; fighting since 1994 among the two main Kurdish opposition groups; and the defection of Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamil in 1995 were all at least partly due to struggles over money, land or other material assets. The potential role of economic pressures in contributing to political unrest should not be underestimated, and should be exploited to the utmost.

It has proven difficult to stop unsupervised oil sales. America's Kurdish friends and Turkish and Jordanian allies all benefit from the illicit oil trade, and none of the Arab Gulf states is yet willing to supplant Iraq as Jordan's main source of oil (many still harbor grudges over Jordan's position during the Gulf War). U.S. efforts in the spring of 2001 to rally UN support for a new Security Council resolution that would have reduced illegal oil sales failed when they came up against the threat of a Russian veto. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the post-September 11 situation is different, though this proposition needs to be tested. Should political efforts to tighten the economic noose on the regime fail, the United States retains the option of bombing Iraqi oil pumping terminals near the border with Syria and in the south, in order to reduce Iraq's oil income and pave the way for regime change.

IV. Support for the Opposition

SUPPORT FOR opponents of the regime is one of the most tangible expressions of America's commitment to regime change in Baghdad. Such support—including tangible assistance for opposition political and military activi-

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ties—could lay to rest the widespread perception in parts of the Arab world that the United States really wants Saddam to remain in power.

The external opposition also has other potentially important roles to play in achieving regime change. As noted above, they could identify and vet potential coup makers, or army officers who might commit their units in support of an uprising. Moreover, oppositionists with paramilitary training might be inserted into the country by the United States to catalyze and coordinate an uprising with the help of U.S. advisors outside of Iraq, with whom they would be in radio contact. (The lack of an ability to communicate and coordinate between different regions and cities was a key weakness of the 1991 uprising.) They could videotape images of rebellion, to be beamed around the world by satellite television in order to mobilize international support for a nascent uprising. Under certain circumstances, opposition military personnel could also be used to direct U.S. air strikes against regime forces, and perhaps to coordinate the airdrop of light arms to rebels.

Implementation of the approach to the opposition described here need not await the creation of a large, well-trained, well-equipped insurgent organization—which could take years to accomplish. Rather, the role that the external opposition might play in the event of an uprising could be filled by a relatively small number of highly motivated individuals who could be recruited and trained in a matter of weeks or a few months at most.

Ensuring an Acceptable Outcome

HOW CAN Washington be sure that a coup or an uprising will bring to power a more acceptable government in Baghdad? It can't. While it can shape the environment and help create the circumstances that might lead to a coup or an uprising, Washington will have but modest influence over the potentially messy, unpredictable, and probably violent process of regime change. Moreover, as suggested above, even under the best of conditions, a coup attempt or an uprising could prompt Baghdad to use chemical or biological weapons against its domestic enemies and those neighboring states associated with the United States. A subtle public diplomacy is required to ensure that the ultimate objective of the U.S. campaign remains ambiguous, so that Saddam does not recognize the existential threat to his regime until it is too late. But success at that cannot be guaranteed, so coalition airpower must be ready to conduct secondary strikes on nonconventional weapons stocks and associated delivery systems should they be deployed in preparation for use. This will require timely and accurate intelligence, and the ability to exploit it in real time. This is a very demanding requirement.

Such uncertainties and requirements, however, must be faced. Should Saddam or an equally vicious successor (probably one of his two sons) acquire nuclear weapons, all bets are off. The United States would likely face determined regional opposition for even a limited air campaign against a nuclear Iraq. Nor would the United States lightly incur such a risk to its troops in the region, let alone against the U.S. homeland. An Iraqi nuclear breakout would probably sound the death knell for U.S. efforts to achieve regime change in Baghdad. It is thus imperative that the United States overthrow Saddam Hussein before an Iraqi nuclear breakout renders such an option untenable.

One of those uncertainties is that the outcome of a coup or uprising may lead to a military government not all that much different from Iraq's current government. Even with Saddam and his sons

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out of the picture, an Iraqi military regime could desire nonconventional weapons and even the inclusion of Kuwait as Iraq's 19th province. Alternatively, an uprising that succeeds in installing a regime dominated by Shi'a, or that fails and results in the mass slaughter of Shi'a, could stir unrest among Shi'a communities elsewhere in the region. An uprising, too, runs a risk of inadvertently producing a loss of central government control, perhaps even chaos, in large parts of Iraq. But it is hard to see how either would pose more of a threat to Iraq's neighbors or to the United States than continued Ba'athi rule under the looming shadow of biological and nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the collapse of central government control in Iraq is unlikely to adversely affect the stability of neighboring states. The one neighbor that stands to be most affected—Turkey—has been effectively dealing with the consequences of a lack of central government control in northern Iraq for a decade already. The most likely consequence of a collapse of central government control in Iraq is the emergence of regional warlords, and competition among neighboring states for influence among them. In other words, Iraq is more likely to *implode* than to *explode*. While certainly not a desirable outcome, and not an outcome that U.S. policy should seek, the implosion of Iraq would not necessarily be a disaster for the Iraqi people, the region or for core U.S. interests. Even the continued extraction and export of Iraqi oil might not be much affected, since a number of its major oil fields are located in the far north and south of the country, in regions that could be seized by pro-Western Kurdish factions or U.S. forces now in Kuwait.

Although Washington might not be able to decisively influence the process of regime change once started, it would have some influence over a new government, which it could use to bring Baghdad to accept relevant UN resolutions related to disarmament, Kuwait's borders and terrorism. Progress toward compliance on these issues should remain a precondition for an end to sanctions. The United States should also underscore its readiness to build a new relationship with a post-Saddam Iraq, to include very generous assistance with debt relief and reconstruction.

BEFORE September 11, U.S. policymakers would have been hard-pressed to justify significant military action against Iraq without a major provocation. In the wake of September 11, it should be clear that America can no longer afford to ignore the danger posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and that is true regardless of Iraq's association, or lack thereof, with the events of September 11. But if Washington is to use force against Iraq, it should do so not just to punish, degrade capabilities, or deter. Rather, it should aim for regime change. Were such an effort to fail, it would still result in the diminution of Iraq's military capabilities and likely have the effect of deterring future aggression. Even that lesser outcome would help bolster a faltering containment regime.

The approach outlined here involves daunting risks and challenges. But, again, the risks of further delaying a serious effort at regime change are even greater, particularly because the passage of time increases the possibility that Baghdad might acquire more advanced biological arms or nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Bush Administration should focus now on forging a serious, long-term strategy for regime change in Iraq, despite the formidable risks and challenges involved. For if ridding Iraq of the regime of Saddam Hussein will be difficult, experience has shown that living with it will be even more so. □

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The Law at War

How Osama Slipped Away

—Ruth Wedgwood

IN THE SPRING of 1996, the White House was preoccupied with Bosnia—implementing the Dayton Agreement, ferrying American troops across the Sava River, building facilities at Tuzla, attempting to install an unworkable three-headed government in Sarajevo, hoping to persuade Muslim, Croat and Serb factions to let refugees return to their burnt-out homes. Bosnia may have been important to the confidence of Europe and the credibility of NATO—but everything is relative. On the same White House watch, a far more important war was left unattended: We let Osama bin Laden escape our clutches.

Barton Gellman's astonishing account of White House decision-making, featured in the October 3 *Washington Post*, laid out a sad Clintonian story of too little, too late. It is a story that bears important lessons for the conduct of the present campaign against terrorism. Well studied, it is a lesson that can teach us to avoid the dangerous confusion between war and peace, and between adjudicative fact-finding and the conduct of a serious foreign and national security policy. It is a lesson that, despite the shock of September 11, we still need to learn.

IN FEBRUARY 1996, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Othman Taba asked the U.S. ambassador in Khartoum what the Sudanese government could do to redeem its heretofore indulgent record on terrorism. Ambassador Tim Carney and State Department official David Shinn laid out a series of sensible demands, including the expulsion of a group of Egyptian nationals conspiring to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak, and the closure and dismantling of Hamas training facilities that readied young men for Palestinian terrorist operations. At the top of the list, however, was the request to put an end to the swaggering presence in Khartoum of Osama bin Laden, who even then was notorious for bankrolling a number of Islamic terrorist groups around the world.

Indeed, by 1995 there was already compelling evidence that bin Laden was financing and training Egyptian and Algerian Islamist groups. He funded a group called Muhammad's Army (*Jaish Muhammad*) that was responsible for terror attacks in Jordan. Bin Laden's farm outside Khartoum had been turned into a camp reserved for the use of Hamas in training new recruits. He bankrolled a December 1992 bombing in Aden that

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killed two tourists and barely missed killing or injuring almost a hundred U.S. servicemen en route to Somalia for famine relief operations. Bin Laden's brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifah, financed Ramzi Yousef in organizing the 1993 World Trade Center bombing designed to topple one of the twin towers upon the other, and funded terrorist groups in the Philippines. In November 1995, a U.S. military training center for the Saudi National Guard based in Riyadh was blown up by a van loaded with explosives, killing five Americans, with the tentacles again leading back to bin Laden's network.

The U.S. government therefore had compelling reasons to pursue negotiations with Sudan over bin Laden's future. These negotiations continued in earnest when Major-General Elfatih Erwa, Sudan's Defense Minister, visited the United States in March 1996. During that visit, Erwa stated that the Sudanese government was prepared to offer two solutions to the bin Laden problem. One was to place bin Laden under strict surveillance, with Sudan reporting regularly to American officials about his activities and movements. The other was to deliver bin Laden into the custody of a third party acceptable to both Khartoum and Washington.

No one seems to have taken Erwa's first proposal seriously. With regard to the second, however, the White House thought to explore whether Saudi Arabia would be willing to jail bin Laden. As it turned out, they were not, and the Clinton Administration declined to press them. Bin Laden was the son of a powerful family of Saudi industrialists with business connections to major U.S. and European firms, and with other forms of influence built up through the family's large bequests to major American universities. So, predictably enough, the Riyadh connection struck out and, in the end, the White House nonchalantly decided to let bin Laden go about his business.

Bin Laden departed Khartoum by plane in May to return to his old haunts in Afghanistan where he had financed and trained *mujaheddin* for the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Before long, bin Laden's particular business began to thrive. Just five weeks after bin Laden was turned loose in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda attacked another American target. On June 25, 1996, a truck loaded with TNT drove up to the perimeter of the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia, where American GIs were housed. Without any adequate alarm system to alert the residents, American sentries spotting the truck were stymied, and 19 servicemen were killed in the massive explosion. Several hundred more were wounded. (In a twisted turn of fate, the contract for reconstructing the American barracks was awarded to the Saudi construction company run by bin Laden's brothers.)

AS BIN LADEN'S plane lifted off from Khartoum, no one in a position of responsibility in Washington was able to convince a distractable President to intercept or divert bin Laden's airplane, and evidently none tried to do so. One of the reasons turned on the administration's reading of the law. Terrorist financier and clear and present danger as he was, bin Laden had never been "linked to a dead American" by the measure of strict juridical standards. Thus, when the opportunity arose to capture bin Laden, FBI director Louis Freeh opposed it. He did so out of worry that the Justice Department would not be able to make a successful criminal case against him in an American courtroom. The White House deferred to this fatal misjudgment.[1]

[1]Second-hand reports suggest that former President Clinton is now aware of this error, and considers it perhaps the worst mistake of his presidency.

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Why was Mr. Freeh so reluctant to get his hands on bin Laden in 1996? The trouble is that information obtained from terrorism suspects in interrogations or confessions is not admissible in domestic American criminal trials unless the informant is willing to testify directly. It is possible, therefore, for the government to have reliable information obtained through intelligence channels and still not be able to use it as evidence in an American court of law. On the surface, Freeh's worries were justifiable. It would have been disastrous to have snatched bin Laden only to have had to set him free again because a conviction against him could not be obtained.

But Freeh's worries were justifiable only on the surface. The responsible officials at that time read the law in a narrow and needlessly self-constraining fashion. The fact is that the law of war permits anticipatory self-defense. It is anticipatory self-defense, for example, to cut off the bankroll that underwrites and replenishes terrorist networks. Even domestic law condemns individuals who aid and abet crimes, as well as those who "induce" criminal activities. Under the law of conspiracy, a sponsor is liable for ongoing criminal acts, whether or not he knows of a particular target, so long as he knows the general nature of the criminal enterprise. In March 1996, bin Laden clearly fulfilled these requirements.

The notion of anticipatory self-defense is hardly a new idea. In the 19th century, for example, Daniel Webster recognized the right of the British under "anticipatory self-defense" to stop an expedition of Irish Fenian revolutionaries from crossing the Niagara river into Canada, even if the revolutionaries had not yet committed any specific crimes on Canadian soil. The point, however, is that to apply this concept it is necessary for U.S. officials to recognize that the law of war is appropriate to the situation at hand. There has been a great deal of confusion about this—less since September 11 than before it, but much confusion nonetheless. Terrorism has to do with attacks on civilians for any number of political purposes. It is a criminal activity although, raised to the level of mass-casualty results, it can also be construed sensibly as an act of war, particularly if states have been complicit in the activity. But attacks against uniformed military personnel operating on foreign soil—even if they are American military personnel—are incontrovertible acts of war. The October 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine compound in Lebanon, the attack on Khobar Towers, the bombing of the U.S.S. *Cole*, all fall into this category. In that light, it is a stretch *not* to apply the law of war to such cases.

Clearly, it has been—and it still is—a very dangerous intellectual failure to confuse the proper role of criminal law in the realm of national security. Our inability to satisfy artificial rules of trial evidence does not mean that a known international terrorist should be left to roam around with TNT and willing accomplices. Even if bin Laden's activities before May 1996 did not carry the point home, the East African embassy bombings of August 1998 surely should have. Those bombings, which not only destroyed our embassies in Dar es-Salaam and Nairobi but also killed 224 people and wounded 4,500, were a major escalation in bin Laden's campaign against the United States. But for Washington, gripped in the midst of the Monica maelstrom, these attacks failed to pass the threshold of seriousness.

As may be recalled, the Clinton Administration responded to these attacks two weeks later with Tomahawk missiles launched against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. The only serious target was a rumored meeting of bin Laden and his lieutenants in one of his Afghan training

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camps. The targeting of sites in Khartoum proved especially problematic. The main plant suspected of chemical weapons manufacture was dropped from the list because of the possibility of collateral damage. The second proposed target, the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant, was not known to be anything more than a transshipment point. (In trying to justify the selection of al-Shifa as a target for U.S. strikes, the principals of the Clinton foreign policy team boggled the basic facts about the plant in their press briefings, which detracted from the credibility of U.S. strikes.) But the more serious issue was timing. To avoid any collateral damage, the dispatch of the Tomahawks was delayed (until 7:30 PM in Sudan and 10:00 PM in Afghanistan). By that point, the meeting of bin Laden's lieutenants had broken up. Foes and allies alike dismissed "Operation Infinite Reach" as a botched job.

The Clinton Administration, however, felt that its approach to terrorism—treating individual perpetrators as criminals rather than conceiving their collective efforts as acts of war—was vindicated by the successful prosecutions that unfolded in the Federal courthouse in lower Manhattan. Sixteen defendants were found guilty of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in trials conducted from 1994 to 1996. Carrying over efforts from the Clinton tenure, the Bush Justice Department managed to convict four conspirators of the East African embassy bombings in May 2001. Officials in both the past and current administration judged these results to be significant successes.

And then, three months later, within just six blocks of the same courthouse, the World Trade Center collapsed and nearly 5,000 lives were lost.

IN A REAL war against terrorists, each cell member counts as a combatant. Under the law of war and legitimate rules of engagement, each can be targeted as a member of a hostile force. If he should surrender, he can be detained as an unprivileged combatant while the conflict is underway. Authorities need not wait for each conspirator to complete a terror attack before rounding up each member of the network. Terrorists are illegal combatants, to be sure—they do not rise to the dignity of prisoners of war because they fail to carry arms openly and deliberately use terror against civilians as an illicit instrument of intimidation. But the law of war is still applicable.

Indeed, the law of war has a separate quiver of criminal tools appropriate to the exigencies of international terrorism. As President Bush suggested on November 18, Bin Laden and his cohort can be tried by a military commission just as legitimately as a civilian court. President Franklin Roosevelt convened such a commission to try the German saboteurs who plotted to blow up U.S. facilities during World War II. President Lincoln used military commissions during the Civil War to try agents who took over civilian vessels for the Confederate Navy. Military commissions can be carefully structured to ensure fair process. Moreover, unlike civil courts, where no portion of the trial can be closed, military commissions can prevent the disclosure of sensitive intelligence information.

Osama bin Laden enjoys no right to be a para-American. He has no right to a civilian trial in the O.J. fashion of "anything-goes" due process. In his 1998 *fatwa*, he declared war against the United States, and he has launched terrorist military operations here and abroad. Thus, if he and his lieutenants should be caught before they are killed, they can be tried under the laws of war.

Treating terrorism as if it were simply another form of crime to be handled by law enforcement agencies also has had negative repercussions overseas. Part of the rationale for treating all unconven-

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tional attacks against the United States and U.S. forces and assets abroad as criminal terrorism is so that we can secure better cooperation with others through legal means than through a diplomacy unaided by reciprocal legal obligations. Unfortunately, practice has generally betrayed theory. Washington has gone repeatedly to its Arab allies for help in apprehending terrorists, putting members of local terrorist networks on trial, restricting their travel, or expelling known members from the country. Time and again we have been disappointed, unwilling to accept that many governments are intimidated by the tyranny of terror. A number of regimes have struck Faustian bargains with the terrorists, allowing them free rein to operate in return for protection against attack. For too long, the United States has chosen to ignore the reality that it must undertake its own defense, and that it simply cannot delegate this responsibility to others. We cannot achieve through legal arrangements that which we are manifestly unprepared to achieve by other means.

It is now five and a half years since bin Laden's escape to Afghanistan, and it took the tragedy of the September 11 bombings to finally cure our political attention deficit to the terrorist war being waged against the United States. Now, at long last, we must get serious and understand that self-defense sometimes requires acting unilaterally and before the fact, without deferring to the sensibility of nominal allies in the region and, most importantly, without tripping unnecessarily over our own legal system. As Alice's Queen of Hearts might say, it is madness to have criminal trials first, and self-defense only later. □

We Will Bury You, Esq.

In current circumstances, when, for reasons of their own, Russia, China and France as Security Council members have all given assent (for the moment) to U.S. action, it may be a temptation for the Bush administration to accede to this process of seeking to legitimize its actions under the international law professoriat's view of international law. . . .

This would be, however, a mistake of a grave order. In seeking to satisfy the inflated expectations of international law as seen by those international elites (whose principal desire is to expand the brief of international law itself), the U.S. would bury itself—in procedural arguments, fruitless attempts at consensus, vetoes from militarily irrelevant but morally preachy states, and endless consultations rather than action—as surely as the Soviets buried themselves, for other reasons, in Afghanistan. . . . A healthy scepticism about what military action can accomplish is an invaluable part of military planning. For the international lawyers, however . . . the most important part of the exercise is not to attack terrorism but instead to use the crisis as a way to build their quasi-religious venture in international governance.

—Kenneth Anderson,
Times Literary Supplement, September 21, 2001

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Tightening the Screws

The Economic War Against Terrorism

Peter L. Fitzgerald

SHORT OF the actual use of force, economic sanctions are among the U.S. government's most powerful tools in the war on terrorism. They seek to deprive terrorist organizations of the financial wherewithal to support and conduct operations such as the September 11 attacks on Washington and New York. Well *before* those events, however, the U.S. government had targeted Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization with financial sanctions as part of three separate anti-terrorist programs established since the mid-1990s. This pre-existing anti-terrorist sanctions framework has now been bolstered by a new Presidential Executive Order on Terrorism, as well as by UN Security Council Resolution 1373 calling for similar sanctions by other nations. These new measures add another layer to an already complex system of financial regulations with relevance to U.S. diplomacy.

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The government's anti-terrorist sanctions are neither isolated nor unique regulatory programs. Rather, they are but a small part of 21 similar, yet ostensibly separate, economic sanctions programs currently administered by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The Terrorist Sanctions Regulations, promulgated in 1996, require "U.S. persons" (i.e., U.S. citizens or residents wherever they may be located, and U.S. business entities including their overseas branches) to block or "freeze" the assets of those who threaten the Middle East peace process, and they prohibit unlicensed transactions with such parties. Presidential Executive Order No. 13,224 of September 2001 then expanded the controls to cover global terrorism. The Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, published in 1997, criminalize the provision of support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations designated by the Secretary of State. Additionally, a broad range of U.S.-affiliated financial institutions and businesses providing financial services are required to block funds in which terrorist organizations or their agents have an interest. Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda are among the targets of both programs.

Moreover, unlicensed financial dealings with the governments of states that have been designated by the Secretary of State as supporters of terrorism pursuant

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to the Export Administration Act—Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria—are criminalized under OFAC's Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations issued in 1996. The Treasury Department also maintains separate stand-alone economic sanctions programs targeted at each of these countries, with the exception of Syria. Among its other country-specific sanctions programs, OFAC prohibits unlicensed dealings with Afghanistan and requires that U.S. persons block any assets in which the Taliban has an interest under the Taliban (Afghanistan) Sanctions Regulations.[1]

The obvious question, then, is if these financial controls have been in place since as far back as 1996, why have they not worked better at preventing terrorism? Moreover, how can we have any confidence that new sanctions will accomplish what the old controls evidently failed to achieve?

AMONG THE key structural and institutional impediments to more effective sanctions are the relatively meager resources devoted to supporting these programs. OFAC is a small office, with a staff of roughly one hundred and a budget of less than $20 million—although it recently received a further $6.5 million to operate the new interagency Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center. With these resources OFAC currently manages the staffing, licensing, compliance, and enforcement aspects of more than a score of sanctions programs. OFAC is easily overwhelmed when either the Congress or the Executive Branch imposes new sanctions programs, or a change in policy direction occurs. Additionally, as policymakers tend to look at sanctions programs individually rather than as part of a whole set of controls, some changes in policy direction call for a disproportionate use of OFAC's resources. For example, in 1994 when Congress mandated that "family remittances" to Cuba must be individually licensed, OFAC was required to draw down sharply the resources devoted to other programs. There is general agreement among those who deal with these sanctions programs on a practical level, both within government and in the regulated community, that insufficient resources are being allocated to administer properly the increasing number of programs OFAC is asked to manage.

However, achieving more practical and effective sanctions will take more than simply coming up with additional personnel or funding. A change in how OFAC employs its resources, and in the agency's basic regulatory approach, is also necessary. As the institutional successor to the World War II-era Office of the Alien Property Custodian, OFAC has labored in relative isolation from both other government agencies and the regulated community. The Director of OFAC has publicly declared that his office is a law enforcement agency engaged in "economic warfare", not a "trade control" agency. The combination of this self-image, a lack of resources, and a lack of integration with the other government agencies that control financial and trade transactions, means that OFAC has not developed a working partnership with the regulated community—those who must implement the dictates of its programs into their business practices.

The effectiveness of OFAC's regulatory programs, not unlike the tax code, is much more dependent upon voluntary implementation and compliance with its rules than on OFAC's enforcement actions. For the financial and trading communities to support the government's anti-terrorist efforts—or any other sanctions—the controls must be commercially practicable and attuned to the demands of business.

[1]See generally, 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (2001).

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This is especially important in an era of rapidly developing e-commerce technologies and new online business practices. However, as a result of its past isolation and lack of resources, OFAC's institutional culture tends to regard the regulated community as an adversary rather than a potential ally. Accordingly, the lack of a good working partnership with those who must comply with its rules—OFAC's "stakeholders", to use corporate jargon—is a fundamental flaw in the way these sanctions are currently formulated and administered. OFAC's usual mode of operation is simply to "command", without considering whether its orders make sense in the 21st century business environment, rather than enlisting the regulated community in a cooperative effort to achieve a common goal—in this case, winning the war against terrorism.

There are still other problems associated with the actual administration of OFAC's anti-terrorist and other sanctions programs. The basic structure of regulatory controls contributes to many of these problems. Many of the 21 self-contained regulatory programs that OFAC administers are driven by divergent policy objectives. Each time a new set of sanctions is ordered an entirely new set of regulatory controls is created. With so many programs there are often delays in promulgating the detailed regulations implementing the new controls. For example, it took nearly 18 months for the Taliban (Afghanistan) Sanctions Regulations to appear in the Federal Register. Additionally, similar provisions in separate sanctions programs may be applied differently. Rather than issuing new regulations for each and every target, OFAC should restructure its controls into a single menu of sanctions, and then selectively invoke those appropriate to the policy objective at hand. By so doing, greater speed, simplicity and uniformity of approach would be achieved without any real loss of flexibility.

Publicizing the controls associated with the various sanctions regimes is also problematic. Historically, OFAC focused most of its attention on providing "actual notice" of its wishes to the U.S. financial community through the Federal Reserve Bank's Fedwire system and a number of similar vehicles. But it largely eschewed timely publication of its actions in the Federal Register. There was even a time when OFAC resorted to what became known as the "radiator distribution system", where the only way for those not in the financial industry to learn of OFAC's actions was to check for hardcopy handouts on the radiator in the entry vestibule to the Treasury Annex building where OFAC is located. In recent years, OFAC has made extensive use of its web page and the Internet to distribute information, but continues to place less emphasis on timely publication in the official Federal Register. In essence, the Internet has become a "virtual radiator distribution system" for the agency.

While use of Internet technology is an improvement over the old system, it does not comport with the requirements in the Administrative Procedure and the Federal Register Acts to publish official actions in the Federal Register. Additionally, failure to use the Federal Register—which provides "constructive notice" of official actions—can also complicate or undermine OFAC enforcement activities. Although OFAC sometimes asserts that it is too time-consuming to publish in the Federal Register, urgent material has occasionally been published very quickly. The Iraqi blocking orders promulgated following the invasion of Kuwait and the new Executive Order on Terrorism, for example, both appeared in the Federal Register within 24 hours of their becoming effective.

On a practical level, having multiple official and unofficial means of distributing differing information greatly compli-

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cates the task of those who are trying in good faith to comply with OFAC controls. This is particularly critical with "smart" sanctions because of the vital importance of knowing who is or is not blacklisted. For example, "Usama Bin Ladin" was first identified as a sanctioned terrorist in an August 22, 1998 Executive Order, and formally added to OFAC's blacklist of "Specially Designated Terrorists" in a Federal Register notice on July 1, 1999. However, his name did not appear in the "changes list" to the blacklist available on OFAC's web site until October 12, 1999, when the spelling was changed to "Bin Laden" and the "Al-Qaeda" organization was added—along with multiple spelling variations and aliases. This updated web site information, in turn, did not appear in the Federal Register until eight months later, on June 23, 2000. The cycle continued as other changes to the terrorist blacklist in the June 23 Federal Register notice did not appear on OFAC's web site until August 18, 2000.

Moreover, following the publication of the President's Executive Order on September 25, 2001, OFAC used its web site to post important additional "descriptor information" clarifying its terrorist blacklist entries, created a new blacklist category of "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" (SDGT) for those identified in the new Executive Order, and made a variety of other changes to over 200 terrorist blacklist entries that did not appear in the Federal Register until October 26, 2001. On November 2, 2001, the regulatory controls applicable to the Foreign Terrorist Organizations were effectively expanded by their redesignation as SDGTs, and five days later 62 additional parties were blacklisted as SDGTs by means of simple entries in the "What's New" file on OFAC's web site. Interestingly, the "What's New" file merely noted that these changes "will be reflected in OFAC's [blacklists] and Terrorism brochure the next time names are added to the list." This divergent content, spread across multiple sources of information, highlights the difficulty facing those who seek to comply with the government's anti-terrorist blacklist controls. Clearly, these practices substantially undermine the ability of the financial and trading communities to help achieve the government's objective of blocking access to the terrorists' assets.

Moreover, the effectiveness of smart sanctions is further limited by their inherent dependency upon the quality and extent of the information contained in the blacklist. For example, despite the imposition of sanctions aimed at bin Laden in 1998, the spelling "Osama Bin Laden" currently being used in most reports was not found in either the list appended to the President's Executive Order or in OFAC's official blacklist as published in the Federal Register until this past October 26. That spelling did not even appear on OFAC's web site until October 1, 2001, with a notation that it should be applied retroactively to the date of the new Executive Order. Thus, until very recently, an automated screen run against the official version of OFAC's terrorist blacklist might well have missed the name altogether, as would a screen conducted prior to October 1 that included the additional information OFAC posts on its web site.

In addition to sometimes being under-inclusive, blacklisting may also be over-inclusive. The more common the name of the blacklisted party, the more likely unproductive false matches will occur. If a name such as Ahmed or Muhammad is as common in Arabic as Jones or Smith is in English, the number of false matches could easily overwhelm those administering blacklist compliance processes. To enable practical and effective controls, more is called for than simply promulgating a list of names. The nature and amount of information provid-

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ed in the government's blacklist is crucial in determining the commercial practicability of the control. It is with processes and problems such as these that a cooperative partnership between the regulated community and government might be particularly useful in devising more effective controls.

NONETHELESS, it is also true that terrorists are unlikely to use their correct name when dealing with any U.S.-affiliated business. Thus, multilateral support for pursuing those at the heart of these controls is crucial to their effectiveness, extending the reach of the sanctions to other jurisdictions that terrorists use to conduct their dealings. As less than 60 percent of the funds attributed to Osama bin Laden or his network blocked since late September were actually frozen by the United States, the value of the cooperation of more than 112 other governments in this effort is clear. Where the domestic blacklists associated with smart sanctions have their real value as a control, however, is in blocking assets and transactions with parties in the "second tier", that is, those who launder or front for terrorists. This conceptual distinction is implicit, but not self-evident, in OFAC's blacklists.

One case that highlights the extraordinary power vested in OFAC's blacklisting authority is that involving Salah Idris, the owner of the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that was bombed in 1998, along with bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan, in retaliation for the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Intelligence sources originally thought that the al-Shifa plant was owned by bin Laden and was producing chemical weapons precursors. Idris was believed to be acting for bin Laden, and OFAC ordered the Bank of America to block roughly $24 million of Idris' assets in the United Kingdom "pending a decision" on whether to add his name to the terrorist blacklist as a second tier party. Idris sued, challenging OFAC's authority to take such an action in the absence of being named in any published blacklist. Idris' assets were voluntarily unblocked in May 1999, when the government declined to fight the suit, in part to protect its sources. Establishing *post*-blacklisting administrative review procedures could afford parties like Idris basic due process of law without seriously affecting the government's control objectives. Additionally, legitimate concerns for protecting intelligence sources and methods are perhaps best handled on a case-by-case basis, rather than by the current blanket denial of the right to review the basis for OFAC's blacklisting decisions. These are especially important points given that the master OFAC blacklist already contains several thousand names, and can be expected to grow dramatically as the war on terrorism proceeds.

The effectiveness of OFAC's sanctions is further undermined by a lack of publicity regarding the agency's enforcement actions. The letter of the anti-terrorist sanctions, like most other OFAC sanctions programs, imposes strict liability for any unlicensed dealings with blacklisted parties. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands of transactions are processed daily by various U.S.-affiliated parties. The New York-based Clearing House Interbank Payments Company handles a staggering 200,000 payments worth $1.1 trillion through its funds transfer system on an average day. Given the breadth of the regulatory controls, inadvertent violations of the sanctions are presumably common, but there is little public information regarding OFAC's enforcement activities. For example, there are only eight readily available press releases concerning OFAC enforcement actions since 1990, all concerning the Cuban or Libyan programs.

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The "Departmental Offices Performance Report for FY2000" indicates that during the last fiscal year over 7,300 banking transactions were blocked affecting just under $500 million, and that OFAC's Compliance Division sent out close to 1,000 inquiries and generated over 500 warning letters regarding questionable transactions. During the same period "over 1,000 compliance cases [were instituted]—the majority of them concerned with OFAC's terrorism-related programs, with 132 ultimately referred for civil penalties and 73 referred for criminal investigation."[2] Testimony by the Director of OFAC before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the Treasury further indicates that this ultimately resulted in six criminal prosecutions.[3] However, little of this information reaches the regulated community, much less the general public. The lack of publicity regarding particular cases is perhaps understandable, as no business wants to be seen as being or having been associated with terrorists or other blacklisted parties. Nevertheless, the combination of the sweeping scope of the controls and the lack of publicity regarding their enforcement combines to create an impression—rightly or wrongly—that the controls are generally unenforced.

The controls are not, in fact, enforced as strictly as they are written. To help define its enforcement practices, OFAC has developed a series of internal policies regarding the use of warning letters, establishing *de minimis* levels below which enforcement actions are not taken as a matter of prosecutorial discretion (for a first offense), and specifying both aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered during settlement negotiations. However, prior to its production to the Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Assets Control chaired by (now Deputy Attorney General) Larry D. Thompson, none of this guidance was available to the public.[4] Additionally, OFAC typically refuses to release any information concerning the imposition of civil penalties or settlements, adverse licensing decisions, or its general policies regarding the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. This actually exacerbates the public perception problem as the literal breadth of the controls makes compliance appear to be overly burdensome and commercially impracticable.

Such an appearance feeds into a more fundamental issue. Most companies will not knowingly become involved in terrorism or other sanctioned activities. In a competitive marketplace, however, legitimate businesses will be skeptical of the need to screen all of their dealings against a blacklist in order to catch those few transactions that are prohibited—unless they believe that their competitors are also required to do so. The lack of visible enforcement activity by the agency thus contributes to the impression that, for legitimate businesses, ignoring OFAC controls is a low-risk proposition. The problem is further exacerbated when the sanctions themselves are not perceived as being commercially reasonable or attuned to modern business demands—such as the

[2]Program Performance Report, Fiscal Year 2000, p.172.

[3]Statement of R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government, May 10, 2001.

[4]See *Judicial Review Commission on Foreign Assets Control, Final Report to Congress*, Vol. 1, Appendix C (January 2001). The Thompson Commission Report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees is the most comprehensive source on U.S. economic sanctions practice and procedure completed since World War II, but unfortunately this $1 million study has not been widely printed or distributed by the Committees.

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shift to online business transactions conducted at "Internet speed." Here again, a stronger partnership with the regulated community might help formulate controls that are seen to be more practicable, which would in turn promote greater compliance and effectiveness in blocking prohibited transactions. A stronger relationship would also provide new avenues for the government to communicate its enforcement practices and successes.

Congress and the Executive Branch must work together to produce a more coherent approach to sanctioning those engaged in terrorist activities. Otherwise, policies and legal measures that may appear sound in theory will fail in practice. The confusion over what to do with the funds that get blocked pursuant to these sanctions highlights some of these difficulties. For example, in 1996 Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act to permit civil suits against state sponsors of terrorism for damages arising from terrorist acts. Congress believed that subjecting such states to civil liability would bolster the pressure being brought to bear against them to renounce their support for terrorism. Since that time nearly $1 billion has been awarded in various suits, primarily against Iran and Cuba. However, the assets available to satisfy these claims are either blocked pursuant to OFAC's sanctions or are beyond the reach of U.S. processes. Accordingly, faced with plaintiffs who suffered terrible harm but were unable to collect their awards, Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. This Act authorizes paying these plaintiffs' awards from the U.S. Treasury in exchange for subrogating their claims against foreign states to the U.S. government.[5] This, in turn, raises questions over whether the government's payments of civil awards directed against foreign terrorist states defeats the purpose of permitting such suits to be instituted in the first place. Similar issues can be expected to arise concerning the victims of the attacks in Washington and New York.

THE WAR on terrorism will not be won by military action alone. Smart sanctions and economic controls specifically directed at those who conduct or support terrorist activities will be an integral part of the effort. But these sanctions must be designed to have a practical and substantial impact in the commercial marketplace; they cannot be allowed to function solely as political statements. The details of the implementing regulations, and OFAC's administration of those regulatory controls, is of vital importance in creating more effective anti-terrorist sanctions. In order to develop more effective controls, the regulated community must become a full partner with the government in this effort, and that will require a conscious and perhaps difficult change in approach. Unless the government's anti-terrorist sanctions are supplemented by far more effective practices and procedures, the new controls are unlikely to be more successful than the sanctions that have been on the books for years. □

[5]Pub.L. 106-386, Div. C., §2002, Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1541–1543.

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Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis

Henri J. Barkey and Philip H. Gordon

MOST international crises take leaders by surprise. While the region or issue that might blow up can often be identified in advance, the timing and contour of any particular crisis usually cannot. The coming dispute between Turkey and the European Union over the Mediterranean island of Cyprus, however, provides the rare opportunity of a coming crisis that can be pretty well scripted in advance. Barring significant new developments, none of which will come about without major outside intervention, the accession of the Greek part of Cyprus in 2004 to the European Union will trigger a severe crisis between Turkey and the West. The crisis is set to begin, however, at the end of 2002, when the EU plans to issue invitations to prospective candidates. Unless something is done to alter the current course of events, the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU will reverse much of the cooperation that has developed recently between Greece and Turkey, increase tensions on the island, further alienate Turkey from Europe and generally worsen Turkish domestic political conditions. The resulting crisis could lead to Turkish annexation of Northern Cyprus, the permanent division of the island, a deep rupture between an aggrieved Turkey and Europe, and a possible military confrontation between two NATO members.

Avoiding this all-too-likely scenario should be a high priority for U.S. and European policymakers, even as they rightly focus the bulk of their attention, political capital and foreign policy resources on coping with the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Indeed, whereas the natural tendency in the face of such an overwhelming new priority would be to push the seemingly eternal "Cyprus problem" to the back burner, the issue is both more pressing and more important than ever before. It is more pressing because of a timetable that has the EU set to announce Cyprus' accession sometime next year, even if Turkey's objections remain. And it is more important because a clash with Turkey over Cyprus, at a time when the United States is trying to sustain a global coalition against terrorism and fight wars in the Middle East, would deeply damage American national interests. Knowing this, of course, Turkey will be all the more likely to dig in its heels over Cyprus and expect Europe to back down.

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The United States has an important role to play in defusing the Cyprus time bomb before it explodes. Whereas the EU naturally holds most of the highest cards (namely the accession timetable and economic incentives), the United States—as Turkey's most important strategic ally and an important partner of Cyprus, Greece and the rest of the EU—has significant leverage on all the parties involved. Leaders in Washington should avoid the temptation to dismiss Cyprus as an unnecessary irritant as they deal with more important issues, and instead use the long lead time before the coming crisis to take action. This means not only pushing hard to achieve a political settlement on Cyprus before accession (the optimal, if improbable, scenario), but also starting to prepare for the more likely scenario in which such a settlement is not reached and the EU enlarges to accept Cyprus without one. Only by pulling a range of strings with Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the EU partners can this latter scenario be managed without producing the crisis that would otherwise inevitably result.

The Divided Island

THE DIVISION of Cyprus has been one of the most intractable problems in international relations for decades, frozen almost in place for over a quarter century. The current disputes date back to the early 1960s, when the delicate balance constructed between the Greek and Turkish communities at the time of independence from Britain collapsed, primarily as a result of attempts by Greek Cypriots to undermine the Turkish Cypriots' constitutional protections.

The constitutional system broke down after inter-ethnic clashes in 1963, after which Turkish Cypriots no longer participated in the government. Between 1963 and 1974, the minority Turkish Cypriot community was frequently harassed by the majority Greeks, and acts of communal violence escalated. Conditions changed radically when, in 1974, the ruling military junta in Athens, in part to compensate for its growing unpopularity at home, instigated a coup in Cyprus. The coup resulted in the overthrow of the elected president, Archbishop Makarios, and his replacement by a member of the main anti-Turkish terrorist movement, Nikos Sampson. Turkey, as a guarantor power, responded by invading the island on July 20, 1974. Unsatisfied with the military gains achieved by the time a ceasefire was implemented, Turkish troops went on the offensive again in August, resulting in the current territorial division of the island. Backed by the Turkish military, the Turkish Cypriots, representing 18 percent of the population, ended up with around 37 percent of the island.

Since then, all efforts to broker a solution to the conflict have failed. While the Greek Cypriots continued to enjoy legal recognition as the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot administration in 1983 declared its independence and formed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, an entity recognized only by Turkey, and supported both by Turkish financial aid and some 30,000 Turkish troops. Over the years, numerous attempts have been made to bring the two sides together, and countless rounds of talks have been held under UN auspices with active U.S. participation. All have proven fruitless. The general contours of a possible deal on a new Cypriot federation have been known for years: the Turkish side would cede territory to more closely reflect its share of the island's population; the Greek side would recognize Turkish administration over its zone; citizens on both sides who lost property would receive compensation or the right

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to return home; and a new, decentralized government would be formed. But none of the plans has been able to overcome seemingly insuperable obstacles: the inherent difficulties of building a joint government for two antipathetic communities; the Greek Cypriots' unwillingness to countenance a formally separate Turkish Cypriot area within Cyprus; and the Turkish Cypriot—and Turkish—preference for the post-1974 status quo.

While those who experienced personal or property losses in 1974 suffered greatly in subsequent years, Cyprus has actually been relatively stable since its division. During the 1980s and early 1990s it was a major issue only for those with a direct interest in it, including the powerful Greek-American domestic lobby and its supporters in Congress. The Cyprus problem rose to new prominence in 1995, however, when the European Union put Cyprus at the top of its list of candidates for future EU membership. The agreement to do so was reached under strong pressure from Greece, frustrated by the lack of progress toward a settlement, and as a *quid pro quo* for Athens agreeing to an EU customs union with Turkey. EU leaders were also convinced that the prospect of membership in the Union—massive economic benefits for both Cypriot communities and the freedom for Cypriots to work and travel throughout the Union—would catalyze the resolution of the inter-communal divisions on the island.

They were wrong. The EU's playing of the Cyprus card only stiffened Turkish resolve against a compromise. The EU's decision at the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit not to offer Turkey a path to EU accession further strained Turkish-European relations and made Ankara even less likely to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to cooperate. Two years later, with a Greek government now focused on deepening its integration with Europe and winning entry into the euro zone (and after strong pressure from the United States), the EU reversed course. At the 1999 Helsinki summit Turkey was made a formal candidate and declared to be "destined to join the Union." The price, however, was a renewed commitment to the resolution of the Cyprus problem. While noting that "all relevant factors" would be taken into account when the time came to decide on Cyprus' accession (widely taken to mean that the Greek Cypriots had to show good faith efforts to negotiate a political settlement), the EU stated clearly for the first time that the end of the island's division was not a precondition to membership. Thus was lit the fuse leading to a political settlement on the island—or to a crisis with Turkey.

Toward Europe

DESPITE THE enduring deadlock over Cyprus, Turkey's relationship with the European Union—including with its historical rival Greece—has improved significantly since the Luxembourg Summit debacle. Whereas the mid- to late-1990s were plagued by a series of dangerous clashes and crises—concerning ownership of the Imia/Kardak islets in the Aegean (1996), the Luxembourg Summit (1997), Turkey's threat to respond militarily to Cyprus' proposed purchase of a Russian S-300 air defense system (1998), and Greece's support for Kurdish Workers' Party leader Abdullah Öcalan (1998–99)—the period since 1999 has been marked by an encouraging rapprochement both between Turkey and the EU and between Turkey and Greece. The Istanbul and Athens earthquakes of August and September 1999 further brought the two countries closer, as the populace in each country mobilized to provide assistance to the other, ushering

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in a period of what some observers called "seismic diplomacy." Under the new, pro-European moderate government of Costas Simitis, Greece adopted a new strategy of cooperation with Turkey. This new approach, driven primarily by Foreign Minister George Papandreou, has led to a long list of concrete agreements—in the areas of economic cooperation and trade, tourism, the environment and people-to-people exchanges—that demonstrate the potential to transform relations among these historical rivals and move Turkey closer to its aspiration of acceptance in Europe.

All of this progress, however, could be halted—and perhaps reversed—by Cyprus' accession to the EU in the absence of a prior political settlement. Turkey has remained deeply hostile to the accession of a divided island, and senior Turkish officials have threatened to do "whatever is necessary"—perhaps including the annexation of Northern Cyprus and further militarization of the island—to protect Turkish interests. Greece, however, has not backed down, and continues both to defend the principle that Cyprus must remain a single international entity (i.e., no recognition for the Northern Cyprus regime) and that Cyprus must be allowed to join the EU regardless of whether the island's division is overcome. Indeed, Greek leaders and members of parliament have made it clear that Greece would block the accession of any other prospective EU members (such as Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic) unless Cyprus is allowed to join at the same time. Thus the potential for crisis, as the seemingly unstoppable progress of Cyprus' EU accession runs into the equally determined Turkish and Turkish Cypriot unwillingness either to accept a deal on the island or to acquiesce in Cypriot accession. Recent improvements in Greek-Turkish and Turkish-EU relations would be unlikely to survive such a development, with all the attendant implications this would have for peace and security in the region, domestic political stability in Turkey, regional military spending, and economic, energy, and defense relations among Turkey, the EU, and the United States.

Suffice it to say, then, that mistakes have been made. The idea of inviting Cyprus to join the EU has not led to a political settlement as was anticipated; there is little evidence that the parties are any closer to an agreement now than they have been for the past 27 years. Even if a majority of Turkish Cypriots want a deal—which may be the case—their leaders (and more importantly, leaders in Turkey itself) are unprepared to accept one on the terms being offered, and those terms do not seem likely to change substantially. On the other hand, Turkish assumptions regarding Cyprus and EU accession—that in the end, the EU would never actually accept a divided island—also seem to have been proven flawed. Until recently, most objective observers would have predicted that a divided island would not be allowed to join the EU, but now the reverse seems more likely.

This change in Cyprus' EU prospects has come about for four main reasons. The first is, as noted above, that in exchange for the extension of candidacy status to Turkey at the 1999 Helsinki summit, the Greek side won the EU's agreement that Cyprus' reunification is not a prerequisite for EU accession. The second factor has been Cyprus' rapid progress in fulfilling the various chapters of the *acquis communautaire*, the body of EU legislation with which all candidates must comply before they are allowed to join. At last report, Cyprus was at the top of the list of candidates in this regard, having fulfilled 23 out of 31 chapters, thus well on the way to removing any technical obstacle to its accession. To the extent that the Turks were hoping that Cyprus'

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accession would be derailed by its failure to comply with EU rules, they have been disappointed.

Third, at its December 2000 Nice summit, the EU undertook the institutional changes necessary to allow for rapid enlargement of the Union, such as limiting the size of the European Commission, using more qualified majority voting, and re-weighting majority votes in the European Council. (It is true that Ireland's June 2001 rejection of the Nice Treaty in a referendum is a setback for institutional revision, but most observers believe that the Irish will find a way to ratify by 2002, allowing the institutional changes to proceed and thus pave the way for enlargement.)

Finally, there is the widespread perception in Europe (and elsewhere) that the Greek Cypriot side has been more willing to pursue a political settlement than the Turkish side, and that the Greek Cypriots should not be punished for Turkish intransigence. In exchange for the December 1999 Helsinki statement on Turkish candidacy, the United States and the EU received assurances that the Turkish Cypriots would re-engage in the UN-sponsored process. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, however, has twice walked away from that process. His decision to abandon the proximity talks in November 2000 re-inforced the perception that his participation had never really been sincere, that he only sought to appear reasonable in the run-up to the Helsinki decision. The following year, arduous efforts by the United States and others led to an understanding between Washington and Ankara that the talks would resume. They did not. On the eve of their scheduled resumption in September 2001, Denktash again backed out, with Turkey's full support—leading to a denunciation of the Turkish Cypriot position by the UN Security Council and key EU member states. Denktash's behavior has thus strengthened the Greek Cypriots' hand, relieved them from having to negotiate, and made it difficult for the EU to do anything but include Cyprus in its ranks.

The Costs of a Clash

IN THEORY, at least, all parties to the Cyprus dispute have an incentive to reach a deal, and a "last-minute" settlement of the problem is not entirely impossible. On the Turkish Cypriot side, dire economic conditions—brought about by a Greek Cypriot-led embargo on its exports and homegrown mismanagement and corruption—have assumed almost disastrous proportions. The exodus of many of the most talented Turkish Cypriots has accelerated, as migrants from Anatolia, with few ties to the local culture and no natural attachment to the notion of Cypriot identity, replace them. (According to the best estimates, nearly half of northern Cyprus' population is made up of mainland settlers.) The recent economic crisis in Turkey also means that Turkish Cypriots cannot count on the mainland to bail them out anytime soon. In this context, the prospect of EU accession may appear increasingly attractive to many Turkish Cypriots, especially to the extent that their rights and interests are protected through membership in the EU. The Turkish Cypriots also have an incentive to make a deal before the Greek part of the island joins the EU, given that their bargaining position would be weaker after such an accession. Moreover, the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots in the EU would have the added benefits of making Turkish an official EU language, and perhaps help to lower the psychological barrier to Turkey's eventual accession.

Even though Greek Cypriots are slated to join the EU, they, too, have incentives to make a deal. First and fore-

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most, a crisis over accession and Turkish annexation of the north would put a definitive end to longstanding Greek Cypriot dreams of a reunified Cyprus. In effect, by withholding sufficient incentives to their Turkish neighbors, they may be strengthening the hand of hardliners; whereas a more moderate Turkish Cypriot administration in the future might reverse course. Annexation would also end any hope of regaining through negotiations some of the territory lost in 1974. There are economic risks, as well. In contrast to the crisis-ridden north, the economy of the Republic of Cyprus is thriving, but a post-accession crisis with Turkey—especially if Ankara has given up its EU aspirations—would undoubtedly lead to increased military tensions that would, at a minimum, undermine investor confidence and hurt the vital tourism sector.

Finally, both Greece and Turkey would themselves benefit greatly from a deal on Cyprus. A settlement of the Cyprus problem would remove perhaps the greatest obstacle to their bilateral cooperation and restore the possibility that the two countries could not only peacefully coexist but actually become friends, as they were before tensions over Cyprus emerged in 1955, ending the two countries' rapprochement that had begun during the 1930s. A deal would greatly reduce the financial drain that northern Cyprus represents for Turkey and would allow both Greece and Turkey to reduce their military budgets (at present by far the highest per capita among NATO members). That, in turn, would facilitate Greece's economic integration into the euro zone and ease, at least in part, Turkey's current financial crisis. Finally, a Cyprus settlement would also remove a key barrier that stands between Turkey and the EU; it is far from the only barrier, but even if Turkey made other necessary changes it is hard to imagine it ever joining the Union so long as the Cyprus issue remains unresolved.

An Opportunity Foregone?

DESPITE THESE clear benefits to all, past history—and the deep mistrust that persists among the parties on Cyprus—suggests that the parties will dig in their heels not only right up until the eleventh hour, but beyond it. Turkey's inclination in the run-up to the EU's Cyprus decision will be to escalate the level of rhetoric in the hope of leading a nervous Washington to weigh in with EU members on Turkey's side. In recent years, Turkey has successfully employed such a strategy against friend and foe alike. In 1998, for example, when Turkey discovered that the Greek Cypriots were planning to import Russian-made S-300 long-range anti-aircraft missiles, it threatened to "take them out" with military force, and the Greek Cypriots—under American and European pressure—had to beat a humiliating retreat. Similarly, Ankara can derive satisfaction from its confrontational stance following the EU's Luxembourg decision sidelining it from the list of candidate countries; two years later, with an active U.S. diplomatic campaign in its favor, Ankara held a winning hand at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. More recently, Turkey's steadfastness helped it dodge a bullet in October 2000 when the U.S. House of Representatives, under pressure from a White House concerned about alienating Ankara, shelved a resolution that would have described the 1915 Armenian massacres as "genocide."

The debate over the EU's security and defense policy provides yet another good example: unsatisfied with the degree of involvement being offered to Turkey in the EU's emerging security and defense policy, Ankara blocked a NATO-EU deal at the April 1999 NATO summit in Washington. It held out for an offer of

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greater influence at Helsinki and Nice, and managed to extract further concessions from the EU in a proposed compromise struck at a June 2001 meeting in Istanbul. (While the Turkish Foreign Ministry was apparently satisfied with the EU's new and improved offer, the military and political leadership in Ankara has delayed agreement, and demanded still more.) With these recent examples to draw upon, no one should be surprised if Ankara were to conclude in the case of Cyprus that a strong stand will ultimately serve it well.

The post-September 11 war against terrorism may further encourage Turkey to dig in its heels. Because of its geographical location, size, military power, and role in the Middle East (particularly as a Muslim neighbor of Iraq and Iran), Turkey's geopolitical attributes trump those of Greece. Many Turks will thus conclude, as prominent Turkish columnist Sami Kohen recently put it, that "the U.S. will be loath to upset Ankara at a time when it urgently needs its help."[1] Indeed, it was perhaps no coincidence that only days after Turkey pledged in November 2001 to send special forces to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and other Turkish officials warned that southern Cyprus' EU accession could lead to annexation of the north by Turkey.

Greece, too, has seen the benefits of staking out maximalist positions. As suggested above, in 1994 Greece forced the EU to reconsider its position on admitting a divided island by simply taking the future enlargement of the EU hostage. Greece's success puts the onus on Turkey to be more forthcoming, provided, of course, that Greek Cypriots do not make diplomatic errors that test the patience of those governments that really matter on this issue. As long as Turkey does not fulfill its part of the Helsinki bargain, it will remain outside the EU, an outcome that may suit many in Athens despite proclamations to the contrary. Indeed, all Athens has to do is keep the Greek Cypriots focused on the goal of completing the *acquis*.

If each party sticks to its maximalist position, all will pay a heavy price. Greece would hardly benefit from Turkey's disenchantment. An immediate casualty of escalating tensions would be the goodwill built up over the last two years. New tensions would stress Greece's domestic resources as calls for spending more on defense would proliferate, undermining the uncharacteristic and impressive fiscal restraint recently shown by Athens. If Ankara were to carry out its threat to respond to Cyprus' EU accession by annexing the island's north, the heightened tensions in the Aegean and on Cyprus could result in a conflict between the two sides—just as the 1996 Imia/Kardak incident nearly did. It is not clear how the rest of the EU would react in such circumstances. A failure of EU states to mobilize on Athens' side would deeply damage Greek-European relations. As became clear during the war over Kosovo, the Greek public is deeply skeptical of, if not outright hostile to, some Western policies. Demands on Greece to back NATO's pledges of support for U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and against Osama bin Laden's terrorist network have further strained relations between the Greek public and the West.

The costs to Turkey could be even greater. A crisis over Cyprus provoked by perceived Turkish intransigence is likely to delay, if not destroy, any chances Turkey has of joining the Union. In the near term, a veto-wielding Greek Cypriot-controlled Cyprus in the EU is hardly likely to accommodate Turkish interests. The longer-term cost for

[1]Sami Kohen, "Kıbrıs Baskısı Azalıyor", *Milliyet*, September 28, 2001.

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Turkey lies in Ankara's alienation or estrangement from the Western alliance. Turkey is not likely to join some other alliance system, nor will Turkish leaders actively court anti-American powers in their region or beyond. However, an inward-looking, increasingly nationalistic and autarkic Turkey could emerge, reversing the economic and political progress the country made during the 1980s and early 1990s. Having exposed the fragility of the Turkish economy, the economic crises of 2000 and 2001 have constrained Ankara's room for maneuver. An incorporation of northern Cyprus or any other precipitous action could undermine any confidence the international financial community may by then have regained. Estrangement carries enormous risks for an economy that is dependent on the West, and yet strong and large enough to think that it can make a go of it alone.

Turkey thus faces a terrible dilemma: a majority of the Turkish elite and public want Turkey to join the EU, an organization it fundamentally distrusts. The misgivings go well beyond Greece's presence in the EU. Discussions in Turkey over Cyprus' EU accession and the fate of the Turkish part are informed by a deep suspicion—not always unfounded—of the EU's real intentions and the authenticity of its invitation to Turkey to join. Rightly or wrongly, Ankara has interpreted current European efforts at constructing a security and defense policy as a deliberate effort to exclude Turkey. While the differences in religion and culture worry some Europeans, others are uneasy because of Turkey's large population, relative underdevelopment and thus its large potential claim on resources from the EU budget. For the EU, Turkish accession still seems remote primarily because of Turkish domestic problems, namely the authoritarian nature of the 1982 Constitution, the constraints on individual liberties and the still unresolved Kurdish question. In the absence of progress in these areas, Ankara will not earn Brussels' seal of approval. A divided Cyprus' joining the EU could also lead to the strengthening of those forces in Turkey hostile to its Western vocation.

Turkey's current economic and political difficulties could re-inforce these negative trends. The political system has been unable to generate new ideas to confront the problems facing the society, or to make way for new leaders willing to take them on. In the vacuum of confidence and competence that has been created, the military's influence has grown, overshadowing the civilians and blurring democratic lines of authority. The military feels pressure not only to defend its corporate interests but also to maintain national stability and ideological harmony.

The military does not worry for nothing. After years of stability the electorate—having historically opted for moderate center-right formations—is showing signs of desperation. In 1995, an anti-Western Islamist party (Welfare), won a plurality with 21 percent of the vote. In 1999, two nationalist parties—the current prime minister Bulent Ecevit's center-left Democratic Left Party and his deputy Devlet Bahçeli's far-right Nationalist Action Party, garnered 20 and 19 percent of the votes, respectively. These strange bedfellows then teamed up with Mesut Yilmaz's center-right Motherland Party to form the ruling coalition. The current instability of the Turkish electorate is further demonstrated by recent polls showing that under today's electoral system, the coalition's three constituent parties would fail to garner the requisite 10 percent of the vote to remain in parliament. This kind of uncertainty is not conducive to new thinking, least of all about Cyprus, and could easily activate the existing nationalist impulses

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of the current coalition government. Ecevit is on record as having said that the present division of Cyprus is the most desirable solution. His poor health and the possibility that his party may disintegrate should he have to leave office might also make the search for a solution more difficult. Bahçeli, as head of a future coalition led by his ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party, might use Cyprus as a means to establish his nationalist credentials.

Rightly or wrongly, the Turkish political-military elite will approach the Cyprus accession issue as one no less existential in nature than the Kurdish and Islamist problems of the past decade. There has been little debate on the merits of the Turkish position and tactics; support for Denktash has been solid irrespective of events in northern Cyprus. Dissent on Cyprus, as the Turkish columnist Ferai Tinç points out, is often branded as treasonous by Denktash and the hardliners.[2] Challenges to the Turkish military by opposition figures in northern Cyprus have also strengthened the military's determination not to concede. More importantly, the Cyprus issue will invariably be seen as part and parcel of a European attempt to deny Turkey what is rightfully its due.

Cyprus could thus emerge—and very soon—as the issue that decides Turkey's long-term future with Europe. Any concessions Turkish Cypriots might be required to make can galvanize not only the nationalistic elements in Turkey, but also those who have been opposed to European membership because of the domestic economic and political changes it would entail. Such a coalition could include established parties like the Nationalist Action Party, the nationalist Left, elements of the military worried about European demands for greater cultural autonomy for Kurds, and inward-looking business elites. Even Islamist groups that have become increasingly pro-European may switch sides if the global anti-terrorism campaign increasingly assumes a West-versus-Islam character, despite Washington's best efforts to prevent that from happening. For some, the temptation might be to replace Europe with a special security relationship with the United States, while maintaining the customs union with the EU.

America's Mandate

THE STAKES on Cyprus are higher than ever before. A crisis over the island's EU accession could dramatically raise regional tensions, undermine Turkey's difficult but steady evolution toward Europe, and create fissures among EU members. All this would leave the United States caught between its desire to promote a wider and more prosperous Europe and its inclination to stand by its Turkish friends.

In the face of these risks, trying to dissuade the EU from fulfilling its promise to accept Cyprus is tempting, but it is not a realistic option. Given the EU's commitments and interests, such an American intervention is unlikely to succeed—which EU member would or could agree to carry Washington's water on this issue?—and thus would lead only to needless tensions with Europe, Greece and Cyprus. An American attempt to block the Cyprus accession would also mean reversing the long-standing position of Democrats and Republicans that Cyprus should be eligible to join the EU; it would remove any remaining pressure on the Turkish side to accept a political settlement; and perhaps most importantly, it would lead to Greece's certain veto of EU enlargement to any of the other pending candidates. That would create a crisis within Europe, which is the last thing the

[2]Ferai Tinç, "Geri Sayim", *Hürriyet*, August 6, 2001.

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United States needs or should care to be blamed for. In short, trying to pressure the EU into pulling back its offer to Cyprus would only add one crisis to another.

Instead, the United States needs to engage simultaneously along four main fronts. First, Washington should not take the parties' current positions as final, and instead should increase its efforts to achieve a settlement. Success remains unlikely, but new factors—further flight of Turkish Cypriots; unrest and political dissent in northern Cyprus; Denktash's departure; political change in Ankara; or new and more tempting offers from Greek Cypriots—could at least conceivably lead to an agreement. The framework of the European Union, with its enforceable regulations on human rights, property and individual security might make practical the sort of political arrangements that forty years ago could not be made to work.

Second, Washington needs to do all it can to deepen Greek-Turkish and Turkish-EU ties so that all sides see clearly the costs of a crisis and the advantages of avoiding one. Since the 1999 earthquakes, much has been done to transform the Greek-Turkish relationship: beyond the new economic and political agreements of the foreign ministries, bilateral trade is now up to over $1 billion per year; a Greek-Turkish Business Council meets regularly; the two countries have cooperated in delivering humanitarian aid to Kosovo, de-mining exercises, immigration and anti-drug efforts; and there is even talk of a joint bid to host the 2008 European Cup soccer tournament as a symbol of their new degree of friendship. Turkey's relationship with the EU—despite the difficulties over the European security and defense policy and Cyprus—has also had its positive side since Helsinki. This has included growing trade via the customs union, Turkey's adoption of a "national program" designed to meet EU criteria, and most recently, the passage in Turkey's parliament of legislation that could advance freedom of expression, make it harder to ban political parties and even pave the way for eventual broadcasting in the Kurdish language. Despite these positive developments, neither Greek-Turkish nor Turkish-EU relations have yet reached a critical level beyond which a rupture becomes impossible. The more that can be done to strengthen such ties, the greater the incentive to reach a compromise over Cyprus.

Third, the United States needs to discourage Turkey from annexing the northern part of the island or otherwise raising military tensions in case of Cyprus' accession. Washington should make clear to Ankara that it would be obliged to denounce such a step and to support a UN Security Council Resolution condemning it (as it did Northern Cyprus' "declaration of independence" in 1983), and that Congress may adopt further sanctions. The United States must also make clear to Ankara that despite its heightened importance in the post-September 11 environment, Brussels and Washington are not prepared to retreat from longstanding positions on EU enlargement. Instead, the Americans should tell their Turkish friends that a measured, restrained response to Cyprus' accession would be the best way to keep the door open for an eventual reconciliation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and for Turkey's own eventual EU accession. Washington could also help by reassuring Turkey that it would help, via bilateral channels with key EU states and through NATO, to ensure that Cyprus' accession to the EU in no way threatens Turkey's security interests in the region.

Finally, the United States should work with the EU, Greece and the Greek Cypriots to develop an accession strategy that holds the door open to Turkish

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Cypriots and thus provides incentives for political solution. In other words, if U.S. support for Cyprus' EU membership cannot and should not be made conditional on a political settlement on the island (which would in effect be giving the Turkish side a veto), it can and should be made conditional on addressing Turkish Cypriot security concerns in a meaningful way. To date, Turkish Cypriots still fear their Greek counterparts' intentions (often for good reason), especially given the Greek side's numeric and economic superiority.

Americans and Europeans must also pressure the Greek Cypriot leadership to start preparing its citizens for an eventual resolution of the problem. Much of the rhetoric on both sides focuses on past wrongs and the need to rectify them. If the island is to be reunited, however, both Greece and the Greek Cypriots have to be magnanimous in their hour of success. Statements made by Greek Cypriots and the EU need to emphasize the willingness to hold the door open to future reconciliation rather than denouncing the Turkish side for actions dating back forty years, as they routinely do. Instead of using their EU relationships to pursue major new arms procurements, the Greek Cypriots should use their enhanced security status within the EU to reduce arms on the island. Another potentially important gesture would be the lifting of the economic embargo on the north. Making the Turkish Cypriots poorer will not make them more willing to compromise, but only further fuel their mistrust.

Ultimately, if a solution cannot be reached in time for Cyprus' accession, the United States and the EU must fashion a reasonable temporary compromise to prevent either side from taking irrevocable decisions. The purpose of such a temporary compromise would be to gain time without losing ground. Even if the EU decides to extend an invitation to Cyprus at its December 2002 summit, actual accession would not take place for another two years, providing time to achieve a solution. Just as Greeks and Greek Cypriots must keep the door open to Turkish Cypriot accession as part of a unified island, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots must understand that their future lies with the West. If the United States can help the parties to take these hard decisions, the coming Cyprus crisis, which now seems so inevitable, might be averted after all. □

Aura and Mystique

By striking at the heart of New York City, the terrorists ensured that at least one deep segment of the country ill-disposed toward a new president is now the most passionate in his defense. Anyone who has ever tried to get one over on a New Yorker knows what I mean. The demons who started this have no idea about the kind of people they have taken on.

—Andrew Sullivan, *London Times*, September 16, 2001

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Retail Diplomacy

The Edifying Story of UN Dues Reform

Suzanne Nossel

PERHAPS THE most widely heard and trenchant criticism of the Bush Administration's foreign policy before September 11 was that it displayed a wilful and counterproductive unilateralism. Clearly, since the terrorist attacks, that policy has changed: We're all multilateralists now, at least for the time being. Nonetheless, a tension remains: Can an administration whose vision of international leadership is defined by a go-it-alone approach whenever possible really conduct effective multilateral diplomacy? The question is not only whether the administration can keep a motley coalition together long enough to accomplish its military and political goals in the war against terrorism. We need also to ask whether it will, and whether it should, maintain a commitment to multilateralism once the present crisis passes.

The answer is not simple; some mix of unilateral and multilateral methods surely makes sense for the United States.[1] But the problem is clear. Despite (or perhaps because of) its superpower status, the United States has grown increasingly isolated in the United Nations and other international forums. In the past year, America has been reviled for sabotaging the Kyoto climate negotiations, bullied in the UN Security Council over Iraq and Israel, kicked off the Geneva-based Human Rights Commission for the first time in history, and provoked to walk out of the Durban racism conference in a huff. These setbacks triggered not only dismay but also a reactive impulse in the Congress. As the first plane slammed into tower one of the World Trade Center, the post of U.S. ambassador to the UN had been stripped of its cabinet rank and left vacant for nearly eight months. American arrears to the UN were at an historic high, with $582 million pledged in January mired in delay.

On the other hand, despite the setbacks noted above, the United States has beaten the odds in several key recent multilateral battles. A year ago the United States kept Sudan, the duly anointed candidate of the African Group, off the UN Security Council. The United States ended Israel's fifty years of technical pariah status at the UN, winning our ally acceptance into a regional group. In late 2000 the Americans convinced the membership to accept Jesse Helms' UN finance formula, cutting its dues while forcing others to pay more.

On all of these issues, successes and failures, more was at stake than what was officially on the table. When the United

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[1]Note, for example, the formulation suggested above by Joseph Nye in "Seven Tests."

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States loses in international forums, both its pride and global standing are hurt. When it stands alone, even if it holds the line, it is vulnerable to accusations of high-handedness and double standards. When it succeeds by browbeating others, it feeds resentments. Every which way, it becomes harder to achieve American goals the next time around and, as we have learned this fall, one never knows when the "next time around" may be the time that really counts.

Both champions and critics of multilateral diplomatic forums have a stake in ensuring that as long as the United States is at the table in global forums, it is effective in promoting American interests and poised to marshal global support when it needs to do so. Even critics of the United Nations have to concede that it plays an important role over an array of functions that serve U.S. interests: human rights and refugee protection, international air traffic control and safety, and now perhaps even "nation-building." Likewise, the UN's most enthusiastic supporters, both in the United States and globally, would be better off if the United States were more confident of its influence among the UN membership, and thus more willing to put trust in the organization. The tired debate over whether multilateral institutions do America more harm than good must give way to a pragmatic discussion of the recent U.S. track record in the multilateral arena and what can be done to improve it.

The need for improvement should be obvious. After the Human Rights Commission ouster, U.S. policymakers were indignant over the UN's act of defiance, having assumed that American stature alone guaranteed the seat in perpetuity. But things no longer work that way. While we remain on top militarily and economically, other spheres of influence—including Europe and China—are rising.

Moreover, America's pre-eminent status can be a mixed blessing. Even as the world pledged to support a U.S.-led fight against terrorism, one could discern an undercurrent of grim satisfaction that the United States had proven less than invincible. Resentment toward U.S. hegemony fuels efforts to use international organizations to rein America in. The United States, in turn, balks at encroachments on its sovereignty, clipping the wings of international organizations by withholding its support. As the events of this fall have demonstrated, however, stifling international organizations is risky, in that there are certain key tasks that only the UN is equipped to undertake.

In a world of competing power centers, the United States cannot rely on a strategy of curbing international organizations at its pleasure. Rather, we must learn how to translate our global military and economic clout into effective and specific diplomatic influence. American strength lies ultimately not in the ability to steamroll the world community, but in the power to turn delegations around one-by-one through persuasion and bilateral leverage. Put another way, we need to focus more on the art of retail diplomacy as a tool for multilateral advocacy.

A noteworthy recent example of successful retail diplomacy was the campaign to negotiate a reduction of America's UN dues. Like many examples of the art, this effort was not particularly glamorous. But it worked, and it bears many lessons in diplomatic skill and stamina that American statesmen will need to learn in the months and years ahead.

Cutting U.S. Dues: A Case Study

IN DECEMBER 2000, after a 14-month campaign, the United States overcame nearly universal opposition at the UN to win an agreement to lower American dues to the organiza-

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tion. The victory fulfilled the terms of the 1999 "Helms-Biden" law, which provided for payment of nearly $1 billion in U.S. arrears to the UN, but only if the UN membership agreed to lower U.S. dues for the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets by more than $170 million annually.

On the face of it, the U.S. position evinced not a little chutzpah. The U.S. stance was the equivalent of having Bill Gates, in response to an IRS enforcement action on back taxes owed, agree to pay up only if the IRS agreed to lower his tax bracket in future years, regardless of what he earned. When the UN membership signed onto the deal, Senators Helms and Biden were as stunned as anyone else, and led a historic standing ovation in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the triumph in what many saw as an era of waning American influence at the UN.

How did the United States convince 188 other countries to fork over more so that—during the longest period of prosperity in its history—the world's richest country could pay less? For starters, the United States wielded powerful leverage: nearly $1 billion in back dues that would be paid to the UN if the American demands were met. Beyond that, the charm, boldness and bravado of then-UN Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke gave the advocacy effort unique momentum and profile.

But incentives and personalities, though crucial, were not enough. When Helms-Biden was passed in December 1999, dangling the promise of repayment in exchange for a dues reduction, a Canadian diplomat described the offer as "a lump of coal in the Christmas stocking"—and the Canadians are about the best friends the United States has at the UN. The UN membership was galled by the U.S attempt to attach strings to payments that it owed under the UN Charter, seeing the move as a bald-faced violation of international law and a dangerous precedent. What would stop the Japanese from withholding payments to protest their lack of a seat on the Security Council? And the Germans from following suit? Most of the membership had long been on record opposing a U.S. dues reduction as inconsistent with the precept underlying the UN's financial system—that each country be assessed according to its "capacity to pay." This phrase became a mantra repeated in every accent known to humanity, the rallying cry of countries accusing the United States of foisting burdens onto the less fortunate.

By some accounts, this was all so much ritual howling before the inevitable concession to U.S. power and money. According to this view, the membership was bound to surrender because the United States was holding the organization to ransom; unless it gave in, the UN would risk bankruptcy. In forums like the UN, however, the best interests of the institution do not always dictate the course taken. For one thing, there is an obvious point that Americans sometimes forget: decisions are not made by "the UN" but rather by 189 member states, each of which acts in its own self-interest. In this equation, the UN's fiscal needs often carry less weight than delegations' own financial interests, loyalties and vanities. Moreover, the organization had functioned under the weight of U.S. arrears for more than a decade, and there were plenty of governments that believed it would be better off holding firm by rejecting U.S. demands and re-inforcing America's outcast image.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to getting the UN to accept American terms was the zero-sum game of UN financing, where every dollar of reduced U.S. dues meant higher payments for another, usually poorer, country. Although virtually

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the entire UN membership privately agreed that, on the basis of their economic growth over the last decade, the Chinese could afford to pay more than their drastically discounted rate, virtually no one was willing to say so to Beijing. Developed and developing countries alike would sooner have left the UN insolvent than ask a poorer country—even a rising economic powerhouse—to pay more to enable a richer one to pay less. The ostensible imperative of giving in to U.S. power did not translate into the political will necessary to meet U.S. demands. So despite its financial leverage, a U.S. victory was hardly foreordained.

That power alone will not always win the day does not mean that America should avoid taking strong stands. In internal discussions, U.S. policymakers often propose that instead of taking aggressive public stances, the United States should recruit other countries to front American views and thereby prevent a backlash against a "made in the USA" position. "Can't we get the Philippines to propose the dues cut?" some queried. While the intuition to recruit others to the U.S. cause is sound, America is far too prominent to slink out the back door while others do its bidding. When an important U.S. goal is at stake, relying on the Philippines or Estonia to front for us is risky. There is no guarantee that our ally will make an effective case and, besides, U.S. silence rarely fools anyone in the midst of a contentious debate. When important U.S. interests are at issue, then, the question is not whether to take a stand, but rather how—tactically—to win the fight without scorching the landscape. Success requires careful attention to the power dynamics at play in multilateral settings, the means and methods of persuasion, and the targeted use of U.S. bilateral power and influence. In short, success requires attention to detail.

Details, Details

THE UNITED States rarely wins arguments inside a multilateral meeting room. The impulse that leads rowdy back-benchers to rise up against heavy-handed prime ministers makes membership-wide meetings rallying points for resisting the powers that be. No country wants to be publicly seen to buckle under U.S. pressure. During the dues battle, formal meetings at the UN were bruising for the United States, with country after country taking the floor to demand that America pay its back dues "on time, in full, and without conditions." Even toward the end, as details of a compromise took shape in private meetings, the public rhetoric remained feverish. Open meetings make good theater, but deals are cut in back rooms. For this reason, too, it was clear that by the time the U.S. delegation was winging its way to the Durban racism conference, the time to rally others to our cause had already passed.

That the United States cannot saunter into a public meeting and expect others to fall into step behind it does not mean that official forums can be ignored. Moves to circumvent ordinary channels risk being labeled as power plays. Likewise, reciting U.S. proposals with a pompous "take it or leave it" tone may seem like fair game for a superpower, but it only undercuts our cause. By doing its homework and making convincing arguments in open meetings, the United States can gain some favor by showing that it knows it cannot rule by fiat and is willing to engage in give-and-take. In its public speeches during the dues debate, the U.S. delegation sought to disarm critics by conceding that the arrears were regrettable, and by pleading for help in solving a problem that was admittedly—in significant part, at least—an American creation. Success in these settings was

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measured in terms of diplomatic damage limitation.

But for every one diplomat in the U.S. seat, playing by the rules, ten others should be working the corridors, explaining the details of the American position one-on-one to foreign ambassadors. Instead of wholesale oratory, the cornerstone of multilateral advocacy efforts is retail persuasion tailored to influence individual constituencies.

Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

Before starting the country-by-country approach, the United States must figure out how to frame its case in a way that others can freely adopt. Winning support hinges on making a coherent, persuasive argument that gives countries a way out from under their reluctance to accede to U.S. power. On the UN dues issue, everyone understood that if American demands were not met, Jesse Helms might never agree to pay a dime of U.S. arrears. But no country wanted to simply give in to an American *diktat* co-authored by the UN's number one public enemy. Even the Israeli delegation needed to present its foreign ministry with a face-saving justification for supporting the U.S. position. The same impulse was at play when our closest allies asked to see U.S. evidence against Osama bin Laden before committing to the anti-terrorist effort. Even those who *want and intend* to side with us prefer to do it on their own terms.

The United States set out early on to formulate the strongest possible argument for dues reform on its merits. Recognizing that talk of a U.S. dues cut prompted knee-jerk opposition, the U.S. delegation quickly retooled, dropping talk of a rate reduction in favor of a push for broad reform of the UN's entire financing system. Although the U.S. government did not care terribly about true "reform" of the UN's dues structure, U.S. diplomats made this goal their rallying cry, recognizing that—unlike a stand-alone U.S. dues reduction—it was an agenda to which other governments could subscribe. Statistics were used to show that some countries were paying too little to the UN and others too much, and that the interests of fairness demanded reform. Ambassador Holbrooke presented unwitting foreign ministers with a laminated card listing every country's payment in order to drive home the point that the system, frozen in 1972, granted steep discounts to some of the richest countries in the world—including Singapore, Brunei and the United Arab Emirates—and simply demanded overhaul.

At the UN, history counts for a lot; delegations often cite chapter and verse of past resolutions to support their points. Digging up quotations, speeches and proposals from days gone by enabled the U.S. delegation to frame an argument that let other delegations back away from their opposition gracefully. We reminded delegates of the dramatic days of 1946, when Senator Arthur Vandenburg—the

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Jesse Helms of his day when it came to UN dues—argued at the very first UN budget debate that the organization must cap the rate of its largest contributor, so that no country, not even the United States, could command excessive influence over decision-making.

Ambassador Holbrooke's arguments, laid out in charts and graphs, were pored over at countless meetings between the U.S. delegation and its counterparts. A diagram of a scale tilting precariously to one side was distributed in the capital cities of all UN member states to illustrate the imbalance in the organization's peacekeeping finance scheme. Over time, U.S. rhetoric on putting the UN on a "solid financial footing" by creating a "flatter, more equitable scale" echoed throughout the membership, finding its way into the speeches and statements of delegations from around the world. Eventually, Nigeria, Pakistan, Algeria and other unlikely allies could be seen button-holing regional colleagues in far corners of UN conference rooms, making the case that the finance system needed fixing. When delegates did meet *en masse*, having these countries repeat the merit-based arguments was infinitely more effective in turning around the remaining skeptics than U.S. pleas and threats.

Although everyone knew the United States was out to get its own rate cut and was making the UN an offer it could scarcely refuse, the reframing of the campaign into one for "reform" defused much antagonism. In the final weeks of the debate, when the momentum for change was unstoppable, the United States calmly but firmly reminded its fellow members that unless the final package met the American demands, even a reformed system would leave the UN in continuing financial crisis. At the tail end, the majority of members had accepted U.S. logic but requested extra time to absorb the proposed rate increases. With the help of Ted Turner, whose donation promised to delay the impact of rate increases for most countries, the American delegation quickly agreed. This small concession helped achieve U.S. goals with a minimum of resentment. This flexibility allowed the United States to come away with almost everything it originally wanted, as well as a reformed system that allowed many other participants in the debate to claim victory.

Untangling Entangling Alliances

MULTILATERAL politics are often dominated by alliances that complicate the task of persuading individual delegations to take the U.S. side. Recognizing the rationale and role of these coalitions and attacking them one by one is essential to building support. Most countries in the United Nations are small or poor or both. Casting lots with like-minded delegations gives weak nations a power base. Although the Cold War bipolarity that generated the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has long since collapsed, by acting under the 120-plus-member NAM umbrella, the developing world has a controlling bloc within the UN General Assembly. Smaller but still significant blocs include the European Union and its associate members, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Rio Group, the Southern African Development Community and others. While these coalitions do not operate in all UN decision-making arenas, their influence is felt ever more widely.

The strength of such groups means that an American appeal to a bilateral relationship—for instance, with the United Kingdom or Mexico—may not lure the ally away from an opposing EU or Rio Group position. While many U.S. foreign policymakers have long advocated a common European foreign policy—a

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single phone number to call, as Henry Kissinger once famously put it—at the UN, the reality of European coordination is slow and cumbersome decision-making that often culminates in lowest common denominator positions dictated by Germany or France. On UN dues, as long as the French held the EU presidency and were determined to oppose the U.S. plan, private sympathy from Great Britain, Sweden, Portugal and others did little good. In the world of bloc politics, the United States must go beyond gaining the backing of friendly delegations to wrest them out of the grip of opposing group positions.

Unified political and regional groups cannot be attacked frontally. Since a major purpose of these alliances is to enable smaller countries to stand up to the United States, an open effort to divide and conquer these alliances usually just solidifies resistance. Nothing galled the French more than indications that the United States was trying "to divide the EU." Although the United States must respect group leadership, the key to changing a bloc's position is addressing the forces behind it. Alliances are generally made up of a large majority of countries that have no stake in the fight and may even privately disagree with the collective position, led by a handful of interested delegations that appeal to group unity to hold the others in thrall. Eroding a solid alliance entails both picking off the disinterested and turning around the core of hardliners.

The United States has yet to fully adapt its multilateral strategies to the reality of alliance politics. Going a big step beyond standard U.S. lobbying tactics, in the dues campaign U.S. diplomats from the UN traveled the world to lobby delegations during key decision-making congresses of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of African Unity. Through these efforts, the United States was able to influence group positions before they were finalized, a far easier task than attempting to reverse unfavorable positions after the fact. By recognizing that key turning points occur within the alliance structures long in advance of actual UN debates, the United States can get ahead of bloc politics, weighing in with key delegations before they have committed themselves to any particular line.

Because they rarely speak up in multilateral debates, the vast majority of delegations from small countries are often overlooked in advocacy efforts despite the voting power they wield. In the Human Rights Commission vote, for example, Andorra, Benin and Fiji held just as much sway over the final result—arrived at by secret ballot—as did China or Russia. Early on in the drive to lower U.S. dues, important delegations often asked why the United States bothered bringing its case to small delegations. Although the United States and other large countries often rue the "one country, one vote" system, the diffusion of power can be turned into an advantage. Harvesting the low-hanging fruit of small delegations can be relatively easy, and can help isolate more influential players in due course. Because of its size, resources and global presence, the United States is uniquely positioned to rally small delegations that others leave out of their lobbying efforts.

The value of soliciting backbench delegations is several-fold. When the United States first called for a debate on the dues issue, other countries resisted, claiming that the discussions would open up a Pandora's Box of irreconcilable differences, since no country would willingly pay a penny more under a revised system. By relying on its bilateral relationships to recruit Israel, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and the Philippines to announce at the outset of the debate that they would "volunteer" to contribute more for UN

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peacekeeping, this argument fell away. Later on, when the United States needed proof that the General Assembly as a whole was ready to create an agenda item to discuss financial reform, eliciting dozens of letters of support from across the membership proved critical. At the UN, demonstrating the allegiance of fully half of the organization's 189 members—even if they are virtually all small countries with limited influence—causes opponents to cower.

Where delegations do not have a strong position, winning them over sometimes requires little more than some stroking. When small countries are lobbied personally by the U.S. ambassador to the UN, capitals take notice. During the dues campaign, Ambassador Holbrooke paid countless visits to UN missions across New York City that had never before hosted any senior U.S. official. The Americans got to know each delegation and its issues: Oman was livid about the UN's peacekeeping failures and did not want to invest another dime in them; the Pakistanis would help, but wanted to ensure that their troop contributions to peacekeeping were properly recognized; the Germans could not discuss UN finances without bemoaning their exclusion from the Security Council. Hearing out these countries enabled the United States to see the dues issue from their perspective and craft effective appeals to them as a consequence. As importantly, the hours spent with each and every delegation helped build up the kind of close relationships that are indispensable in a crisis but that cannot be forged on the spot.

Ledger Diplomacy

POWER-POINT presentations and personal visits were not enough to sway staunch opponents to the dues reform agenda, however. Some delegations scoffed at what they deemed efforts to cloak a unilateral U.S. agenda in the guise of UN reforms. In these cases, the United States brought bilateral pressure to bear to persuade hostile delegations to moderate their opposition.

Although at a forum-wide level U.S. power can have a polarizing effect, American influence is a powerful weapon for persuading individual delegations. In *A Dangerous Place*, an account of his experience as U.S. Ambassador to the UN in the mid-1970s, Daniel Patrick Moynihan suggested that the United States use its bilateral ties to advance multilateral priorities. Absent other compelling bilateral goals, Moynihan argued, the U.S. Ambassador to Togo, for example, should make it his or her number one objective to secure that country's backing on key matters in the UN and other forums. By mobilizing support in this way, he suggested, the United States might have headed off the "Zionism Is Racism" resolution that sent U.S.-UN relations into a decades-long downward spiral.

Unfortunately, Moynihan's proposal went nowhere. Multilateral issues remain a sidebar at best to bilateral relationships. Ambassadors have no incentive to push remote and contentious multilateral issues that have little direct bearing on their day-to-day jobs. When the State Department asks that a typical UN issue be raised, embassies tend to simply fax off a background paper to the foreign ministry. When it is brought up at all, the issue is generally raised in isolation, rather than as something central to the give-and-take of the relationship. Even where embassies are willing to push, they rarely have sufficient information to persuade. Though the United States has unparalleled capacity to wage effective campaigns on the global stage via its network of diplomats, this machinery rarely kicks into gear.

On pressing issues, ambassadors need

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to be held accountable for delivering the support of their host countries and, in turn, they need to be equipped with the tools and incentives to do so. During the dues debate, the limitations of traditional channels, whereby only the State Department can "instruct" an embassy to raise an issue, became immediately apparent. Instruction cables, required to go through multiple "clearances" by various regional and functional bureaus, were too slow, formal and routine to elicit the necessary advocacy and energy. Instead, once the instructions were given, U.S. diplomats at the UN established direct relationships with their counterparts in various capitals, providing detailed, country-specific information in real time. Traditionally, when UN issues are raised in capitals, they are brought up only once, with the ambassador reporting back via cable whether the host country said "yes" or "no." On the dues issue, by contrast, since countries' initial reactions were invariably negative, the first approach needed to be supplemented by a campaign to turn "no" into "yes." U.S. diplomats at the UN implored their colleagues in embassies to press on in the face of opposition, and to raise the issue repeatedly whenever the country's relationship with the United States was discussed.

While the United States knows how to mount an aggressive diplomatic campaign when it needs to, the efforts tend to be confined to a handful of countries routinely judged as major players, irrespective of whether these governments are actually calling the shots on a given issue. During the dues campaign, these stepped-up tactics were deployed around the world, with more than fifty embassies actively engaged. In this way, the United States was able to ferret out some unlikely ringleaders—Oman for the Gulf Cooperation Council, for example—who were ultimately behind unfavorable groups' positions.

The UN dues campaign illustrates that the multifaceted relationships between the United States and most other countries make it possible to use both carrots and sticks to elicit cooperation. When a collective incentive such as the salvaging of the U.S.-UN relationship will not sway a country, a more targeted individual inducement may. Most nations count the United States among their most important relationships, a position that confers substantial leverage.

But links between bilateral and multilateral agendas are rare. The State Department strictly separates responsibility for multilateral and bilateral priorities, and the bureaucracy is deeply skittish about *quid pro quos*. The conventional wisdom is that linking unrelated issues complicates bilateral relationships, risking charges of abuse of power. While other countries routinely trade votes on candidates for election to international bodies, U.S. policy forbids it. As a result, on the Human Rights Committee vote we were deserted by some of our closest friends who had committed to trades with other countries in order to advance election campaigns they were waging.

The U.S. government maintains no central ledger in which bilateral relationships are tracked. There is no place to turn to find out what the United States has done for a particular country lately, or what a country may want or fear. We do not keep formal track of which U.S. officials have trusted relationships with which foreign counterparts, of who in the business world might bring influence to bear, or even of what we have learned about how each government makes decisions. An ambassador or State Department desk officer will have part of the picture, but so will officials in Defense, Commerce and other departments and agencies. Likewise, no one tracks what the United States is seeking from others, so that just as one Executive Branch department is trying to curry favor on a top priority, another may

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be complaining about something petty. Because they are smaller, and their relations with the United States are of high priority, other countries' right hands are much more likely to know what their left hands are doing when it comes to relations with the United States. While they can play off a range of policy issues to get what they want out of the Americans, the United States is poorly organized to do the same.

During the UN dues negotiations, the U.S. delegation repeatedly learned after the fact of loans, debt forgiveness and other concessions made to countries that actively opposed the reform process. At the end of a long and contentious meeting with the Singaporean delegation, one of their diplomats pulled from his briefcase a press report announcing a U.S.-Singapore free trade agreement. "*This* is what matters", he said, dismissing the importance of the dues issue while steadfastly maintaining his country's refusal to pay more. Without a ledger, Singapore's recalcitrance at the UN had no impact on their favorable treatment at the hands of the U.S. Trade Representative. Had the matters simply been raised together, the free trade cooperation would have provided leverage on the dues issue even without an explicit *quid pro quo*. Allies and enemies alike know that the United States does not keep track of its bilateral relationships in this way, however, and thus rest assured that opposing the United States in multilateral forums will rarely trigger repercussions in the bilateral relationship.

The growing importance of multilateral decision-making demands steps to factor multilateral issues into bilateral relationships. Simply keeping closer track of countries' support in international forums—and making this information available to ambassadors and intermediaries—would signal other countries that their relationships with the United States cut across multilateral arenas. Before heading off to their posts, ambassadors and political officers stationed in U.S. embassies abroad should visit the UN for a briefing on their new host country's UN record and a strategy session on how to promote better cooperation. While vote-swapping for international elections might bring more grief than gratification, on top priorities involving, for example, UN sanctions, countries should be told that their cooperation will be taken into account by officials with influence over the bilateral relationship.

This does not mean that the United States can or should demand lockstep support in multilateral forums from all aid recipients and trade partners, or disrupt important policy initiatives when involved countries fail to toe America's line on unrelated issues. Multilateral decisions with serious consequences are relatively few, and the scope of our bilateral relationships makes possible nuanced rewards and disincentives that do not compromise American principles or priorities. During the UN dues campaign, U.S. diplomats at the UN made a point of asking other countries whether there was anything that could be done for them bilaterally. While America's UN diplomats could not move mountains, small gestures—usually jostling a small favor loose from another area of the bureaucracy—often went a long way.

The multilateral context itself offers some opportunities for low-cost linkages. During the year of the dues debate, the U.S. delegation used support on that issue as a criterion for deciding which countries to support in contested elections to international bodies. While the United States would not back an inappropriate candidate simply because it backed the dues drive, positions on the dues issue were used to decide among qualified contenders.

This year, while the UN will focus

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heavily on terrorism, it will also debate and pass resolutions on other issues—for example, combating AIDS, nuclear and small arms proliferation, and global development. While these will pale in significance for the United States next to the anti-terrorism campaign, they will be of prime importance to certain countries. Our handling of their concerns—our level of engagement, flexibility and willingness to listen—will influence how others treat our priorities.

Another useful measure short of an explicit *quid pro quo* is engaging cabinet secretaries, members of Congress and other U.S. officials to stump for support in key capitals. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was heavily engaged in the dues campaign, visiting the UN, lobbying Washington embassies, and even writing to ask foreign leaders to agree to pay more. Near the end of the dues debate the U.S. Trade Representative and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense were enlisted to call ministers of finance, trade and defense in countries in which they had close ties. Although these officials were generally unfamiliar with the dues issue and were usually speaking to foreign colleagues equally remote from the UN negotiations, mobilizing these important interlocutors underscored the seriousness of the U.S. campaign and created a useful implicit link to other bilateral priorities.

Though targeted efforts can erode a solid group stance, there are invariably some delegations that cannot be won over. In the dues negotiation, these included Cuba, Libya and others who opposed initiatives simply because the United States had proposed them. But intractable nations can be isolated by convincing others that their opposition is politically motivated or based solely on narrow, as opposed to enlightened, self-interest. While delegations may be loath to criticize colleagues for ill-founded positions, the silent majority of moderates is willing to work quietly to prevent spoilers from blocking progress.

From December to September

THE QUEST to lower America's dues and settle the arrears problem recedes in importance now that much weightier problems stand before us. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that without the December 2000 deal the United States would be undertaking its delicate coalition-building from the position of being the UN's biggest debtor, on the verge of losing its General Assembly vote. To get out of this awkward corner, the administration and Congress would have had to voluntarily pay the back dues, notwithstanding the proposed Helms-Biden bargain having been spurned. Likewise the UN membership would have faced a quandary: either refuse the United States in its hour of need, or put aside the dues issue, leaving UN finances in ruin and resentment toward the United States on the rise.

Though that crisis was averted, another very nearly flared. Although the Senate acted in January 2001 to approve payment of the promised arrears on the basis of Ambassador Holbrooke's deal, the House leadership sat on its hands for months, even proposing to attach new conditions to the promised payment. In early September, as the annual opening of the UN General Assembly approached, delegations concluded grimly that, nine months after the deal was reached, President Bush intended to arrive in New York empty-handed. Those who had supported the United States felt sheepish if not betrayed, and our opponents patted themselves on the back for having predicted U.S. faithlessness.

After September 11, the Congress

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moved swiftly to discharge payment, and the frustration dissipated, though it did not disappear. Rather than riding off the momentum reached in U.S.-UN relations when the December deal was announced, the administration was faced with a risky standing start, having first to put a new ambassador in the driver's seat and then to accelerate from zero to ninety in mere seconds. In the first few weeks it appeared as though we had pulled it off, but we must avert such situations in the future. Our multilateral behavior should be aimed to ensure that, whatever befalls us, we can approach the UN free of baggage, as a trusted, respected leader able to mobilize support from around the world.

Whether it ever truly existed or not, the era of the United States as unchallenged global agenda-setter is over. In a globalized setting with competing centers of power, the United States must learn how to maximize its influence by bringing others on board, rather than trying to shove them off to the side as we press ahead. The surest way to dissolve the fragile international coalition we have assembled for the fight against terrorism is to take it for granted. Impatience or arrogance toward the UN will signal the world that the newfound U.S. focus on multilateralism is a passing fancy that will last only as long as the current crisis. Now is the time for a genuine change of course, built on the understanding that to win in the multilateral arena, the United States must rely not on power alone but on hard work—patient persuasion, alliance politics and targeted leverage. A failure to sharpen these tools may mean that an increasingly interdependent world hews less and less to American interests. □

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Small Mercies

China and America after 9/11

David M. Lampton

"THIS CHANGES everything" was Senator Chuck Hagel's verdict as he surveyed the transmogrified landscape of international and domestic politics in the immediate wake of the "911" attacks. Others, such as retiring senator and China nemesis Jesse Helms, asserted that nothing fundamental has changed in U.S.-China relations, and that nothing should change. As for Taiwan, it hopes Helms is right but fears Hagel may be. It worries that Washington may seek to win Beijing's help in the struggle against global terrorism at its expense; as the *China Post* in Taipei put it: "Communism . . . is no longer considered a serious threat but rather a helping hand in the new war against terrorism."[1]

The unsurprising but useful truth is that some things have changed and others have not. The trick is to figure out which is which.

What has *not* changed is the careful calculation of national interest that guides Beijing's decision-making process. What *has* changed is that the United States is now more focused and disciplined in defining its interests with respect to China. In dealing with Beijing, Washington has learned quickly to pursue a less cluttered agenda, with sharper priorities filtered through the lens of national security. This is imposing a discipline on the U.S. political system that has not existed since the Tiananmen bloodshed of 1989. As for Beijing, its elite sees an opportunity to improve relations to an extent that it has not perceived possible for over a decade.

The principal feature of U.S.-China relations for the foreseeable future will be that two realist decision-making elites will be dealing with each other within the constraints of their respective domestic political circumstances and the uncertainties inherent in wartime. But while the two governments have stumbled into a new framework for limited security cooperation, other realms of policy will be affected minimally—unless the common threat to both nations rises further, making more intimate cooperation both necessary and politically feasible.

Security cooperation will be limited because important constituencies in each nation remain skeptical of the other's

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[1] "Anti-Terrorism Helps Mainland China Rise, But...", *China Post*, October 16, 2001.

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long-term intentions. Both sides are uncertain about which forms of cooperation would serve its interests. For example, in October as Washington sought Chinese support for the struggle against terrorism, and tried to create a positive atmosphere for President Bush's meeting with President Jiang Zemin in Shanghai, the Bush Administration found itself internally divided over whether to waive a Tiananmen-era sanction against supplying the Chinese with spare parts for previously sold Black Hawk helicopters. The administration demurred. In short, while there is a new context that fosters some cooperation, old problems ranging from Taiwan to proliferation to human rights have not disappeared.

Amid this mixed circumstance, four questions beg further examination. First, how do Beijing and Washington define their strategic circumstances, and how do those circumstances differ from the 1971–72 era when Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger went to China? Second, what domestic constraints may make intimate cooperation difficult for both Beijing and Washington? Third, what can Washington expect in terms of Chinese cooperation, and will it be significant enough to overcome deeply embedded problems in the bilateral relationship? In turn, what steps might the American side take to facilitate more meaningful cooperation with Beijing?

A New Basis for Cooperation?

WHEN President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong set U.S.-China relations on a new trajectory in Beijing on February 21, 1972, the U.S. President said, "What brings us together is a recognition of a new situation in the world and a recognition on our part that what is important is not a nation's internal political philosophy. What is important is its policy toward the rest of the world and toward us."[2] The shared perception of threat from Moscow was so powerful that Beijing and Washington subordinated their many disagreements about territory (Taiwan) and ideology (human rights and democracy) to the exigencies of security cooperation. Thereafter, the United States and China engaged in parallel opposition to Soviet proxy wars in Africa, and Washington sought to deter Moscow from using armed force against China in the late 1960s and the late 1970s. The two governments cooperated in monitoring Soviet missile tests from western China. And most intimately, the two cooperated in opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan *mujaheddin*.

The comparatively long period of Sino-American security cooperation was brought to an end by a series of developments, the principal ones being that China's national power grew much more rapidly than had been anticipated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the sharp reaction of Americans to the 1989 Tiananmen bloodshed. The *coup de grâce* to strategic cooperation was delivered when the Warsaw Pact crumbled and the Soviet Union imploded in 1991. With security concerns no longer a trump card to discipline potentially dissenting voices in Congress and deter other claimants on America's China policy (such as economic and human rights organizations), interest group politics in America filled the void.

The new disciplining effect of renewed security cooperation in the wake of September 11, however, will be considerably weaker now than it was in the 1970s and 1980s—again, unless the

[2]Nixon quoted in William Burr, ed., *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Secret Talks with Beijing & Moscow* (New York: The New Press, 1998), p. 64.

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perceived common threat to China and America rises further. Security cooperation in the war against terrorism is likely to be limited and ambivalent because constituencies in both countries are deeply divided over how much of a long-term threat each society poses to the other, because Beijing is so focused on its domestic problems, and because China does not feel as threatened as America. As a senior Chinese scholar put it to an American group in October 2001, the events of September 11 are "still regarded as an American misfortune, still very far away. So, how much political risk will Chinese leaders take?" Consequently, in both Washington and Beijing, defining a common security agenda has become much more complex than it was for Nixon and Mao.

The ambivalences created by the tension between the need for short-term security cooperation in the war against terror and long-term strategic distrust is nowhere so well illustrated as in the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), issued by the U.S. Department of Defense almost three weeks after September 11, 2001. While some hasty revisions were made in the QDR after "911", neither the U.S. effort to build a global coalition nor President Jiang's almost immediate personal pledge to President Bush on September 12—that "China is ready to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the United States and the international community in combating all manner of terrorist violence"[3]—prevented the following from appearing in the QDR: "The possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region [East Asia and the East Asian littoral]."[4]

To Beijing these words mean that Washington sees China as a potential security challenge and that the United States is building future capabilities with that in mind. This posture clearly weakens the elite and popular basis for Chinese cooperation with the United States, but it does not remove it altogether. Beijing will still provide meaningful assistance to the struggle against terrorism because it, too, fears Central Asian and Middle Eastern terrorism (particularly with the 2008 Olympics coming up in China), and because it wants to protect its economic interests with the United States. In addition, America and China now share an obvious interest in a stable Pakistan, and Beijing does not want to be isolated regionally or globally. The point of departure for Chinese strategic thinking is the need to maintain a set of external relationships and conditions that permit internal development to proceed with minimum feasible difficulty. Among external players, the United States has the greatest impact on that environment and hence on China's prospects for development.

Nonetheless, as China's leaders survey their country's periphery they see one major trend and from it they sense one major fear. The trend is that most of the major states around China are aligning with the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism to various degrees and for undefined durations. Russia has veered considerably closer to the West by allowing U.S. military overflights destined for the Afghan theater; making it clear that Russia has no objection to former Soviet Central Asian republics being used as staging grounds for U.S. military and intelligence operations in Afghanistan; indicating that it will consider modifications to the ABM Treaty; and suggesting a

[3]Jiang Zemin quoted in Reuters World Report, September 13, 2001.

[4]*Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001), pp. 2, 4. The East Asian littoral is defined "as the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal."

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desire for closer relations with even a further expanded NATO. Washington's relations with a nervous New Delhi have improved, as have U.S. ties with Pakistan, Beijing's long-time ally on the subcontinent. Japan has taken the opportunity (some Chinese call it a "pretext") of the coalition against terrorism to be more helpful than it was in the Gulf War, and has broadened its security role in the rear-area support dimension, a sensitive issue throughout Asia. Even Iran, by indicating a willingness to assist with downed American aircraft, may be setting the stage for improved relations with Washington. That the United States could emerge from the present conflict with a stronger diplomatic position in the region—and perhaps a larger military presence as well—is a concern to Beijing.

This trend around its periphery feeds into China's millennia-old fear: encirclement. One Hong Kong analyst admirably summed up the perspective of at least some in Beijing: "To China, it means that the United States fills the last gap in the northeast of its ring of encirclement. . . . China will feel prickles down its back."[5]

Other factors will also affect the level and tone of U.S.-China cooperation. One is China's relative propinquity to the action. If one conceives of the coalition against terrorism as a series of concentric rings, where countries closer to the core cooperate more extensively with Washington than those toward the periphery, China lies at some intermediate point moving toward the outer rings. NATO will be close to the center, with Pakistan, selected Central Asian and Arab states, Japan, and India occupying progressively more distant rings. President Bush, through his telephone calls and other communication with President Jiang, as well as his compressed trip to the APEC leaders' meeting in Shanghai on October 19–21, has promoted cooperation with Beijing, but there are constraints on how far he can, will or should go. His discussions with President Jiang in Shanghai and their joint press conference there on October 19 made clear that China is not at the core of the coalition.[6] President Jiang did not explicitly endorse the use of force against Afghanistan and raised the Taiwan question. President Bush noted issues of proliferation and human rights, saying, "The war on terrorism must never be an excuse to persecute minorities", a reference to initial Chinese attempts to link "separatist" tendencies in China's west to terrorism.

Not only can the coalition against terrorism be visualized as a set of concentric rings, but the actual and potential targets of U.S. action can be thus arrayed as well. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda are the core targets, and every critical government has agreed initially with that. Building a broad coalition to deal with those targets, to include China, has been comparatively easy. But if the military phase of the campaign spreads beyond Afghanistan, then Washington must anticipate increasing misgivings and perhaps resistance from Beijing, among others. Moving toward the next ring of target states (Iraq springs immediately to mind) would be very difficult for Beijing to support, unless such a state were shown unambiguously to have been actively complicit in terrorist attacks on the United States—or, in the future, on other coalition members. As Walter McDougall put it in a broader context,

[5]Ba Ren, "The United States Meddles with Afghanistan to Kill Three Birds with One Stone", *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong Internet version in Chinese), September 24, 2001.

[6]Office of the Press Secretary, October 19, 2001, "Remarks by President Bush and President Jiang Zemin in Press Availability", Western Suburb Guest House, Shanghai, People's Republic of China.

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Beijing may be "in for a dime, but not necessarily for a dollar."[7]

More immediate considerations also preoccupy Beijing. With roughly 19 million Muslims in China, Beijing is anxious not to be seen as participating in a clash of civilizations. This internal security fear is mirrored externally, with so many Muslim states to its vast, sparsely populated and vulnerable west. China is also becoming increasingly dependent upon oil supplies from abroad (30.1 percent dependent in 2000, and an anticipated dependence of 60 percent in 2020). The Middle East is particularly important, accounting for 60 to 70 percent of China's crude oil imports, and so, quite predictably, Beijing is reluctant to alienate the major oil supplying countries or see the price of crude jump because of instability.

Domestic Limits to Cooperation

BEYOND THE strategic and security inhibitions noted above lies the critical realm of domestic politics in both America and China. Domestic constraints in the United States inhibit Washington from taking certain steps that Beijing's leaders could use to justify positive steps of their own toward America. Similarly, domestic constraints in China make it hard for Beijing to take certain steps that might lead to change in Washington. The modesty of the cooperation that is likely before us makes it hard to justify a transformation of the overall relationship in either capital—though both President Bush and President Jiang probably desire such an outcome. For example, Chinese leaders must ask themselves, "If the Americans won't even sell us spare parts for grounded Black Hawk helicopters that they sold us more than a decade ago, what will our cooperation achieve?" The American response is that these helicopters can be (or have been) used in theaters such as Tibet and the Taiwan Strait where Washington does not want them employed.

Looking more deeply into domestic constraints in both societies, when George W. Bush came into office, his administration was divided over China policy, and the schism deepened with the April 2001 incident involving the collision between a Chinese jet fighter and a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane. The contours of this ongoing division are complex, but the principal protagonists are Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is in the broad "engagement school" of the preceding six U.S. administrations, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who is more impressed by China's suspected and documented proliferation activities and Beijing's muscular posture toward Taiwan. The President seemed positioned mid-way between his two subordinates. He has pointed continuously to the importance of economic and cultural engagement and "productive relations"[8] with China (by supporting Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organization, extension of normal trade relations to China, not opposing the selection of Beijing as the site for the 2008 Olympic Games, and by traveling to Shanghai for the APEC meeting as anthrax attacks were unfolding in the United States). But by saying on April 25, 2001 that he would do "whatever it takes" to resist an attack on Taiwan by the PRC, he sought to deter possible Chinese adventurism; and in early September 2001 the President imposed sanctions on a Chinese arms manufacturer for allegedly proliferating missile technology to Pakistan.

The result of these twin impulses

[7]Walter A. McDougall, "Cold War II", *Orbis* (Winter 2001).

[8]"Bush on China: 'Different Values, Common Interests'", *New York Times*, April 13, 2001.

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within the administration—and seemingly within the President—was that by the time of the September 11 attack, the President and his colleagues had slid from campaign formulations of China as a "strategic competitor", through interim formulations of "We view China as a partner on some issues and a competitor on others" and "China is a competitor and potential regional rival, but also a trading partner willing to cooperate in areas such as Korea, where our strategic interests overlap", to simply dropping the "competitor" formulation altogether. As Secretary Powell put it in July 2001, indicating that he wished to dampen the differences within the administration, "The relationship is so complex, with so many different elements to it, that it's probably wiser not to capture it with a single word or single term or cliché."[9] In Shanghai, on October 19, 2001 Bush simply said, "America wants a constructive relationship with China."

Another constraint on U.S. action is public opinion. Public attitudes are not immutable, and they are subject to the influence of strong leadership. Nonetheless, public opinion toward China has not improved in the dozen years since the violence at Tiananmen.[10] While lukewarm public opinion does not make improved bilateral relations impossible, neither does it create any pressure on the President to act. A pre-September 11 survey reported that, "Most [Americans] see China as at least a serious problem, but only one-in-five call it an adversary." Further, "Overall, a 46 percent plurality believe that Bush is taking the right approach with China, while 34 percent say he has been too soft."[11] In short, with the administration divided, Chinese cooperation in the struggle against terrorism limited (but positive), and public opinion ambivalent about improved relations, something dramatic is needed to overcome the inertia. Thus far, Beijing has not provided anything dramatically positive.

Single-issue interest groups and the mass media invariably move into any significant vacuum created by bureaucratic division and popular skepticism. Shortly after September 11, pro-Taiwan interests began to argue that the island should not be "sold out" to win Beijing's cooperation; Chinese domestic and exiled pro-democracy forces urged that their cause not be forsaken for geostrategic reasons; Western human rights organizations argued that their issues should be pushed harder with Beijing; and anti-proliferation and conservative security organizations asserted that China is part of the problem, not the solution. Once again, these pressures could be overridden by American statesmen, but those who would do so must plausibly show both that Beijing's cooperation is essential to core U.S. security interests and that it is attainable.

President Jiang faces his own constraints. Beyond the suspicions that Chinese security, intelligence and military officials have of the United States, China's civilian leaders judge almost every policy issue from the perspective of how it will affect prospects for domestic economic growth and socio-political stability. They face serious problems. China's financial system is in an advanced state of disrepair. The rate of its export growth is sagging due to the global economic slowdown. Unemployment is already high and is likely to increase dramatically with

[9]Powell quoted in "China is 'Strategic Competitor' No More", *Agence France Presse*, July 30, 2001.

[10]See my *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 385.

[11]The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, "Public Behind Bush on Key Foreign Issues: Modest Support for Missile Defense, No Panic on China", http://www.people-press.org/china01rpt.

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China's entry into the WTO. Rural dissatisfaction with mounting inequalities and slow rural income growth is spilling over into confrontation and violence as income-starved local governments impose arbitrary fees on increasingly estranged peasants. Within this combustible domestic setting, China confronts independence tendencies in both Tibet and the western region of Xinjiang. Beijing fears that if China becomes too closely aligned with Washington in the struggle against terrorism, it could dangerously energize some parts of its own Muslim population, particularly the Uighurs in Xinjiang, a small number of whom China alleges have ties to Osama bin Laden.

Beyond all this, President Jiang is widely perceived in China to have been too accommodating to U.S. pressure in the past, whether in his having accepted minimum compensation and expressions of regret for the 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade and the April 2001 reconnaissance plane incident, or for having accepted very stringent terms for Chinese accession to the WTO. This charge of "soft" on the Americans comes against the backdrop of a popular undercurrent of anti-Americanism, an undercurrent to which the regime has contributed in the past when it seemed expedient to do so. With the rough Chinese equivalent of general elections coming up in the fall of 2002 (the Sixteenth Party Congress), and President Jiang desirous of either holding onto some significant position himself or, at a minimum, having trusted protégés succeed him, he must not allow himself to be seen as putty in American hands. In short, he needs something significant from Washington before he can be as forward leaning as he otherwise might wish to be. Thus far, however, he has not even been able to get Washington to lift some sanctions imposed as long as twelve years ago.

Modest Prospects

BEIJING AND Washington will both seek to avoid any appearance of deteriorating relations during the war against terrorism, and modest progress will likely be made in trade and leadership exchanges. Bilateral discussions about contentious issues such as human rights and proliferation will continue, but results will probably not be dramatic. With respect to Taiwan, China will continue to employ a mixed strategy of coercive diplomacy (e.g., missile deployments, force modernization and international isolation) to deter Taipei from moving toward independence, while simultaneously seeking to integrate Taiwan's economy ever more closely with that of the mainland and building a "united front" with all Taiwanese political forces opposed to the government of President Chen Shui-bian. As long as Beijing continues to believe that a Taiwanese declaration of independence is unlikely, and that current policy makes eventual reunification at least plausible, China's current leaders are unlikely to use force against the island. That said, the outcome of Taiwan's December 2001 legislative elections, and the character of future U.S. weapons sales to the island, could change the dominant assessment in Beijing.

With respect to the global struggle against terrorism, Beijing has its own reasons to cooperate in the intelligence sharing and money laundering areas, as it already has done. In the United Nations, we can expect Beijing to support General Assembly and Security Council actions that give the United States considerable practical latitude, but which do not formally endorse specific forceful U.S. actions in specific places. Beyond the visible spectrum of cooperation, China may provide further help "behind the curtain" (*muhou*). Some policy analysts and low-level

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Chinese officials have suggested to me that U.S. aircraft forced down in China would now receive a much friendlier welcome than did the crew of the U.S. EP-3 in April 2001. Were wounded Americans to need treatment in China, that too is possible. These are small mercies.

Even within this context, each capital could take modest steps that would provide the other with reasons to enhance cooperation. For instance, the Pentagon is still stuck in neutral on military-to-military exchanges with China's People's Liberation Army. Renewing contact with forces that one may wish to cooperate with in the struggle against terrorism seems elementary. Likewise, with Beijing entering the WTO, the world economy slowing, and U.S. firms still investing heavily in China, the long-standing prohibition against Overseas Private Investment Corporation activity in China is, at best, silly. For its part, Beijing needs to stop doing counterproductive things, most notably its attempt to use dangerous weapons and technology transfers as leverage against U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. Moreover, China could publicly support the movement of humanitarian relief to Afghanistan through its territory. Many things are possible, but until Americans see real cooperation from the Chinese side, the gridlock will continue in Washington.

When all is said and done, unless the perceived common threat to both nations rises sharply, driving both political leaderships to further subordinate domestic divisions to security cooperation, Sino-American cooperation will remain limited and ambivalent. This adds up to a good prospect for marginal improvement in U.S.-China relations, but not for anything resembling strategic transformation. Yes, then, the world has changed; in this regard, however, it has not changed much. □

All in Good Time

'We have nothing to do with each other', one Uighur said. 'The Chinese here act like they see right through us, like we're not people to them.'

Then there is the issue of the time. Big stores, or those owned by Chinese, mostly quote opening hours in Beijing time, as if it were their umbilical cord to civilization. Those owned by Muslims, which tend to be small businesses, are two hours behind.

'We Chinese go by Beijing time', said a bartender named Wang, whose father was sent here to work 20 years ago. 'But the Uighurs do not.'

—Elizabeth Rosenthal, *New York Times*, November 19, 2000

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Odom's Russia: A Forum

WILLIAM Odom's essay, "Realism About Russia", in the Fall 2001 issue of The National Interest *put forth a stark and controversial view of Russia's prospects and of how U.S. policy should adapt to those prospects. In the interest of generating a conversation over what remains an important and multifaceted relationship between former Cold War antagonists, we asked a group of distinguished scholars and analysts—among them Americans, Russians, and Europeans—to respond to General Odom's presentation. Little did we know at the time that the events of September 11 would alter the context of that relationship and generate what may turn out to be significant changes in it. Not surprisingly, several of the critiques presented here refer to the impact of the terror attacks and their aftermath on the course of U.S.-Russian relations. That, in turn, has provided Gen. Odom with an opportunity to respond to his critics and to comment on the post-September 11 environment at the same time.*

—The Editors

*Martin Malia, University of California, Berkeley:**

IN THE bogged-down debate about post-Communist Russia's tribulations, William Odom has the merit of clearly identifying the chief villain of the story: "seven decades of Soviet rule are mostly to blame . . . not the West." Among works written as if Yeltsin's "young reformers" had inherited a thriving society from communism, he appropriately calls Stephen F. Cohen's *Failed Crusade* "egregious." The same must be said of Peter Reddaway's *Tragedy of Russia's Reforms*, which places the blame on "Thatcherite market bolshevism" *(sic!)*.

Odom is again right to claim that it is not enough to decree neo-liberal economic measures to create a true market economy, or to hold a few elections to produce a genuine democracy. For a successful market democracy, a strong institutional foundation *is* necessary: "rules for deciding who rules", guaranteed individual freedoms, an independent judiciary, stable property rights, and so on—all "deficit" items in post-Soviet Russia. Thus Putin has inherited "a mix of old and new institutions", a scaffolding of market democracy around a society still half-Soviet and with a holdover *nomenklatura* elite. Indeed, a decade after communism's collapse, Russian reform is clearly stuck in the mud, and the facile optimism of the days of "Boris and Bill" now appears juvenile and naïve.

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At this point, however, Odom's analysis bogs down in a pessimistic version of the "Washington consensus" equation of free markets with democratic politics that he otherwise rejects. For the main burden of his article is that Russia will remain arrested in a neither-fish-nor-fowl state for decades to come, a position he argues with such plausible state-of-the-art social science models as "path dependence lock-in" (meaning set ways are hard to break) and "weak state" syndrome (meaning reformist initiatives from above cannot make any difference). On this basis, Odom concludes that it is pointless for the Bush Administration to continue the Clinton Administration's efforts to move Russia forward. In particular, he says, we should not treat Russia as a great power, or even take it seriously as an international actor beyond its ability to cause trouble for weak neighbors. Nor should Russia's stock of decaying nuclear weapons move us to give undue importance to such joint security efforts as the Nunn-Lugar program (though the program's first purpose is to protect *us* against nuclear proliferation).

It should hardly be necessary to say that the globequake of September 11 rendered these conclusions nugatory overnight. Russia is back in the game, and our ally to boot. Yet even without that spectacular reversal, Odom's argument fails for the more fundamental reason that his social science lacks proper historical grounding. His gold standard for measuring progress is the usual one: that most lucky of modern European nations, insular England in 1688. Albion then "broke out of its old institutional pattern based on absolute monarchy" thereby finding its "effective economic path", one "that *also took hold in Holland* (my emphasis) at about the same time. Meanwhile, France [and] Spain . . . remained . . . chained to absolutist institutional arrangements . . . trailing the booming English and Dutch economies for the next three centuries." This simply will not do, even as a rudimentary summary of how Europe modernized.

The first "modern" economy was obviously 17th-century Holland (building on the antecedents of medieval Northern Italy and Flanders), for which Jan de Vries' prize-winning *The First Modern Economy* (1997) gives the full story. Throughout the century, moreover, the English imitated the Dutch—as in the creation of a national bank—not the other way around. And in 1688 the *Stadtholder* of Holland, William of Orange, mounted the English throne with the aid of Dutch and French Huguenot troops in order to contain Europe's premier power, France. Thus, with Dutch help, Britain was set on its way to becoming, by the mid-18th century, the continent's leading model for what we now call "modernity."

THESE remarks are no pedantic quibble about remote events without relevance to 21st century conditions. Rather, these developments defined the Atlantic matrix out of which modernization, both institutional and economic, later came to central and eastern Europe. Indeed, among the earliest sovereigns to take the cue was Peter the Great, in 1697–98. Significantly, he went first to advanced Holland and only later to William III's more recent dominion, England. So St. Petersburg came to be laid out in imitation of Amsterdam; and Peter for a time considered making Dutch the official language of his empire (William said the Czar spoke it "like a Dutch sailor").

Similarly, and in fact somewhat earlier, the Great Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia had imported Dutch craftsmen and Huguenot exiles to develop his backward realm; and later the Stein-Hardenberg

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Reforms introduced into Prussia a watered-down version of the French Revolution's innovations. As for Russia, from Alexander II's Great Reforms of the 1860s down to Sergei Witte's industrialization of the 1890s and his Duma Constitution of 1905, it was successfully plodding its way to both the economic *and* the institutional foundations of a more open order, this despite a notable "path dependence" of autocracy and serfdom—progress annulled by seventy years of communist pseudo-modernization.

The great social science model for this West-East dynamic of development is, of course, given by Alexander Gerschenkron in his *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (1962). Its central thesis is that backward societies modernize not by retracing their predecessors' exact steps, but by compressing and telescoping them through state action from above: *ergo* Peter, Alexander II and Witte; and, in his perverse and ultimately disastrous way, Stalin.

Could it be, then, that the new Petersburg boy, Vladimir Putin, is contemplating a Petrine-like leap to lift Russia out of its present humiliation? This is surely suggested by the way he was energized by September 11 to face down his stuck-in-the-mud military and gamble his Kremlin tenancy on the West. Witness the ardor of his embrace of Bush, his Lorelei song to the German Bundestag, and his economic wooing of the European Union in Brussels—all this at a time the Russian economy is at last picking up. It is most unlikely that such radical defiance of his earlier domestic base is merely a Potemkin ploy to lull us again into naiveté. So perhaps Russia's "path dependence lock-in" is not as tight as Odom thinks. And perhaps the organic coupling of the market and democracy may yet turn out to have merit, even in darkest Muscovy.

*Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Princeton University:**

GENERAL Odom tells us that Russia is not a great power, probably cannot be one for a very long time, and therefore should not be treated as one. He does not, however, explain what a "great power" is in today's world, or how U.S. behavior should be influenced by the power hierarchy he imputes to the international scene. He implies that since Russia is no longer a great power it should be sharply demoted in significance, since its willingness and ability to support American interests are limited and its ability to harm those interests is not much greater.

Odom's perception of the world, of Russia, and of American interests differs from mine. The world I see is one in which states are no longer the sole players (if they ever were). It is a world in which non-state actors have seized part of the stage, acting sometimes as tools, sometimes as partners, but sometimes also as scourges of governments and the states they rule. It is a world in which success and failure do not depend entirely or even primarily on the size of a country, or its military strength, or the affluence of its population, or any other single factor—or, for that matter, on any simple combination of factors. States can be comparatively powerful in some respects and weak in others. In today's world, it is impossible to conjure up some litmus test that will usefully distinguish a "great power" from other states. One must first ask, "Power for what?"

Presumably, the power that is relevant to U.S. foreign policy is that which can affect American interests. Defining these

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interests and assigning priorities among them is a tricky exercise on which reasonable people can disagree. Nevertheless, one interest normally trumps all others: the defense of a country's territory against attack from abroad. On that score Russia is more likely to help than harm the United States, and these days we need all the help we can get.

Don't forget: The Cold War ended with Russia's help. (The Soviet Union was not Russia writ large but a Communist empire that Russia's leaders helped demolish.) When the Soviet Union disappeared from the geopolitical map, the United States became the unchallenged military power in the world, so much so that other states could no longer pose a plausible threat to American territory. Only non-state actors—terrorist networks, to be precise—can do that, by employing forms of asymmetrical warfare that operate below America's deterrence capabilities. The sort of defenses and alliances that were necessary during the Cold War have become of limited utility in dealing with the new threat. Russia, however, irrespective of its success or lack thereof in creating a stable, democratic society, was and remains relevant. It has been a target of these same malign forces and its geographic location provides indispensable assets for combating the most direct threat to American security.

That is why, ultimately, debating whether Russia is a "great power" is a pointless exercise. We need cooperation with Russia to secure our most fundamental security interests. If such cooperation were not in Russia's interest it would be futile (or too costly to other interests) to try to enlist it, but it is in Russia's interest. It would be irresponsible to reject security cooperation with Russia just because it has not yet and may never mirror image our own political and economic institutions.

I DO AGREE with General Odom that past U.S. policy toward Russia has been mistaken, but the mistake was not the one he cites. The very limited economic support the United States offered Russia could not have been decisive in creating a transformation that at best will take more than a generation and, for better or for worse, it was not the most important element of Clinton Administration policy.[1] Far more important, mostly for worse, were other decisions: NATO enlargement; bombing Serbia without Security Council approval; and the erratic use of military force to solve problems for which force was ill suited.

The fundamental flaw in Clinton Administration policy was the absence of a strategy to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Too many obsolescent Cold War practices were continued. American economic and military strength fed the illusion that the United States was invulnerable and could use its military forces to whatever purpose it chose so long as it limited American casualties. The administration failed to build the sort of alliances needed to meet the terrorist threat and dissipated American power by intervening in disputes with little relevance to its security, but that created or nurtured pockets of determined and dangerous enemies.

Finally, General Odom exaggerates Russia's current defects. His is the attitude of a hanging judge prepared to accept any allegation of wrongdoing as valid, while ignoring contradictory or qualifying facts. Indeed, the caricature General Odom draws of current conditions in Russia

[1]Odom also exaggerates its extent. It was hardly "massive": the grant aid could have come out of Bill Gates' after-tax income without significantly affecting his lifestyle. The IMF infusions (at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer) were loans, half of which have already been repaid.

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forms a precarious platform for his confident predictions. That caricature is reminiscent of others based on partial evidence and the "straight-lining" of temporary trends out into the distant future. Examples abound: the predictions in the 1970s that Japan would outstrip the United States in GDP by the 1990s; the "new paradigm" theorists' overblown projections of stock market valuation during the price bubble in technology stocks just a few years back; and the estimates, right through the 1980s, that Communist Party rule in the Soviet Union was so entrenched that it could not be seriously undermined from within. The prediction that Russia is "trapped" into some "weak state" syndrome has no more logical validity than one positing that Russia will gradually adapt its institutions to support a capitalist economy and an open society.

Neither outcome is inevitable, but several things should be clear. One is that only the Russians themselves can build the institutions and develop the attitudes they will need to fulfill their potential in a globalizing world. The second is that it is in the interest of the United States, its allies in Europe and the entire world that Russia become a full and responsible member of the civilized world community. The third is that U.S. policy can influence developments in Russia at least at the margins. Russia is much more likely to become a modern, productive and friendly state if its leaders see the country's future served by close association with western Europe and the United States. But they are likely to sustain that view only if the United States and its allies take Russian interests into account and cooperate in dealing with common problems.

This is not a prescription for treating Russia as an exception, or for excusing those shortcomings still apparent in its governance and some of its actions, but only for continuing policies that have proven successful in the past in other cases. We did not exclude Portugal, Spain or Turkey from NATO membership on grounds that they were no longer "great powers" or that they were insufficiently democratic. The fact that Portugal was a member of the Western alliance played an important role in the evolution of a stable democracy when Antonio Salazar passed from the scene. Spain's basing agreements with the United States while General Franco was still running a fascist dictatorship helped rather than hindered the subsequent inclusion of Spain in NATO and the establishment of democratic institutions there. Would we or Turkey be better off today if we had refused to ally ourselves with that country because its armed forces razed Kurdish villages and intervened in Cyprus? In fact, the U.S.-Turkish alliance has helped preserve a secular government in Ankara and has encouraged political solutions in Kurdistan and Cyprus. Are there not useful lessons here when we consider relations with a Russia that, like the United States, faces the threat of terrorist attack?

General Odom wrote "Realism About Russia" before September 11 and, to be fair to him, I have written my critique as I would have on September 10, 2001, not going beyond views I have expressed publicly for nearly a decade. Let the reader judge whether the world today better fits his concept of realism or my perception of reality.

*Jerry F. Hough, Duke University:**

FOR THOSE OF us who were engaged in debate with General Odom twenty years ago, his recent article in *The National Interest* brings a smile to the lips. Then, too, he

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was convinced that the Soviet present and future were determined by its past. Then, of course, he saw the Soviet Union as a strong state, dominated by its military and driven by that military to world domination. The dovish argument that the Soviet elite "only" wanted defense and equality with the West he denounced as naiveté; the possibility that social forces within the Soviet Union would produce evolution he dismissed out of hand.

As General Odom sees it, Russia is still incapable of any improvement or evolution, but now it is eternally a weak state, and its military officers are absorbed only with personal gain. None has any sense of national pride, professionalism or desire either for defense or national expansion. Defense against a rising China no longer occupies the thinking of any Russian, although in the past the historic fear of Tatars was said to make all Russians paranoid about China.

There is no question about the policy of Russia's current rulers. Anatoly Chubais, along with other Leningraders like Putin working with him, simply use the state to steal. These men do not seek economic growth because domestic stagnation gives them more oil, fertilizer, and natural resources to export, and they can easily receive a percentage of the proceedings for their personal gain. They do not invest their money at home, but keep it safely abroad.

In the short run, at least, this development is much more advantageous to American foreign policy than General Odom acknowledges. The United States can and does bribe Russian leaders to accept virtually anything—the expansion of NATO, an American sphere of influence in Serbia or Uzbekistan, assistance in Afghanistan, modification of the ABM Treaty, and so forth. The United States should not be criticized for sugarcoating what it is doing by treating Russia as a great power; that is, after all, a small price to pay for the privilege of suborning Russia's national interest.

THE MOST fundamental problem with General Odom's analysis, however, is that it lacks perspective on the very long and difficult process of the development of markets and constitutional democracy. What we call corruption is a key part of this process, for it builds a network of people in different elite groups who have an interest in property rights, and in a government that both promotes economic growth and restrains the ruler. If a businessman brings a politician and a military officer into his project, then the government will protect and promote growth for personal reasons, and the military will support it. Members of the elite will support property rights so they can retain their wealth after they leave office, and so that their children can inherit it.[1]

But such investment-oriented corruption must be broadly based to be a positive factor in development. In Russia, major corruption has been too narrowly concentrated. Broad corruption has been limited to forms such as bribes that are dependent on a person remaining in office. The military let the Soviet system fall because its leaders had received none of the economic benefits of an American junior officer. Yeltsin's allowing the top generals to "privatize" the Ministry of Defense dachas in 1991 was crucial. The failure of Putin to bring Russian officials and military officers into the kind of development-centered corruption found in other Third World countries makes the Putin regime very susceptible to a military coup unless it changes its economic policy.

The notion that well-educated Russians cannot have China's rate of eco-

[1]See Hough, *The Logic of Economic Reform in Russia* (Washington: Brookings, 2001).

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nomic growth is silly. Douglass North, whom General Odom misinterprets, and Joseph Stiglitz, who just received a Nobel Prize, were directing their fire at the policy of Larry Summers at the Treasury Department, at his faith in neo-liberal economics and at the Russian leadership's willingness to adopt this policy in order to receive Western money. North and Stiglitz rightly said that this policy was totally inappropriate for market building. The policy will go down with pre-1941 Comintern support for Hitler as a classic case of the ability of dogmatic ideology to cause human suffering on a massive scale.

But just as the failure of Russian reform was the product of policy, so a change of policy can produce a different outcome. If the Russians adopt the advice of Alexander Gerschenkron and Joseph Stiglitz, if they re-adopt the policies of Nicholas II and Count Sergei Witte, they too can and will have rapid and stable growth. There are too many in the civilian and military elite with a vital personal interest in that development for it to be postponed for much longer.

We lose perspective about time when we live through torturous periods. We forget that 13 years passed between the Declaration of Independence and General Washington's inauguration. We don't discuss the fact that the Constitutional Convention was the result of Washington's threatened military coup against the Continental Congress and that threats to his property rights in western Virginia were one of the factors driving him. It will be December 2004 before a similar period passes in Russia. It would be surprising if Russia were not following something like America's time framework. The determination of Russia's current rulers to keep their money abroad shows that they have a similar expectation. Let us hope that the result will be a George Washington and not the Napoleon Bonaparte produced by the nearly simultaneous French Revolution.

*Geoffrey Hosking, University College, London:**

ACCORDING to Odom, the "transition" in Russia is well and truly over. The country has become trapped in "path dependency": a vicious and ineluctable circle of corrupt authoritarian rule, economic stagnation and irresponsible behavior abroad. Its government cannot collect taxes, its oligarchs drain resources out of the economy instead of investing in it, and the army tries to dominate Chechnya by violence and intimidation.

One cannot deny the verisimilitude of Odom's picture. But the inferences he draws from it smack of American arrogance and exclusivity that increasingly alarm and repel the outside world, including some of America's closest allies. According to his model, only a few virtuous countries in the world are able to combine liberal democracy with a properly functioning market economy. These depend on having institutions of the kind created in England following the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688–89 or in America after it declared independence. All other countries have "weak states" and an "ineffective economy", and are unlikely to escape from this condition since "once a country has put in place a set of institutions—formal and informal—they are difficult to change." Among their number is Russia, which differs from the others only in claiming a great power role. We should reveal that claim to be hollow and abandon our attempts to integrate Russia into major international institutions. Thus Odom.

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Odom derives his notion of "path dependency" from Douglass North, who has indeed made a major contribution to economics by demonstrating that political and social institutions play decisive roles in generating sustained growth. But it is caricaturing North's work for Odom to draw such heavily determinist conclusions from it, and doing so suggests an exclusivist Anglo-American version of modernization and globalization that threatens the stability of societies when thoughtlessly applied—as it often is nowadays. Countries can modernize in different ways, and with different institutions. France, as Odom notes, did not in the 18th century adopt the same institutions as did England in the Glorious Revolution; nevertheless, despite the destructive wars fought on its territory over two centuries, it did not get mired in "path dependency." The French economy today is at least as prosperous and productive as that of Britain, and its democracy is no less stable. The same could be said of several other European countries as diverse as Italy, Germany and Sweden.

Russia's economic performance during the first post-Soviet decade has unquestionably been very disappointing. However, it could be argued that it was precisely adherence to an Americanized model of development, imposed through the IMF, that best explains the failure. I would not take that argument too far, since the Soviet legacy would have been difficult to overcome in any event. But it is worthy of note that Russia's economic performance has improved markedly since the crash of 1998 and its *dis*engagement from some IMF-sponsored programs. Russia's potential was and is considerable. Its resources are abundant and still insufficiently mobilized. Furthermore, despite the degradation of the last decade, it still has a relatively low-paid and highly skilled workforce, well-qualified professional staffs, and a science and technology base capable of being restored to its previous high international level. This is a combination of resources not commonly found in foundering Third World economies.

ODOM'S accusation that Russia plays an irresponsible and unconstructive role in world affairs is also overdone. Its record is far from irreproachable: the brutality of Russia's attempt to subdue Chechnya has created massive devastation and has probably reinforced terrorism. Russia has not always behaved constructively elsewhere, either—for example, in Abkhazia (but that was at least in part because international institutions did not respond to its request for help with peacekeeping there) and in the Balkans during the lead-up to the Kosovo crisis (but that was because NATO did not genuinely consult with it about a region in which Russia has traditionally taken a close interest). But all the same, during the last 15 years the Soviet Union and then Russia dismantled huge quantities of weapons, dissolved a military alliance, and withdrew from Afghanistan and most of central and eastern Europe, including the Baltic states and Ukraine which were once parts of its sovereign territory. I should have thought this a record to praise.

It is true, as Odom asserts, that Russia is no longer a great world power with claims to rival the United States. It remains, however, a very significant regional power, without whose active involvement none of the major security problems of Europe or central, north and east Asia can be solved—not to mention international terrorism. It borders on more countries that any other state in the world. Its aging and degrading nuclear arsenal is in some ways more dangerous in that condition than if it were being properly maintained and controlled. All these factors suggest that we should integrate Russia into international decision-

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making institutions, not dismiss it with a condescending wave of the hand.

Odom is right that there is much to be gloomy about in Russia today. But there are also countervailing factors. No one can be certain about the country's future, but writing off such a major power as one to be shunned because it is condemned to decades of the "weak state" syndrome and economic stagnation is to help generate the unfortunate situation it describes. Russians are very sensitive to insults to their honor, and they are at their most formidable when their backs are against a wall. It is much better to regard Russia as a power capable of standing up for itself, willing and able to play a responsible role in world affairs when it is treated as a potential partner. This approach may turn out to be unrewarding, but it is preferable to err in that direction than in Odom's.

*Alexey K. Pushkov, Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policies, Moscow:**

A STRONG trend in Western thinking about Russia rejects Winston Churchill's definition of it as "an enigma wrapped in a puzzle" in favor of a clear-cut verdict that Russia is just a failed country incapable of contributing to international order and constantly engaging in trouble-making diplomacy. This is the position taken by William Odom. If ten years ago pro-Russian enthusiasts were painting its future in blue and gold, nowadays the opposite school of thinking paints it mainly black.

General Odom praises Germany after World War II for "facing facts"; this, he asserts, helped Germany to be more easily integrated into the international order. Let us face some facts, too. Germany was made to face facts because it was defeated in a hot war and occupied by foreign powers. Russia, however, was not defeated in a war; rather, it rejected communism through its own internal evolution—to the evident amazement of the United States and others. The fact that the Soviet Union lost a cold war but not a hot one is crucial: Russia simply could not have been expected to behave or evolve as did occupied Germany or Japan.

Odom is certainly right to say that Russia is still far from being a Western-type liberal democracy. But if one compares today's Russia not with an abstract ideal, but with the reality of only ten years ago, one finds tremendous positive changes. The scope and depth of such changes are surprising for a country weighed down by ten centuries of authoritarian history and seventy years of communist rule, a country that—to repeat—has not undergone a foreign occupation to force upon it a market economy and democratic political institutions. Hence Odom's conclusion, using a phrase borrowed from Jeffrey Tayler, that Russia is fated to be "Zaire with permafrost", is neither fair nor instrumental for a realistic understanding of Russia's future. Not only does Odom ignore the slow but important progress Russia is making, but his approach to realism is limited to an exercise in building worst-case scenarios. The main burden of Odom's pessimism lies in his reading of Russia's international behavior. By focusing on Russia's ties with China, India and Iran, Odom overlooks the most significant dimension of Russian foreign policy, its Western dimension: Russia's ever-growing ties with the European Union and its persistent movement into the world economy. President Putin's decision to support the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism is clearly based on the desire of a leading part

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of the Russian political class, and a growing part of the Russian public, to see Russia as part of Europe and—politically—as one with the Western world. Without a serious basis for such a pro-Western choice, President Putin would not have risked such a stand.

In real strategic terms, too, Russian assistance to the United States has been, so far (as of mid-November 2001), more important than that given by the majority of its NATO allies. Russia is the largest and one of the two most powerful nations in Eurasia, as the crisis surrounding Afghanistan made clear, even for all those who failed to notice it before. One may well compare the Russian GDP with that of the Netherlands, but when one comes to geostrategic terms the comparison stops. Can the Netherlands talk to Central Asian countries about accepting U.S. military forces on their soil, or send troops to Tajikistan to counter Taliban incursions?

Russia's role in Asia is bound to grow further in coming years as China emerges as a leading international actor. In this light, Russia's special ties with India should not be criticized but applauded, especially in the light of a possible Indian-Pakistan confrontation in which Russia as a nuclear power can exercise a sobering effect on both sides of the conflict, perhaps together with America. Finally, as the events of September-October 2001 demonstrate, Russia does not use its ties with former Soviet republics to coerce them into an anti-American policy. Russia does exercise influence on those countries, but in the same way that the United States exercises influence on its Arab allies and partners. Why should Russia be condemned for pursuing a policy similar to one adopted by the United States?

One of the reasons Russia is seen as a trouble-maker in the West is that America's present strength has created a propensity—among some Americans, at least—to equate "responsible" international behavior with that which corresponds to American interests. But Russia cannot automatically espouse U.S. foreign policy interests, for two very good reasons. First, Russia's geopolitical setting requires it to deal pragmatically with a number of regimes that the United States dislikes, such as China and Iran. Second, since Russia is not a member of a U.S.-led Western alliance, and does not enjoy the shared security of NATO members or the protection of the American nuclear umbrella, it must guide itself according to a different set of security and political interests. Whether those interests will conflict or comport with those of the United States depends on U.S. foreign policy as well as on Russia's. After all, the events of September 11 have made clear that even the United States, with all its might, cannot successfully conduct a policy in Eurasia that is not based on a shared-interests approach with key countries of the continent, Russia being one of them.

While General Odom has chosen to remove Russia from the ranks of the great powers, President Bush has chosen otherwise. When President Putin offered to assist the United States in the war against terrorism, he did so not as a supplicant, but as the leader of the great power he believes Russia to be. So it was that, on October 7, President Bush called President Putin to inform him in advance about the impending U.S. strike against the Taliban. Putin took the call and offered support. Could they both have been wrong?

*Robert Legvold, Columbia University:**

ALTHOUGH the point may not come through clearly, the essential issue raised by Bill Odom's essay is whether—for good or

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ill—Russia matters to the United States. He says, for the most part, no; but where it does matter it does so largely for ill. If Odom has reached the wrong conclusion, it is because either the argument is wrong or it is the wrong argument (or perhaps both). Let us begin with the argument.

Few observers, either in Russia or on the outside, would disagree with Odom's judgment that Russia's problems flow from its sad transformation into a "weak state." Nor would there be disagreement over the hurdles obstructing its escape. Disagreement would begin over how hopeless the prospects are. Odom settles for a rather wooden and simple dictum for why Russia will not shake free. His theory notwithstanding, if Russia does progress, it is likely to do so in small steps that begin to salvage the state, cleanse and strengthen key institutions such as the judiciary, put in place supports and practices that facilitate sustainable growth, and work around retrograde special interests.

Over the last two years, significant progress along these lines—albeit partial and incremental—has occurred. Nothing guarantees that this advance will reach critical mass, propelling Russia on to a swift and secure path to democracy and a revitalized economy. Odom could yet be right (and not only about Russia, but about a majority of the post-Soviet states), but the fragmentary trends of the moment remind us that path dependency works two ways. It may also lead Russia out of its hole. A prudent judge would pause and await more evidence before deciding.

The other half of Odom's argument raises sharper objections. Again, few analysts in the United States would disagree that Russian behavior at times, in places, and on certain problems has been "unconstructive", perhaps intentionally so. This is true of the way it has dealt with its immediate neighbors, sold nuclear technologies, pursued cooperation with states from China to Cuba, and reacted to NATO enlargement, national missile defense and other pet American ideas.

To treat this as the whole story, however, does considerable violence to the truth. Russia has also been capable of constructive behavior, even, at times, when in a larger context we have seen it as unconstructive, such as the ultimate role that it played in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Long before September 11, and in many respects—from its dealings with North Korea on the nuclear issue to the dialogue with the European Union; from its long-standing collaboration with the United States on Afghanistan to its handling of Ukrainian debt—Russian actions, by any fair-minded judgment, have been constructive. Russia's behavior has been neither uniformly disruptive nor impervious to the influence of other states, including positive U.S. incentives when, on occasion, they have been offered. Odom's claim that Russia's waywardness stems from inherent political and psychological factors unsusceptible to U.S. influence is, at best, debatable.

WHATEVER one thinks of the accuracy of Odom's argument, however, the more serious drawback derives from its questionable utility or aptness. Russia matters to the United States not because it is a great power now but because it remains a significant factor on the world stage. To wind ourselves around our own axle over whether Russia should or should not be treated as a "great power" misses the point. Russia is not a distant tenth planet. It is located at the heart of the crucial landmass between Europe and Asia. Not only is this part of the world blessed with more natural wealth than any other, it also contains the potential for some of its gravest instability. Russia's fate and its actions remain the single most decisive factor determining the impact that the

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post-Soviet space will have on us all.

Not that Russia's 45 percent share of the world's nuclear weapons does not also matter, and is hardly to be written off as Odom suggests, while the United States unilaterally attempts to design a new strategic nuclear regime. Not that the role that we have discovered for Russia in the new overriding struggle against global terrorism ought not also to be in the picture. But the kind of relationship that we, the Europeans, Chinese and Japanese work out with Russia for coping with the challenges (or benefiting from the opportunities) in the netherworlds between NATO-Europe and Russia, and in the Caucasus and Central Asia, will shape the peace of mind and welfare of the two arenas that do indisputably matter to the United States—Europe and East Asia. It seems unlikely to me that we will get far in building the right kind of U.S.-Russian relationship for these purposes—let alone prosper in dealing with nuclear weapons and global terrorism—if we frame the issue in terms of Russia's twisted ego or write Russia off on narrow semi-deterministic grounds, not to mention making it our goal to keep "Russia's international role to a level commensurate with its power."

*Henry Trofimenko, Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Moscow:**

GENERAL Odom's analysis of the "Russian question" (which is of perennial interest to the United States) is undoubtedly very important for the new administration in Washington. With great sadness, I confess that many Russians would agree with his dissection of the problem.

The key to his analysis lies in the concepts of "path dependence" and the "weak state" syndrome. As he himself points out, the theory is not new; as applied to the USSR, in particular, it was developed by such American Sovietologists as Richard Pipes and Seweryn Bialer, both of whom argued that the Soviet regime was in most respects a continuation of the imperial Russian regime—indeed, one that saved the Russian empire. Similarly, there is much evidence to suggest that the post-Soviet Russian regime has not changed as much as many suppose, neither as a result of so-called *perestroika* or even as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The ruling class of the "new country" remains the same—the old Soviet *nomenklatura* now bedecked with new titles and new fashions. During the Soviet period this class managed the resources of the state that belonged to it collectively. Now it (mis)manages the same resources that, through the mechanisms of privatization, were distributed to members of the same ruling elite. It is too much to expect that the members of this class, who continue milking former state property for personal gain (in amounts thousands of times greater than under the *ancien regime*), would actively hamper the continual process of their personal enrichment. Thus too, sad to say, Odom is correct to suggest that nearly all the assistance that was provided to Russia from the outside world has been appropriated largely by the ruling thieves for personal gain. Regretfully, many foreign consultants, especially the Americans, used their influential positions in Moscow for similar purposes.

One may hope that a new generation of leaders soon to replace the present aging elite will change Russia's path, but it is unlikely. The simple reason is that in Russia today the same old method of co-opting persons to high government positions is at work: only those reliably devoted to personal enrichment have a chance

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to ascend the ladder. Meanwhile, the rotting education system makes it very difficult for those not of the traditional establishment to move up.

Every state in the world is a living organism of sorts—the longer it exists, the more its old values (habits, culture, institutions, attitudes) are consolidated. Americans were extremely lucky to start with a relatively clean slate, but even so, it took 75 years to ban slavery and another century to rectify its legacy. Indeed, the continuing popularity of Louis Farrakhan suggests that the full integration of blacks into American society lies still in America's future rather than in the present. The point is that cultural patterns hang heavily over new generations of citizens—if not over their leaders—and the older the state culture, the heavier the burden. To change existing ways and attitudes requires great courage and boldness from truly outstanding leaders. And even with the best of intentions and a supportive international environment, significant changes take a long time.

Odom is also correct to argue that, whatever changes might be eventually executed in Russia and in the other newly-independent states (most of which are still ruled by "popularly re-elected" oriental despots), the result will not be liberal democracy as it exists in the West. The present Russian embodiment of one of the main institutions of liberal democracy—the popularly elected parliament—came into being after the previous one, also duly elected, was crushed by the "democrat Yeltsin" tank gunfire, with the connivance of President Clinton. The new one, however, is a mockery of common sense: the members of its upper chamber are now appointed by the Russian president, and democratically-elected members of the lower house—the Duma—outdo each other in their collective frenzy to demonstrate absolute loyalty to the "higher authority", the un-elected Kremlin clique. This is the continuing heritage of ages of Russian history.

ALL THAT said, General Odom has trouble finding his ballast when discussing the particularities of contemporary Russian politics.

First, freedom of the media really does exist in Russia for the first time in hundreds of years, the insinuations of media magnates like Messrs. Berezovsky and Gusinsky notwithstanding. The regular, unhampered publication of such rabidly anti-government weeklies as *Zavtra* and *Duel*, as well as the daily re-broadcasts of the U.S. *Radio Liberty* on domestic Russian FM frequencies, confirms this fact. Media freedom is curtailed to a certain extent, but not because of official censorship or other restrictions. Rather, in contrast to the U.S. experience, the private ownership of most newspapers and TV stations mitigates against objectivity because the media is used in turf struggles among elite factions.

Second, the dyed-in-the-wool democrats like Sergei Kovalev and Elena Bonner now have zero influence in Russian politics. Grigorii Yavlinskii, who exists on foreign donations, is just a political chatterbox who surpasses even the superdemagogue, Mikhail Gorbachev, in his irrelevance to current events.

Third, Russia, despite its predicament, remains a great power by the fact of its still tremendous (if mismanaged) economic potential, its political influence in Eurasia and its place on the UN Security Council. Moreover, if Russia's leaders abandon their rhetorical flourishes in favor of real talks on the future of the ABM Treaty (as Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has recently suggested), Russia's international image will certainly improve—as it has already by dint of Russia's response to the events of September 11.

Fourth, the Russian military does not shun constructive reform. But its leaders

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do oppose idiotic non-stop reorganizations of the kind that has almost liquidated the only really battle-ready Russian force—the airborne troops. However, it is true that the immense quantity of newly-created generals and admirals (through protection and patronage) continues to wreak havoc in the command structure.

Fifth and most important, while weakened, Moscow has no real desire to unleash mischief in the international arena. The tragic events of September 11, which evoked a great deal of sympathy for the United States among Russians, demonstrate that there are still convincing reasons for the United States to pursue close and constructive cooperation with Russia to achieve shared and common goals. Russia's national interests are not identical to those of the United States, but that hardly makes Russia different from, say, France, as far as U.S. foreign policy is concerned. Or have some of us still not gotten over the bad habits of the Cold War?

Odom Replies:

LET ME thank all the respondents for their commentaries. To generalize about them, they agree with most of what I say about Russia's institutional development and economic performance, but they either do not like the way I reach my conclusions or do not like the conclusions themselves—occasionally both.

Because Professor Malia's reaction is the most interesting and complex, a proper reaction to it requires "more than a pedantic quibble" about his reading of Russian history. By his account, Russia has always been about fifty years behind Europe. By 1785, its nobility achieved institutions like France's *ancien regime*. The Great Reforms in the 1860s brought Russia up to Prussia's reforms of 1807–12. And the October Manifesto of 1905 was virtually a constitutional breakthrough.[2] This interpretation is not universally accepted. The late Michael Florinsky would reject Malia's assertion that the Charter of the Nobility of 1785 instituted property rights in Russia similar to those in France at that time.[3] Stefan Hedlund would probably deny that such rights were observed in Russia a century later.[4] The Prussian reformers built on longstanding legal institutions deriving from Justinian's Code. Russia first introduced European code law in 1864. Ignoring key institutional realities, Malia can feel much cheerier about Russia's prospects.[5]

That is one reason he is so upset that

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[2]See Malia's *Russia Under Western Eyes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). The cornerstone of his case may be found on page 146: "The pressure generated by Europe's advance, combined with the drag of native backwardness, would continue to complicate Russia's way to modernity. It is the action of these two forces, not the hoary memory of the Sacred Palace of Byzantium or the Mongols' Golden Horde that constitutes the true anomaly of Russia's modern history." Grant his "two forces", but by brushing off the Mongol period, Malia ignores the persistence of key Mongol institutional legacies, particularly the deeply ingrained practice of no limits on state power and no system of private property rights. A few other Mongol legacies endured in Muscovy's secular institutions; Byzantium provided its lasting cultural institutions. See Donald Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-cultural influences on the steppe frontier, 1304–1589* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 47, for this evidence.

[3]Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 570–1.

[4]Stefan Hedlund, "Can Property Rights Be Protected by Law?" *East European Constitutional Review* 10 (No. 1, 2001).

[5]Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols, 1304–1589*. Unless Malia can dispose of Ostrowski's evidence and interpretations, his dismissal of Mongol and Byzantine institutional legacies in modern Russia is difficult to accept.

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I put the 17th century English experience before the Dutch. Indeed, the Dutch economic take-off was somewhat earlier than England's, but that does not damage my argument. Political power in the Dutch provinces rested on the wealth of their towns, which were never fully subordinated by an absolute monarch, as was the case in England and France.[6] The wealthy cities of southern Germany might have put that region on the Dutch path if they had not been weakened by princely wars against Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, and later devastated by the Thirty Years War.[7] The English case is more instructive for Russia because it involved changing absolute monarchy to limited monarchy. In Russia today, the problem is still limiting the state and making it assume the "third party enforcer" role.[8] Can "the Petersburg boy" accomplish this in less than five decades?

I agree with Malia that Russia must turn West because it is welcome nowhere else. Our difference is over Russian institutional realities, a matter on which there is still much to be discovered.

Turning to Ambassador Matlock, although he does not really challenge my analytical scheme, he does reject its implications, leaving me little to say. Since he once again complains about NATO enlargement, however, I must recall his oft-made prediction that it would bring the worst people to power in Russia. Presumably, then, Putin is an awful fellow who should not now be cooperating with the United States.

Professor Hough's wide-ranging comments can only be treated eclectically. His recipe of widespread corruption for creating a liberal regime is a sure formula for keeping Russia locked into its present path dependency. As for his charge that I have never acknowledged change in Russia, given his own record of predictions, one should not be surprised that he failed to read mine carefully. I confine two examples to a footnote.[9] And for Russia's sake, let us hope its leaders do not heed his suggestion that they adopt the policies of Witte and Nicholas II. Nicholas died believing that the entire empire was his "patrimony", and Witte shared Nicholas' suspicion of "limited liability corporations", neither view being very helpful for economic performance.[10]

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[6]Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477–1806* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Jan de Vries' excellent book, mentioned by Malia, is not as comprehensive on the political history as is Israel's.

[7]See Thomas A. Brady, Jr., *The Protestant Politics of Jacob Sturm (1489–1553) and the German Reformation* (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1995), for details of the politics of these cities and their struggle to keep their institutions from being destroyed by either Charles V on the one hand or the local princes on the other.

[8]Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), also offers historical grounding for this point.

[9]In 1987, I wrote that "the paradox remains that great central control is required to achieve major decentralization of economic control and power. If Gorbachev succeeds, he will lose his centralized power to forces that could undercut the political authority of the regime to a degree that could lead to the breakup of the empire." See my "How Far Can Soviet Reform Go?" *Problems of Communism* 36 (No. 6, 1987). Hough also might want to look at my "Choice and Change in Soviet Politics", *Problems of Communism* 32 (No. 3, 1983), where I pointed out that the only problem Andropov could not put off indefinitely without systemic implications was "the declining vitality and responsiveness of the party cadres." Failing to address it was "to risk eventually greater dangers for the system—dangers of the kind that developed for the Polish party." I saw change in the USSR as political decay. Hough saw it as transformation to a pluralist system.

[10]Thomas C. Owen, *The Corporation Under Russian Law: 1800-1917* (New York: Cambridge

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Professor Legvold correctly notes that my arguments are equally applicable to most other post-Soviet states, not just Russia, but his belief that countries can incrementally creep out of predicaments like Russia's needs a few examples to be convincing. Wars and domestic upheavals more often bring such change. On the importance of Russia to the United States today, Pakistan and Uzbekistan are more important, but that does not make them great powers or permanently important to us. By his own standard these are "arguments that are wrong, not wrong arguments." I concede a point to him, however, and other respondents. I did not believe that my points about Russia's international role ruled out *all* cooperation with Moscow. If they did, then Legvold is right to emphasize that we do need Russian cooperation today. Will it last? Has it suddenly become the same as the cooperation among all G-7 members? I remain skeptical, September 11 notwithstanding.

Professor Hosking dislikes my style, not my arguments, accusing me of "American arrogance and exclusivity." He has a point. Perhaps I should have put them more softly, but the tone was meant more for Westerners than Russians. On the "exclusivity" charge I feel less vulnerable, having suggested the Meiji restoration and Kemal Atatürk's handling of Turkey as ways that Russia might escape its present path. The American "free framer" route to liberal democracy (Robert Dahl's term) is difficult to imagine for Russia.

Neither Henry Trofimenko nor Alexey Pushkov rejects my case outright. They even approve much of it. Beyond that, Trofimenko's defensive remarks about freedom of the press and certain Russian liberals reveal an understandable sensitivity. So do Pushkov's comments about Germany. Pushkov does, however, evoke my humility by reminding us how far Russia has come in such a short time, throwing off the Soviet regime by itself and making unprecedented attempts at reform. I have acknowledged as much in the Russian press, asserting that the Soviet peoples, not the United States, won the Cold War.[11]

MY ARTICLE is intentionally provocative, and had I been a critic of it, I would have asked me if I really believed it. My answer? I would bet on Russia remaining in its present institutional path for at least several decades. After all, look at the expectations held in 1950 or 1960 for Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Peru, and other richly endowed states that have received Western tutelage and assistance. Have any of them really "made it"? Something extraordinary would have to happen to make Russia different.

One change, of course, has eased Russia's traditional predicament: most of the minority nationalities have been offloaded. They were an obstacle that no liberal reformer could overcome, certainly not Nicholas II and Count Witte. Without the nationalities, Russia's military requirements drop drastically, another positive sign. Still, Russia's institutional legacies in property, law, and state power present monumental barriers to change. Malia can justly claim that by his fifty-year lag thesis, Russia will break them by mid-century. Because its only real alternative is to join the West, it might do so, but it could take much longer than fifty years. □

University Press, 1991). As this account shows, economic development in the last decades of the Russian Empire encountered huge institutional difficulties, but these were obscured by the impressive growth rates of that period.

[11]Interview in *Argumenty i fakty* (July 1998).

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

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Books

Meaning Well

The Curious Life of a Habsburg Idealist

Larry Wolff

Paula Sutter Fichtner, *Emperor Maximilian II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 368 pp., $35.

"IN OTHER countries dynasties are episodes in the history of the people; in the Habsburg Empire peoples are complications in the history of the dynasty", epigrammatically wrote A.J.P. Taylor in 1948 in *The Habsburg Monarchy*.[1] It is notable that in 2001, at a time when the royal biography is not an especially favored genre of professional historians, the Habsburgs can still be approached through that old-fashioned form of historical narrative, which is what Paula Sutter Fichtner has done in writing *Emperor Maximilian II*. Her portrait of Maximilian offers important insights into pressing 16th century problems that are full of modern relevance, especially the frustrating enterprise of consolidating and sustaining an ethnically and religiously pluralist state.

Fichtner surveys the reign of a single Habsburg ruler, who reigned for a dozen years (from 1564 to 1576), and one whom she herself regards as a "failure" in most of his political enterprises. He is, in some sense, a slender dynastic reed for supporting a comprehensive historical analysis. As it happens, the Yale University Press jacket illustration shows Maximilian standing slenderly in a Renaissance doublet of black and gold, gazing perhaps myopically out at us, the academic public of five centuries later, whose critical evaluation he must now endure. But Fichtner makes good use of her biographical subject to focus on the problems that the dynasty, and all of Europe, faced in the 16th century: the formation of the institutions of the modern administrative state, the military defense of Christian lands against the Ottoman Turks, and, above all, the tense religious circumstances in a continent divided between Roman Catholicism, seeking to consolidate its authority in the age of the Counter-Reformation, and the multifarious and theologically volatile forms of Protestantism. Though Fichtner's *Emperor Maximilian II* is unlikely to rival in public success the other, more glamorous Habsburg biography of 2001—Antonia Fraser's book about Maximilian's collateral

[1] A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965 printing), p. 10.

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descendant, the Habsburg Archduchess Marie Antoinette—each book takes its subject's political mistakes and misfortunes as an opportunity to diagnose some of the crucial systemic tensions in the *ancien regime* of early modern Europe.

Though Taylor noted that the Habsburg "peoples"—that is, the multinational populations of the monarchy with their virtually irreconcilable nationalisms—were the great "complication" in the history of the dynasty in the 19th century, in the 16th century "peoples" and popular aspirations were not prominent on a monarch's political agenda. National identities in the modern sense were still largely unformed.

Indeed, one might conclude from Fichtner's work that the major "complication" in the history of the Habsburg dynasty in the 16th century was the dynasty itself. She provides fascinating detail on Maximilian's complicated relations with his uncle, Emperor Charles V, whom he accompanied on military campaigns against the German Protestants in the 1540s; with his father, Emperor Ferdinand I, who censured Maximilian's religious equivocations, and even hesitated to include Maximilian in the succession; with his cousin, King Philip II of Spain, whose coercive Catholic commitment stood in stark contrast to Maximilian's pursuit of compromise; with his wife, the Empress Maria, Philip's pious sister and intimate ambassador in Maximilian's imperial bed; and with his brothers, the Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles, who divided the Austrian inheritance with Maximilian and maintained courts and administrations of their own in Innsbruck and Graz, sometimes cooperating and sometimes competing with the emperor, who, while based in Vienna, was often out on the road. The Habsburg dynasty was a worldwide enterprise in the 16th century, stretching from Bohemia to Bolivia, and trying to govern it no small challenge. Under the more unified leadership of Charles V, a universal imperial ideal was cultivated, but after his abdication in 1556 the dynasty could not be considered an unequivocal vehicle of streamlined imperial power. Rather, as Fichtner carefully demonstrates, the Habsburg political project was both nourished and occasionally confounded by ongoing family frictions, tensions, and negotiations.

That project was further complicated by the fact that the early modern state was a work in progress. The Habsburgs worked with a rudimentary bureaucracy and the generally haphazard financing of government operations. Maximilian recognized and sought to address such problems in his *Hofkammerordnung*, the exchequer reform of 1568, but it would be the work of centuries for the Habsburgs to devise and establish the institutions of government that would correlate the diverse parts of such far-flung dominions. Maximilian, as Holy Roman Emperor, faced the particular challenge that followed from the crucial distinction between the Habsburg dynastic lands, which he inherited, and the lands of the Holy Roman Empire, which he ruled under very different terms by election as emperor. It was not obvious to Maximilian, or to anyone in the 16th century, that the Holy Roman Empire would never function as a modern state in Germany; not until 1806 would Napoleon consign its fragile imperial framework to the rubbish bin of history.

IT WAS within that fragile imperial framework that Maximilian had to consider the central question of his life and reign; that is, the religious balance between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, equilibrated within the soul of the emperor as well as within the political structure of the empire. Fichtner follows in a long historiographical tradition that has focused on Maximilian's religious identity and policy as the most puzzling and important aspect of his reign.

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Maximilian envisioned the possibility of religious reconciliation between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism in the 16th-century context of intense, violent and sometimes murderous religious conflict. After the wars of Charles V against the German Protestants, a religious compromise was reached in 1555 at the Diet of Augsburg, the convening of the German princes of the Holy Roman Empire. Charles abdicated the following year and retired to a monastery in Spain, partly from frustration after Augsburg; his brother Ferdinand, Maximilian's father, succeeded as emperor. The Augsburg settlement, which dominated Maximilian's political coming of age, recognized the coexistence of Roman Catholicism and Lutheran Protestantism in the empire under the famous Latin formula, *cuius regio, eius religio*, "whose region, his religion." Each of the three hundred German princes of the empire would theoretically choose the religion for his principality, either Roman Catholicism or the particular form of Protestantism specified in the Augsburg Confession. For Lutherans this compromise seemed to offer official acceptance in Europe; for the fiercely inquisitional Vatican of Pope Paul IV it was a dirty deal with heretics and merely postponed the final Catholic reckoning with Protestantism.

For some conciliatory spirits, however, Augsburg was a statement of two differing religious positions for the purpose of eventually reconciling them in the recovery of European confessional unity. That this ideal was ultimately a "failure" is perfectly evident from the fact that there are Catholic and Protestants in Europe to this day, but Maximilian's refusal to rule out theological reconciliation reflected Renaissance irenical concern in the 16th century, a spirit that would barely recur within Roman Catholicism until the emergence of modern ecumenicism in the 20th century. Maximilian was ahead of his time.

For this conciliatory spirit Maximilian was suspected by some Catholics, including the saintly Pius V in Rome and the crusading Philip II in Madrid, of being himself a heretic, of practicing some sort of crypto-Protestantism. In a 1994 essay Fichtner left open the possibility that Maximilian was indeed a heretic: "The Habsburgs themselves, with the possible exception of Maximilian II, kept true to the faith of Rome."[2] In this new biography she seems more inclined to accept his Catholicism. Fichtner notes that throughout his adult life he insisted on taking communion in both kinds, the bread and the wine (*sub utraque*), though such practice was then considered suspiciously Protestant. Yet, dating back to a special Vatican concession of 1561, mediated by Emperor Ferdinand, Maximilian was formally permitted communion in both kinds, and in 1562 he took a vow before his father to remain within the Roman Catholic Church.

Later as emperor, Maximilian permitted the practice of Protestantism to the nobles of Lower Austria, partly out of sympathy for the Augsburg Confession no doubt, but also because he needed to press them for fiscal and military contributions to the state, such as it was. In the 16th century, the "complication" of the people in Austria was that so many were Protestant, and the Counter-Reformation project of reconversion, under the aegis of the Jesuits, did not even really begin until the very end of the century (finally producing the Catholic character of Austria in modern times). Maximilian himself did not encourage Jesuit missionary activity in Austria, and was unenthusiastic about the religious enterprises of contemporary popes, remarking about Pius V in the 1560s that "the pope would be well suited

[2]Fichtner, "Introduction", Charles Ingrao, ed., *State and Society in Early Modern Austria* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1994), p. 30.

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as an inquisitor or to direct a monastery . . . but ruling the world is quite another calling." Indeed, that was often considered a Habsburg calling, especially in the view of the Habsburgs themselves. (The great intellectual historian Frances Yates lectured in London in 1952 on the ideal of universal empire in the age of Charles V, and, more recently Yale University Press published Marie Tanner's *The Last Descendant of Aeneas*, on the "mythic image" of the Habsburg emperors and the Trojan pedigree that was devised in accordance with their ambitious imperial ideology.[3])

Maximilian's universalism was certainly premised on the possibility of a unitary and reconciled Christian faith in Europe, but he did not accept that it was the absolute prerogative of the pope to determine the contours of that faith. What is perhaps most striking about Maximilian as a Catholic is that he regarded the content of Catholicism as open to discussion and compromise. After all, he had grown up in precisely the age when Catholicism met the Protestant challenge by some measure of internal reform and even critical self-reflection; the Council of Trent was finally concluded in 1563, only a year before Maximilian became emperor. After that, the question of reforming the Church was more or less closed as far as Rome was concerned, but Maximilian clearly cherished the possibility of redefining Catholicism in such a way as to reconcile with Protestantism. His own personal insistence on communion in both kinds was an affirmation of the possibility of compromise. After the 1560s, the content and nature of Catholicism would not again be so open for discussion until perhaps the 1960s.

FICHTNER DOES not think that Maximilian's commitment to religious unity served him well: "If Maximilian saw any alternative to confessional reconciliation through compromise and accommodation, he never disclosed it. His consistency of purpose may argue for his unwavering belief in his policy, or it may be evidence of weak imagination, overall exhaustion, or both. In any case, his commitment to religious tolerance was at odds with the political realities." Alas, he was behind his times, too.

In other words, Maximilian meant well, but meaning well was not enough to make his personal vision into effective policy. To the historian thinking retrospectively, it may be clear that the moment for reconciliation had passed by the time Maximilian became emperor; this was probably less clear to Maximilian in the 16th century. One may wonder whether his religious imagination was too strong rather than too weak, in the face of what Fichtner properly identifies as changing political realities in Europe as a whole. Perhaps Queen Elizabeth, who ruled in England while Maximilian ruled in Austria, offered some glimpse of the kind of religious compromise and peace (within a broad-based Anglican Church) that he hopefully envisioned. In fact, Maximilian's brother Charles was one of the unsuccessful candidates for Elizabeth's hand in marriage. The emperor was certainly not edified by the state of religious affairs in France, and was horrified by the St. Bartholomew's massacre of French Protestants in 1572. "The affairs of religion cannot be adjudicated and dealt with by the sword", wrote Maximilian in 1574, notably out of tune with political realities. "Furthermore, Christ and his apostles taught this over and over." He seems really to have meant it. Interestingly, too, the

[3]Frances Yates, "Charles V and the Idea of the Empire," in *Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975); Marie Tanner, *The Last Descendant of Aeneas: The Hapsburgs and the Mythic Image of the Emperor* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

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historian R. Po-chia Hsia has found that Maximilian intervened on several occasions against the persecution of Jews in the Holy Roman Empire.[4]

One of the most religiously delicate domains of Maximilian's empire was the Czech province of Bohemia, where Jan Hus had sounded the call to heresy in the early 15th century, and where Utraquists still prevailed in the 16th century, favoring precisely the suspect communion in both kinds that Maximilian privately preferred for himself. He eventually, though reluctantly, had to promise some measure of religious toleration in Bohemia. Indeed, Maximilian was only the second Habsburg, after his father Ferdinand, to rule over Bohemia and Hungary, lands that became fundamental for the future of the dynasty. Maximilian had to learn Czech for administrative purposes as he negotiated with Bohemian nobles over their historic rights and prerogatives. He ruled over only a part of Hungary, where the nobles were no less sensitive, and, because the greater part had been conquered by the Ottoman Empire, Maximilian had to defend the frontier of Christianity. His one major effort to challenge the Turks in Hungary ended ignominiously in 1566. Five years later he held himself aloof from the most triumphant contemporary crusade, the naval victory over the Turks at Lepanto in 1571; while Maximilian could not regret a Christian victory, he could not have been altogether pleased to see the glory go to Philip II and Pius V. At Maximilian's court, the crusading spirit was also tempered by humanist curiosity. The emperor's patronage extended to Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, imperial diplomat and fascinated observer of the Ottoman Empire.

Maximilian's religious ideas make most sense in the context of the waning of Renaissance Christian humanism in the late 16th century. Exceptionally important for appreciating this historical context is the work of R.J.W. Evans; his book on *Rudolf II and His World* (1973) explored the significance of Renaissance humanism at the Habsburg court, and in *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy* (1979) he considered the correlation of humanist Renaissance and Counter-Reformation Baroque forces in the formation of an early modern Habsburg state ideology. Evans emphasized the humanist continuities between the courts of Maximilian and Rudolf, both major Habsburg patrons of arts and letters, and observed that the reign of the former "witnessed the climax of orthodox Humanism in Austria." This was inevitably related to less orthodox perspectives on Catholicism, harbored by frankly Protestant or suspiciously heretical humanists in Maximilian's service. Evans noted that there were even Renaissance Hermetic magical currents at Maximilian's court in Vienna, anticipating their importance later at Rudolf's court in Prague. Fichtner mentions but does not emphasize issues of artistic and intellectual patronage, and she does not really explore their relation to political and religious concerns. In matters of patronage, she points out Maximilian's "failure" to obtain for his court the greatest artists of the time, such as Palestrina in music and Palladio in architecture.

Because his reign was so brief, ending in his death before the age of fifty in 1576, it is hard to know how highly to rate the "success" of the measure of religious peace that he pursued within the Holy Roman Empire. Certainly it can not compare in duration with Elizabeth's half century in England, the relative peace that permitted the English Renaissance to flourish insularly in the age of Shakespeare. Yet Maximilian's policy of peace, compromise, and reconciliation in an age of reli-

[4]R. Po-chia Hsia, "The Jews and the Emperors", in *State and Society in Early Modern Austria.*

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gious violence, persecution, and massacre deserves consideration within the broader context of Habsburg history. In 1957, a decade after Taylor's *The Habsburg Monarchy*, Henry Kissinger published his postwar contribution to Austrian history, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace*. Kissinger, writing about the early 19th century, emphasized the common Austrian and English interest in preserving a conservative peace after the fall of Napoleon, but noted the crucial difference between England's insular and Austria's continental perspectives. Metternich, argued Kissinger, seemed to recognize that Austria's geographical position in the middle of Europe, and its "anachronistic" political condition as a dynastically-linked polyglot agglomeration of lands and peoples, made the conservative preservation of the international status quo seem absolutely essential to imperial survival. Metternich therefore identified the particular political needs of the Habsburg dynasty with the principles of general European conservatism. In a striking passage, Kissinger wrote:

> Metternich's thus became a never-ending quest for a moment of tranquillity, for a suspension, if only for an instant, of the flux of life, so that what happened, perhaps inevitably, could be represented as a universal principle instead of an assertion of will and of indeterminacy. It was as if a physicist, unable to measure both position and velocity of the electron accurately, bent all his energies to making the electron hold still, if only for a fraction of a second, because this would enable him to chart its course for eternity.[5]

This analysis of Metternich's perspective on the modern Habsburg monarchy—a sort of striving to achieve "the end of history"—offers an interesting analogy to Maximilian's perspective on the early modern Habsburg monarchy. Working from a similar geopolitical position, confronting explosive religious tensions rather than a modern nationalities conflict, looking to universal Christian principles rather than universal conservative ideology, Maximilian also aspired toward an ideal peace. He sought a formula for harmony and stability at a time when tensions could be temporarily balanced, neutralized, or assuaged, but could no longer be resolved in the fundamental fashion that he envisioned. Kissinger's imagery from modern particle physics could have been analogously anticipated by the language of Hermetic magic that was current among the irenic humanists of Maximilian's court. The fantasy of religious reconciliation in the 16th century was universal in its spiritual assumptions and presumptions, but also particularly adapted to the perceived concerns of the Habsburg dynasty in a century of cultural and political crisis. Metternich would have understood.

OF WHAT relevance is Maximilian's life and era to our own? Samuel Huntington, in *The Clash of Civilizations*, issued this insufficiently heeded warning: "To ignore the impact of the Islamic Resurgence on Eastern Hemisphere politics in the late twentieth century is equivalent to ignoring the impact of the Protestant Reformation on European politics in the late sixteenth century." In this regard, Maximilian certainly had his eye on the ball, reflecting deeply and creatively about the impact of the great religious upheaval of his own century. In Huntington's vision, however, the religious fault line between Catholicism and Protestantism seems of limited contemporary relevance, since he regards them both in combination as the Christian reli-

[5]Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 205.

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gious foundation of the West: "Western Christianity, first Catholicism, and then Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important characteristic of Western civilization."[6] Maximilian certainly believed in the fundamental unity of Western Christianity and his quest for reconciliation, his efforts to bridge religious difference, may be seen as a visionary determination to evade a definitive "clash" by refusing to recognize it as definitive. Though Maximilian mobilized for hostilities with the Ottoman Empire on the tense Hungarian border, an empire reaching from Buda to Baghdad, he was also capable of maintaining tactical neighboring relations when he knew he lacked the military means to go on the offensive. Facing an adjacent and extremely powerful Islamic enemy, while seeking to address the religious tensions within Europe, Maximilian stood at the early modern threshold of that religious nexus which eventually crystallized as "Western civilization" in the modern age. Even in his hesitations and half measures he seems to have had some significant sense of what was at stake.

As for us, the Habsburg dilemma of the 16th century is perhaps easier to grasp today than it was a few years ago. Maximilian faced a complicated mix of strategic and religious division—a militant Islamic force at the gate, and sharp differences of creed within the broad confines of empire. It made sense to Maximilian, for practical as well as moral reasons, to seek unity within so that he could stave off assault from without. In his own way, he knew very well the importance and frustrations of coalition maintenance. □

[6]Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 70, 111.

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On the Road with Maximilian's Ambassador

There remained one annoyance, which was almost worse than a lack of wine, namely, that our sleep used to be interrupted in a most distressing manner. We often had to rise early, sometimes even before it was light, in order to arrive in good time at more convenient halting-places. . . . [But] the Turks have no hours to mark the time, just as they have no milestones to mark distances. They have, it is true, a class of men called *talismans*, attached to the service of their mosques, who make use of water-clocks. When they judge from these that dawn is at hand, they raise a shout from a high tower erected for the purpose, in order to exhort and invite men to say their prayers. They repeat the performance half-way between sunrise and midday, again at midday, and half-way between midday and sunset, and finally at sunset, uttering, in a tremulous voice, shrill but not unpleasing cries, which are audible at a greater distance than one would imagine possible. Thus the Turkish day is divided into four periods, which are longer or shorter, according to the time of year; but at night there is nothing to mark the time. . . . I explained to them that I had clocks which never failed me, and would arrange matters. . . . When they had tested us once or twice and found that they were not deceived, they relied on us henceforward and expressed their admiration of the trustworthiness of our clocks.

—Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, 1554
(from Bernard Lewis, *A Middle East Mosaic*)

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A Whole New World?

William Perry

Michael Wood, *Conquistadors* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 288 pp., $27.

Robert Harvey, *Liberators: Latin America's Struggle for Independence, 1810-1830* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000), 561 pp., $40.

Octavio Paz, translated by Jason Wilson, preface by Charles Tomlinson, *Itinerary: An Intellectual Journey* (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 129 pp., $22.

Howard Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America: the Cultural and Political Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 417 pp., $35.

GEORGE W. BUSH has seized enthusiastically upon what had initially been his father's concept—a comprehensive Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)—as, hopefully, one of the most personal hallmarks of his presidency. At a summit of hemispheric leaders in Quebec this April, general agreement was secured for conclusion of such an historic accord by January 1, 2005—with universal ratification to follow by the end of that year. If successful, this process would make NAFTA the world's largest trading bloc, comprised of some 900 million people and boasting a combined annual GDP approaching $10 trillion. Even more fundamentally, by laying the basis for an ever-more integrated Western Hemisphere community of nations, it would imply a considerable revision of past U.S. geostrategic priorities (traditionally oriented across the Atlantic toward Europe), over the course of the new century (and era) that we are now entering.

The original impetus for this visionary construct came at a time of unusual optimism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, almost anything seemed possible. Meanwhile, on the hemispheric scene, an irresistible tide seemed to favor democratic government and the free-market economic model—something that Washington wished to encourage both to ensure local stability and to strengthen its own position in the competitive world of the future. Since that time, however, the United States—while doing much better economically *vis-à-vis* Europe and Asia than was generally expected—has come to confront several perplexing and perilous new difficulties around the globe, dramatically highlighted by the horrific events of September 11. In Latin America, the administration now faces a fresh constellation of social, economic, security and political problems that threaten the future of democracy and the free market in the region, and that generate both direct and indirect dangers for the United States. Moreover, on the domestic front, there is an increasingly visible resistance to commercial integration—especially within developing countries (and, indeed, with respect to globalization generally)—that progressively paralyzed progress toward a comprehensive, inter-American trade zone during the Clinton years.

It is therefore time for a deeper consideration of the basis for an ambitious, long-term policy that envisages ever-greater integration of the United States with its hemispheric neighbors. The historic experience of Latin America over the past five centuries is markedly different from that of the United States and Canada. In creating any sort of hemisphere-wide association, therefore, a better appreciation of what makes Latin America distinctive

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from its northern neighbors is critical. In this regard, four new books, each addressing a particular facet in the history and development of Latin America, can help us.

Conquistadors, by Michael Wood, highlights the epic saga of how Latin America's most advanced native civilizations were subjugated by and integrated within a vigorously emergent Spanish empire (Brazil and the non-Hispanic Caribbean are not directly treated). Wood's work has the flavor of a somewhat whimsical travelogue (not surprising from a maker of BBC documentaries) as he takes the reader from place to often-remote place, stopping at each to explain the historical significance of the venue. In four chapters, beautifully illustrated with abundant photographs, he escorts us through Cortés' conquest of Mexico, the Pizzaro brothers' equally amazing exploits in Peru, Orellana's travails in descending the Amazon from its source to the sea, and of Cabeza de Vaca's eight-year odyssey by boat to Florida and then on foot from Texas up the Rio Grande and across to the Pacific Ocean.

In *Liberators*, British journalist Robert Harvey deals with the course of events three centuries later that freed the region from the by-then decrepit Iberian monarchies—resulting in the creation of the independent nations we know today. Harvey's volume employs a series of interlocking biographies of the principal figures to illustrate the region's struggle for independence. Among those profiled are Francisco Miranda, Simón Bolívar, José de San Martín, Bernardo O'Higgins, Thomas Lord Cochrane (the British naval officer who assisted in the Peruvian and Chilean campaigns), Pedro I, first emperor of Brazil, and the Mexican triumvirate of Miguel Hidalgo, José María Morelos and Agustín de Itúrbide.

A slim selection of the late Mexican philosopher Octavio Paz's voluminous writings—entitled *Itinerary* and ably translated by Jason Wilson—provides a valuable window on how Latin American intellectuals have tended to look at the world during the 20th century. As would be expected, Paz's contribution takes the form not of an academic treatise, but of an elegant, extended philosophical essay on his own ideological evolution.

Finally, Howard Wiarda's *The Soul of Latin America* goes more directly to the bottom line of interest today by discussing the unique elements of the formation of regional culture (especially on the political plane), and the degree to which it is now compatible with evolving trends in the developed world, especially in the United States. Of the four works, this is the one closest to a traditional academic approach in its efforts to probe the development of political culture in Latin America.

WHILE THESE books vary enormously in approach and style, that turns out to be an advantage, for each one, in its own way, contributes to a better understanding of Latin America. Taken as a whole, these four volumes highlight the differences between Latin America's origins, experience and nature on the one hand, and the Anglo-American tradition on the other.

In contrast to North America, the vast and varied region south of the Rio Grande was subjugated by crusading states still evidencing strong medieval characteristics, as a continuation of their centuries-long struggle to recover the Iberian Peninsula from Moorish domination. The basic desire of those most directly involved was to extend the Catholic faith, extract wealth in the form of precious metals, and rule over these lands in a feudal fashion. In pursuit of such expansive aims, they found in native civilizations—themselves with pronouncedly authoritarian traditions—an already large subordinate class of peons. When disease decimated the native populations, slaves were imported to fill the

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role. Moreover, the riches drained away from their American empires served to prop up Spain and Portugal in gaudy splendor (for a time, at least), but their very success in these medieval terms removed any incentive to adapt, and thus made them losers in the modernization process then beginning in northern Europe. All of these factors left Latin America with a markedly different colonial legacy than the one bequeathed to North America.

By the early 19th century, locally-born New World elites—influenced by the American and French Revolutions, as well as Great Britain's industrial and commercial ascendancy—threw off the feeble, exploitive hand of Iberian colonialism. But the violence of that struggle (except in Brazil), the weakness of the middle class and the absence of experience with even limited self-rule meant that the practice of genuine democracy (even republicanism) soon proved a sad travesty. Rather than providing for liberation and genuine self-determination, the removal of traditional authority made vacillation between near-anarchy and local authoritarianism the rule in Latin America's political life. It made much of Latin America a synonym for misgovernment and underdevelopment until well into the 20th century.

Indeed, this debilitating cultural legacy persists to the present. Even when the worst was over and countries such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico began to develop into their modern selves, enormous problems persisted. Even when comparatively successful, they tended to remain class-bound and statist, with many old conditions and habits conducive neither to good citizenship nor to the broad-based diffusion of economic opportunity. Thus, local intellectuals and aspiring politicians tended to be attracted by populist or Marxist dreams of utopian redemption. This trend, already evident by the end of the 19th century, led to a renewed round of often bloody contention in the new environment of the Cold War.

Only in the 1990s did it prove possible for all Latin American states (except Cuba) to support real democratic governance and to embrace a liberal economic model for economic growth and development in harmony with the advanced countries of North America, Europe and East Asia. But the question remains as to whether this represents a definitive departure from an unfortunate past, or merely a cyclical high point doomed to turn down again at some point in the future. On a higher level, it raises the general point of how much culture matters, and of whether and how fast political cultures change.

But this is no longer a matter of mere academic inquiry from the standpoint of U.S. policymakers. They perceive how seemingly irresistible forces are driving the United States into an inextricably closer relationship with its hemispheric neighbors, not merely in the conventional terms of overseas political, economic and security interests, but also in ways that uniquely affect the composition and well-being of American domestic society. Three U.S. presidents now have seen this clearly enough to support a far-sighted, integrative policy aimed toward ensuring that Latin America becomes a valuable asset to our country—not a debilitating liability—in the uncertain world of the future. But such a course would plainly be impossible if the region were condemned by cultural factors to periodic regression into authoritarianism, economic debacle and violent instability. Thus, having some sound notion of the correct prognosis has become indispensable to proper formulations of our present and future approach.

THE PAIR of historical books in this quartet—Wood's and Harvey's—make clear that divergent natural and geographic circumstances, worldviews and experiences have yielded pre-

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dictably different results between what became the Latin American nations and what was to ultimately emerge as the United States. Distinct processes of conquest and settlement produced different kinds of colonies, with different relationships to different kinds of mother countries. Building upon this, their respective and nearly contemporaneous struggles for independence gave rise to very distinct societies and forms of government. Moreover, their subsequent trajectories of development pulled them even further apart in terms of technology, material well-being and degree of power in the wider world. Within little more than a century, the United States rose from its rather rustic beginnings to a position that was so dominant as to allow the likes of Richard Olney, Secretary of State for Grover Cleveland, and Theodore Roosevelt to declare something approaching a protectorate over the rest of the hemisphere.

Given this divergence, it is therefore no surprise that the intellectual framework of Octavio Paz—who was born during the Mexican Revolution and lived into the 1990s—is one that most North Americans would find rather distant from their own. In it, Locke, Smith, Madison, Jefferson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and the line of thought they represent are entirely absent from the first decades of the Mexican poet's thought—despite the fact he lived in the United States for two periods during his life. Rather, the Greek and medieval philosophers, Rousseau, more modern socialist and communist thinkers in Europe, and the events of the Spanish civil war are the principal sources of inspiration for his speculations on the prospects for improving upon local Mexican traditions and creating a better form of government there. These were ideas that he basically accepted for most of his life, and this on the part of a man who achieved even greater notoriety (infamy in some leftist circles) toward the end of his life by repudiating Marxist and other authoritarian systems of government (although he always retained a deep skepticism about the "hollowness" of liberalism, especially as practiced in the United States).

Howard Wiarda ably draws these examples together to provide some basic lessons to be drawn about enduring Latin American political realities. As a whole, the region was organized by elites on a corporatist basis (originally, landholders, the church and military institutions) to rule over the masses of the population, who were more subjects than participatory citizens. In his view—despite social mobility (many of the subsequent *caudillos* were of very humble origin), emerging new ideologies, revolutionary movements (both successful and unsuccessful), secularism (reducing the influence of the Catholic Church), economic evolution (with business groups largely replacing *hacenderos*)—this tradition has largely endured. The result is something of a political museum in which contemporary institutions continue to exist on the same old corporatist bases. No one can deny the validity of these observations, particularly on an historical plane, and anyone who has had the least experience with the hierarchical, bureaucratic governments of Latin America (including the self-styled "progressive" or "radical" among them) knows that these traditional influences have left a powerful legacy.

On the other hand, generational change and galloping globalization have produced significant evolution in local societies and their expectations in recent years. Old-style forms of authoritarian government—which dominated the region as recently as two decades ago—are very difficult to imagine in the present day. Countries with origins different from those of the United States have proven able to create and maintain vibrant, enduring democracies (albeit with their own distinct characteristics). Even Spain and

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Portugal, the sources of most of the traditions examined in these four volumes, appear to have made the transition, as have some of the formerly communist states of central and eastern Europe. A great deal of diversity exists among all these democracies, both in terms of institutions and political culture, which suggests that a successful democracy need not be constituted exactly along the lines of the Anglo-American model.

Of course, one must be prepared to accept that some of the efforts to establish functional, pluralistic democracies in Latin America will probably fail. Indeed, the prospect of losing one or another of them (at least temporarily) is greater than most people expect. Moreover, the nations that do succeed will inevitably continue to possess characteristics quite different from those of the U.S. political system. However, fundamental, long-term socioeconomic trends and the influence of the wider world militate in favor of the eventual realization of the democratic ideal within all but the very least favored Latin American countries. And policymakers in Washington have little real choice except to push forward vigorously with policies that encourage them, given the proliferating linkages that are now propelling the United States into immutably closer interaction with its hemispheric neighbors.

PRESIDENT Bush's commitment to the forging of a genuine inter-American community comes at a critical time for the hemisphere and the wider world. While the literature points up the many domestic obstacles and idiosyncrasies that will have to be overcome or accommodated in the unique Latin American case, our neighbors to the south will probably emerge as a significant adjunct to a worldwide association of democratic nations. Either that, or they will constitute perhaps the single most important failure of globalization. Compared to many other areas of the globe, the prospects are comparatively favorable, but, if success proves elusive here, what can be the future of the remainder of the developing world—in socio-economic and, ultimately, security terms?

Thus, Washington must now guard against being totally distracted from developments in a region that will sooner rather than later reassert an inevitably growing influence on our society, made unique by the ever more intimate proximity of our common future. If we play our cards right, we may one day soon finally have a whole New World. □

William Perry is president of William Perry & Associates and a former director of Latin American Affairs at the National Security Council.

I have often wondered at the extreme fecundity of the press, and how it comes to pass that so many heads, on which nature seems to have inflicted the curse of barrenness, should teem with voluminous productions.

—Washington Irving, "The Art of Book-Making" (1822)

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The Four Schoolmasters

H.W. Brands

Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), 345 pp., $30.

THE BRITISH statesman Lord Bryce once remarked that describing American foreign policy was like describing the snakes of Ireland. "There are no snakes in Ireland", he added.

It's an old anecdote but an apt one for Walter Russell Mead, who rebuts Bryce from the outset of his new book, *Special Providence*. Mead discovers lots of snakes in Ireland—four species, in fact. One species that predominated for decades bore protective coloration, which was why Bryce missed it. But it and the other three have long been active, often aggressive, and very successful in defending and expanding their territory.

The first species—that is, the first school of American foreign policy—Mead calls "Hamiltonian", after the founding Secretary of the Treasury and the most influential advisor to George Washington. Mead's Hamiltonians see the world as a marketplace and perceive the purpose of U.S. foreign policy to be the enhancement of America's position in that marketplace. They are conservatives in the sense of doubting the perfectibility, or even the substantial improvability, of human nature; yet they are optimists regarding the benefits that will accompany the growth of commerce and the institutions that support it. For the first century of America's independent existence, the Hamiltonians advocated cooperation with Britain, the world's leading trader. Upon Britain's decline in the 20th century, they pushed the United States to the van of world trade, but their fundamental belief remained as before: that business was both the *raison d'être* of foreign policy and the facilitator of such collateral benefits as peace and stability.

Mead's second school of foreign policy is the "Jeffersonian", which arose about the same time as the Hamiltonian, and in opposition to it. The touchstone of Jeffersonian thought is democracy, which occurs, the Jeffersonians judge, not as some happy side effect of commerce, but only as the result of careful cultivation. Where the Hamiltonians are pessimists regarding human nature but optimists regarding the institutions of commerce, the Jeffersonians are just the opposite. They revere the individual and fear that institutions, especially those of commerce, will corrupt personal virtue. For this reason they have been skeptical of intercourse with other nations; better to perfect democracy at home than risk it in the hurly-burly of foreign relations. Their enemies have called them isolationist; Mead prefers the term nationalist. But, however labeled, the Jeffersonians have put the domestic interest so far ahead of the international interest as to convey the frequent impression of indifference, even hostility, to the world beyond American shores.

The "Jacksonians" have a similarly domestic orientation, although they have been the driving force behind some of America's most energetic assertions of interest and power abroad. Where the Jeffersonians have tended toward elitism, handing down democracy from above, the Jacksonians are populists, viewing democracy as arising from the people them-

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selves. In contrast to the diffident nationalism of the Jeffersonians, the Jacksonians brandish a belligerent nationalism, quick to take offense, punctilious as to honor, untroubled by the denial of rights to foreigners and other lesser breeds beyond the law. The most militant of the four schools, the Jacksonians have consistently supported spending for defense, and have never been reluctant to use the weapons once purchased. Yet their aim in fighting has been *American* victory, not the salvation of the world. Perhaps the world is redeemable, perhaps not; but the Jacksonians waste no time on such airy questions, as their sole concern is for the vigorous defense of American honor and interests abroad.

Mead's fourth school is the "Wilsonian", which believes that the world *can* be saved, and that America is called to save it. Named, of course, for the President who promised to make the world "safe for democracy" and championed the League of Nations, the Wilsonians have often allied with the Jeffersonians, for like the Jeffersonians, the Wilsonians hold democracy to be the highest social value. But where the Jeffersonians fear that contact with the world will debilitate democracy at home, the Wilsonians fear that debilitation will come from a *lack* of contact. To save itself, America must save the world.

MEAD'S TAXONOMY is not entirely original, and he does not claim that it is. His Hamiltonians and Wilsonians are, respectively, conservative and liberal internationalists, while his Jacksonians and Jeffersonians are conservative and liberal nationalists. Sliced differently, the Hamiltonians and Jacksonians are internationalist and nationalist hawks, respectively, while the Wilsonians and Jeffersonians are internationalist and nationalist doves.

So why go to the trouble to invent new names for old categories? For two reasons. First, Mead wants to underscore the honest inconsistencies of actual history, as opposed to the spurious clarity of theoretical constructs. Readers, he guesses, will find it easier to accept the contradictions when considering them within a category named for Thomas Jefferson, for example—who was nothing if not inconsistent—than in some disembodied liberal nationalism.

The second reason is more to the basic point of the book. Mead has written a history of American foreign policy that, more than most histories, looks forward as much as it looks back. Mead is the senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and he wrote this book on commission for the Century Foundation; by inclination, affiliation and subvention he is interested in charting a path for American diplomacy into the future. On this subject—as on most others—he is engagingly frank. American foreign policy, he says, has operated on myths in the past, including the myth of virtuous isolation in the 19th century and the myth that the Cold War represented a break with American tradition. What America needs at present, and what he essays to provide, is a myth for the 21st century. The book is his conjuring effort, and his labels represent a self-conscious calculation that he will have better luck selling it—the myth primarily, but no doubt also the book—if it comes with familiar handles.

He is probably right: in their reflexive regard for the Founders and the other great figures of their past, most Americans will be more comfortable with a foreign policy identified with Hamilton or Jefferson or Jackson or Wilson than with some sterile offspring of political science.

Yet, whatever the brand-name appeal of his nomenclature, there are some serious historical problems with it. Anyone with any sensitivity to history cannot help shuddering to read of "Wilsonians" living

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and busy long before Woodrow Wilson was born. And though it has often been noted that Jesus would not recognize much of what has been called Christian, one would like to think that Jefferson, for instance, would hold the beliefs that Mead calls Jeffersonian. Jeffersonians, Mead says, make almost a fetish of constitutionalism; yet the most important foreign policy action of the Jefferson Administration, the purchase of Louisiana, was one for which Jefferson himself could find no constitutional authorization. Swallowing his scruples, he went ahead and closed the single best deal of America's national life.

Other historical judgments are equally problematic. Mead suggests that Charles Francis Adams, the American ambassador to Britain during the Civil War, stood in a long line of U.S. diplomats defending American commercial rights on the high seas when he complained to the British government about the British construction of warships for the Confederacy. While true on its face, this interpretation gets the underlying meaning just backward. The Civil War was that rare case in Anglo-American history when the United States was the aggriever on the subject of maritime rights, and Britain the aggrieved. Adams' real complaint about the *Alabama* and the other warships was that they violated British neutrality and would prolong the war.

When, in speaking of American westward expansion, Mead says that "many of the Indian wars were caused less by Indian aggression" than by white land hunger, he is being entirely too kind to the white settlers. When he asserts that the Battle of New Orleans was "perhaps the most decisive battle in the shaping of the modern world between Trafalgar and Stalingrad", the emphasis clearly has to be on the "perhaps." Jackson's victory at New Orleans was soul-satisfying to Americans, but it came after the treaty ending the War of 1812 had been signed, and it had no effect on the war's outcome. Gettysburg, Tsushima Straits, the Somme and a score of other battles had far more significance. Mead's exegesis of the Monroe Doctrine is provocative to the point of perverse; to suggest that it foreshadowed NATO by registering a commitment to the balance of power in Europe would have astonished its author, John Quincy Adams.

Then there are the problems of taxonomy, of who gets classed where. When Mead calls Martin Luther King, Jr. a Jacksonian, one wonders whether he is pulling the reader's leg. This student of Gandhi, this apostle of nonviolence, this advocate of racial equality as philosophical kin to the hotheaded, dueling slavemaster? (And when Mead characterizes Andrew Jackson as "enormously well read", one can only ask, compared to whom?) To apply the Jeffersonian label to Ronald Reagan, on grounds of Reagan's support for human rights, makes one wonder who *wouldn't* be a Jeffersonian, on Mead's logic. Reagan's was the administration whose point-person on human rights, Jeane Kirkpatrick, got her job on the strength of an essay advocating support of merely authoritarian good dictators (of the Right) against the bad totalitarian dictators (of the Left).

Yet most of Mead's provocations are more positive. In calling Wilsonians the Trotskyites of the American Revolution and the Jeffersonians the Stalinists, he makes a point that readers will not soon forget (unless they never knew why Trotsky wound up with an ice pick in his skull. For those who do not grasp the doctrinal wars of the 1930s, Mead provides crib notes—but they will still miss the meaning of the analogy). When he says that Jeffersonians and Jacksonians are both attached to the Bill of Rights, but the former give highest priority to the First Amendment while the latter prefer the Second (or alternatively, that

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Jeffersonians join the ACLU while Jacksonians join the NRA), he is being glib but not simplistic. When he dubs the United States the "Britain of Britain", in that what Britain was to continental Europe the United States was to Britain, his logic requires some thought but finally makes sense. When he considers the disadvantages democracies labor under in conducting diplomacy, and says, "A democracy can, so to speak, easily have too many drinks and then pay a sordid call on a prostitute; it is much harder for a democracy to maintain a cultivated mistress in a fashionable apartment", he nicely captures the distinction between the adolescent immorality to which democracies often resort and the far more studied amorality of autocracies.

Mead is also persuasive in accounting for the striking contrast between the historic success of American foreign policy and the failure of foreigners—and many Americans—to recognize that success. By any measure, American foreign policy has been the most successful of any great power in history. Two centuries ago the United States hardly rated consideration in world affairs; now it bestrides the globe like no country before it. To skeptics who point out that American power has resulted from America's favored domestic position, especially its control of a large part of a very blessed continent, the obvious rebuttal is that such control came about through the effective conduct of an active and often bellicose foreign policy.

So why have observers failed to give American diplomats due credit? Britain's Bryce was not alone among foreigners in his dismissal; Germany's Bismarck sneered that God has a "special providence" for fools, drunks and the United States of America. (In borrowing Bismarck's jibe for his title, Mead employs it against the Iron Chancellor.) The Europeans failed to appreciate American diplomacy, Mead argues, because it did not conform to the European model of "continental realism", the pragmatic, security-preoccupied diplomacy of Talleyrand and Metternich (and Henry Kissinger, who is the object of numerous oblique, and sometimes direct, stabs by Mead). American diplomacy has not been unpragmatic, Mead argues, but its pragmatism has been infused with a larger dose of ideology, and especially of economics, than the Europeans were used to. Continental diplomats (and English aristocrats like Bryce) disdained economics; and if Britain was a nation of shopkeepers, America was a whole continent of them.

Americans did not disdain economics, but neither did they generally recognize it as part of foreign policy. The single most consistent goal of the U.S. government in its dealings with other countries has been the protection and expansion of American trade. Occasionally this has required such obvious and undeniable instruments of traditional statecraft as warships, as during the War of 1812 and World War I. But more often it has proceeded quietly, by commercial treaties, reciprocal trade arrangements, and the operation of such impenetrable (to the popular mind) institutions as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Until the anti-globalization protests of recent years, the activities of the economic diplomats rated little notice or respect—sometimes even from those who hired them. "I don't give a shit about the value of the lira", once shouted Richard Nixon, Kissinger's partner in Metternichian realism.

Moreover, during the half century of the Cold War, economic diplomacy often took a back seat to matters of grand strategy. As nuclear warheads and intercontinental bombers and missiles shrank the oceans, American diplomacy came to resemble the diplomacy of continental Europe. Partly for this reason, but also because of the enormous impact of the two world wars on the psyche of at least

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three generations of academics (among many others), "realism" dominated discussions of international affairs. The histories and politics of individual countries appeared to play little role in determining their actions on the world stage; all that mattered was the configuration of the international system and the power vectors that resulted from it. The unexpected end of the Cold War cast considerable doubt on the more formulaic expressions of the realist paradigm, which certainly had not predicted any such thing; and during the decade since, economics has returned to the main stage of international affairs. No longer the Rodney Dangerfield of diplomacy, it now risks becoming the scapegoat for sins it never committed. The politics of protest aside, the resurgence of economic diplomacy allows authors like Mead to rediscover its importance for an earlier era.

AS BIG-PICTURE history, Mead's book works reasonably well, although it is definitely not for those unfamiliar with the subject. He makes four passes over the ground of American foreign policy, once for each of his schools. The effect, at times, is Rashomonian, with each group perceiving the critical moments of American diplomatic history differently. For Hamiltonians, World War I represented the transfer of economic hegemony from Britain to the United States. For Wilsonians it signaled an opportunity—sadly squandered—to remake the world in America's democratic image. The Jacksonians responded viscerally to the insult of German submarine attacks, while the Jeffersonians worried, rightly, about what the military mindset fostered by the war would do to American civil liberties.

Mead is persuasive in contending that the history of American foreign policy can be understood best in terms of the interaction of his four schools, although it is not obvious why four should be a magic number. A social scientist might see, behind Mead's great-man labels, a pair of orthogonal axes, measuring, respectively, nationalism versus internationalism and conservatism versus liberalism. But social scientists are constrained by what can be printed on the page. (Mead's one graphic is a chart showing the prior foreign policy experience of American presidents, which effectively makes his point that presidents before the Civil War had much better training in diplomacy than the presidents of the 20th century.) Mead presumably could have identified three schools, or five, or six.

He might also have said more about how and why the schools interacted as they did. At times, the schools all pointed policy in the same direction. In December 1941, for instance, everyone wanted war: Jacksonians because American honor had been violated, Jeffersonians because American democracy was in danger, Hamiltonians to protect American economic interests, Wilsonians to redeem the world from militant fascism. For much of the Cold War, the indicators were similarly aligned. But on other occasions—at the end of the Spanish-American War when the Senate had to decide whether to annex the Philippines, in 1968 after the Tet offensive in Vietnam—the schools clashed. Why the winners won is something Mead too often leaves unexplained.

This is particularly important in evaluating the moral of Mead's story. After covering 200 years of American history (800 if one counts the four crossings of the ground he undertakes), Mead unveils his prescription for the 21st century. Frankly, it is rather disappointing. After all the work Mead has done, the reader expects a sophisticated synthesis, something combining the strengths of the author's four schools. Instead Mead offers

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merely a modernized Jeffersonianism—and not modified all that much. His hero turns out to be John Quincy Adams, whose most famous statement of policy asserted that while America is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all people, she is "the champion and vindicator only of her own", and that while "she might become the dictatress of the world, she would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."

Mead is entitled to his opinion, and America could do far worse than to find another John Quincy Adams (for secretary of state, not president). But Mead's recommendation would be more compelling if he had shown that the Jeffersonian view has clearly outshone the others, or that the other schools have led America astray. In any event, Mead's own evidence strongly suggests that all four schools will be always with us—regardless of what pundits and American diplomats might desire—for they reflect profound aspects of the American character.

At one point, in a discussion of the influence of missionaries on American diplomacy, Mead distinguishes between the foreign policy of the American people and the foreign policy of the American government. There will always be a foreign policy of the American people—or rather four policies, by Mead's count. The task of American leaders is to negotiate among these policies, not to try—vainly—to select one above the rest. After all, there are definitely snakes in Ireland, and none of the species is endangered. □

H.W. Brands is the author, most recently, of *The Strange Death of American Liberalism* (Yale University Press).

The Fifth Schoolmaster?

In a very interesting French book the other day I was reading of how the Mediterranean was freed from pirates only by the "pax Britannica," established by England's naval force. The hopeless and hideous bloodshed and wickedness of Algiers and Turkestan were stopped, and only could be stopped, when civilized nations in the shape of Russia and France took possession of them. The same was true of Burma and the Malay states, as well as Egypt, with regard to England. Peace has come only as the sequel to the armed interference of a civilized power which, relatively to its opponent, was a just and beneficent power. If England had disarmed to the point of being unable to conquer the Sudan and protect Egypt, so that the Mahdists had established their supremacy in northeastern Africa, the result would have been a horrible and bloody calamity to mankind.

—Theodore Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, September 8, 1905
(from H.W. Brands, ed., *The Selected Letters of Theodore Roosevelt)*

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Letters

The Next NATO:

James Kurth's "The Next NATO" (Fall 2001) had a subtitle that may be more relevant now than it was when first published: "Building an American Commonwealth of Nations." Little did he know, of course, that the ghastly but brilliant and precise terrorist attack of September 11 on the two main symbols of global capitalism and military power would shock the nation and the world into undertaking a project something like building a new commonwealth of nations. I hope Professor Kurth will soon share his unique and powerful insights with us on this new project and its prospects.

For example, will the coalition against terrorism (not to mention a commonwealth of nations), whether large or small, be hobbled by the downdraft in the U.S. and Japanese economies—the world's two largest? The strategic consequences of such a critically important reality need to be addressed. The contrast with the upsurge in the American economy that began in 1939, and the political lift it provided to FDR as we came out of the Depression going into World War II, is striking.

Second, China is a part of the anti-terror coalition, due to its own exposure to Muslim terrorists and separatists in Xinjiang with links to the Taliban. The Chinese also rely, tacitly, of course, on the United States as guarantor of world order, and their foreign exchange reserves are heavily weighted in dollars. They enjoy a huge positive balance of trade with us—a balance that funds their annual state budget. Still, they can hardly be thought of as members of an American commonwealth. They have serious national interests that conflict with our own—mainly over Taiwan—and a growing regional military capability that rightly concerns us.

Third, will Russia's joining the coalition against terrorism—a decision regarded in Moscow as a major strategic move westward—now allow the Bush Administration to devise a way for Russia itself to join NATO? The implications for the structure of the West are staggering but not unthinkable. The globalization of terrorism directed against civilization has taken us back to the Thirty Years War of the 17th century, a war of religions. The Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 put war on a state-to-state basis, but this is now, evidently, quite obsolete. Some sort of revised legitimation of civilization is necessary. NATO was always more than a classical 19th century-style military alliance, and NATO of the 21st century could be a powerful source for a more humane and secure world. Of course, the military deployments and commitments, and the legitimacy of the political structures of NATO, would have to be re-conceptualized.

As for legitimacy, there are literally dozens of well-funded, well-staffed, highly effective NGOs that are determined to fill the competency gap that exists where governments used to occupy the international space.

Finally, I notice that Professor Kurth characteristically shifts from his brilliant technical, historical and strategic analysis to a transcendent call for something above and beyond. In this case, he requires "of the American statesman of the 21st century a level of sophistication and determination that would have amazed those of the 20th." Here may be the

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single most important point in Kurth's current thinking. He is speaking of the Baltics joining NATO, which is a lesser challenge than that which confronts us today. My instinct tells me that the American public will also require, as Professor Kurth does, a very high level of sophistication and determination. We may well be amazed if we actually meet those requirements: let us hope that the bin Laden network and what it stands for do not survive to fill the gap.

ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
former U.S. Ambassador to NATO

Kurth replies:

Ambassador Ellsworth's perceptive and thoughtful comments are right and wise. The American war on global terrorism provides both a new necessity and a new opportunity for building an American commonwealth of nations. However, the nations of a true commonwealth will still need to have a great deal in common, on many dimensions of social and cultural life. This is the case with the present and proposed members of NATO (with the exception of Turkey and some of the Balkan states). China and Russia can and should become allies of the American commonwealth (perhaps like the United States and France were allies of the earlier British commonwealth). There will, of course, still be important differences in national interests among these three powers, but discerning American statesmen should be able to subordinate these differences to the common interest that America, China and Russia share in containing and combating Islamic terrorists. I think that the differences between Russia and America over the Baltic states can best be resolved by redesigning NATO, but not by admitting Russia. It is conceivable, however, that having Russia in a future NATO might be not much more anomalous than having Turkey in the present one.

The current downdraft in the U.S. and Japanese economies, if it develops into something like the downdraft of the early 1930s, would of course make creative innovations in international cooperation much more difficult. Conversely, however, new spending on anti-terrorist measures (including information technologies) and perhaps on substitutes for Persian Gulf oil could actually provide a substantial stimulus to the economy, perhaps analogous to the spending on rearmament in the late 1930s.

As Ambassador Ellsworth states, the most profound challenge posed by the Islamic terrorists is that directed at the American public. I believe that we can indeed prevail in this contest. We will do so, however, by becoming more of an American public than we have been during the past two decades or so (i.e., by becoming more American and less multicultural or "transnational" in our identity, and more public and less private in our interests). When the people in America have come together as an American public, they have always prevailed.

Il Caso Silone:

In his discussion of the *caso Silone* ("*Il Caso Silone*", Fall 2001), Michael McDonald introduced the authors of the volume *L'informatore: Silone i comunisti e la polizia*, as "two somewhat obscure historians" who conducted "clumsy" research in the archives in order to inflict a "near-death blow" to Silone's reputation. Their book, he concluded, is a "travesty of scholarship." Mr. McDonald also called *Nuova storia contemporanea*, which broke *il caso Silone* in the Italian press, "the revisionist journal of the Right."

As co-author of the volume in question, I would like to point out that I hold a Berkeley Ph.D in history. I have spent nearly a decade studying Silone's works and conducting research in Italian police archives. Professor Mauro Canali, a former student of Renzo De Felice, is a respected scholar and author of several books on fascism. We both teach in reputable academic institutions.

In dismissing our work—and the debate which has engaged dozens of scholars in Italy and abroad—as "a travesty", Mr. McDonald conducted no first-hand analysis

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of the evidence we presented. Rather than carrying out independent scholarship on such a complex matter, he simply chose to adopt the criticism made by the "socialist historian" Tamburrano at face value and make it his own.

In suggesting that our conclusions are "false" and "pure invention", Mr. McDonald did not verify any sources, did not examine the original documents, nor offer any scientific qualifications to evaluate the work we conducted over thousands of folders and unedited OVRA reports. Indeed, much like Tamburrano, he knows very little about these matters and appears to be driven by ideological prejudice.

As for the reputed affiliations of *Nuova storia contemporanea*, the readers of *The National Interest* need only to examine the journal's editorial board to realize the nonsense of Mr. McDonald's allegations. François Fejtö, Eugen Weber and Richard Pipes, among others, are all but "right-wing revisionists."

I'm surprised and disappointed that a journal such as *The National Interest* should have published an article that is both offensive and academically devoid of any substance or scholarship.

In truth, Canali and I were the first to be shocked—and even saddened—by the discovery that Silone had betrayed his comrades and sent detailed reports to the fascist police. Yet, as historians, we could do nothing but present the papers to the public and call for a new, more insightful reflection on Silone's life, legacy and intellectual biography. Indeed, *il caso* is still far from closed.

DARIO BIOCCA
Assistant Professor of History,
Università di Perugia, Italy

McDonald replies:

How clever of Marx, Robert Conquest once remarked, to have written *Das Kapital*. There's the proof of the soundness of my theories, he could afterwards crow. The true believer's heart swelled at the sight of the gargantuan tome—no need, heaven forbid, to open it. And the would-be critic's heart dropped into his boot at the endless expanse of plodding, psuedo-scientific prose. Much easier to register the claim and move on.

Biocca and Canali have the technique down pat. They have written a book which, if not up to Marx's logorrheic standards, is both respectable-looking and abstruse. To it they have appended a miscellany of allegedly incriminating documents that they claim are from Silone. For well over a year now, they've pointed to the book's existence as if that fact, in and of itself, validated their claims. True believers on Italy's political extremes jumped at the opportunity to settle scores with an old enemy, and journalists who should have known better reported the sensational charges against Silone without bothering to verify them.

The historian Giuseppe Tamburrano was the lone exception. Together with researchers at the Fondazione Pietro Nenni, he undertook the time-consuming task of reviewing the documents and, as I reported in great detail, found that the so-called proof was spurious except to the extent that it suggests that Silone sought to save the life of his younger brother by providing the authorities with generic, non-harmful information. No betrayal of comrades. No spying. No nothing. Dr. Biocca feigns indignation and reflexively invokes "the proof." But his failure to respond to a single specific criticism tells the disinterested observer all he needs to know about where the truth lies. This latest *caso Silone* does indeed remain open. But for reasons vastly different than Dr. Biocca imagines.

Altitude Sickness:

S. Frederick Starr persuasively diagnoses worsening poverty as a major cause of escalating violence in the world's mountainous regions ("Altitude Sickness: Poverty and Violence in the Mountains", Fall 2001). Noting the failure of most large-scale economic development projects to alleviate poverty, he also prescribes a credible cure: "hands-on assistance carried out at the village level" and focusing "on

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more modest tasks, like helping to dig village irrigation ditches, setting up self-sustaining tree nurseries, upgrading seed grains, improving animal husbandry, or teaching rudimentary accounting to women who manage credit organizations."

While he cites the Swiss government and the Aga Khan Development Network as successful practitioners of this sort of development, Mr. Starr overlooks an iconic American organization that has been practicing it successfully for 40 years: the Peace Corps. It currently has nearly 7,000 volunteers in 66 countries, most of them recent college graduates with enthusiasm for service and a sense of adventure who spend two years working directly with people in rural villages and small towns. The Peace Corps' development philosophy and practice involve undertaking sustainable small-scale projects with substantial local input as well as teaching practical skills directly to impoverished people.

Here in Niger, our 100 volunteers are doing all of the "modest tasks" that Mr. Starr mentions and more.

In addition to promoting effective development, the Peace Corps contributes to a more positive image of America and Americans among people for whom we are often no more than a hateful caricature generated by Hollywood and hostile propaganda. It also gives a substantial number of Americans a better understanding of countries that few could find on a map but which, as we recently learned with Afghanistan and its neighbors, can suddenly become quite important in this age of globalism (or New-Economy American Wilsonianism, if you prefer). And it is a marvelous training opportunity for young Americans embarking on international careers. (In 1999, for example, 40 percent of new Foreign Service Officers had Peace Corps experience.)

Strengthening and rejuvenating the Peace Corps would be a highly cost-effective way of promoting both American ideals and American interests. This could help to address the pervasive poverty that underlies much of the violence and instability in the world's mountainous regions (and, I would add, in its equatorial zones, as well)—an important adjunct to the war against terrorism. Moreover, it would be an excellent example of "compassionate conservatism" applied internationally.

J.R. BULLINGTON
Country Director
Peace Corps, Niger

Bonn Voyage:

The inference that one draws from "Bonn Voyage" by Daniel Bodansky (Fall 2001) is that global warming due to carbon dioxide emissions is an established fact. Nothing could be further from the truth, as recognized by a growing number, probably a majority, of climatologists. The temperature observations of the atmosphere above the "boundary layer" (the first three to five thousand feet) by satellite and balloon-borne radiosonde show no rising trend in atmospheric temperature. It is true that the surface temperature seems to be rising, although there are large uncertainties associated with the data because of "the urban heat island effect." However, if atmospheric carbon dioxide is the culprit, then we must see rising temperatures above the boundary layer, which we do not. Before this or any other nation signs on to Kyoto, the science must be clarified to a much greater degree than exists today.

ROBERT C. WHITTEN
Research scientist (NASA, ret.)
Cupertino, CA

Bodansky replies:

In my article, I noted, "Most scientists believe the [climate change] problem is serious, but many uncertainties remain, allowing skeptics to argue for delay until more is known." Whitten is clearly one such skeptic. But contrary to his claim that "a growing number, probably a majority, of climatologists" have similar views, Whitten clearly represents the minority. In its Third Assessment Report, issued earlier this year, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—

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which reflects the work of literally thousands of experts—concluded that global average surface temperature had increased by about a degree Fahrenheit over the last century, and that most of the warming observed over the past fifty years is attributable to human activities.

The Bush Administration questioned the IPCC as "UN science" and asked the National Academy of Sciences for a U.S. view. But the National Academy study, issued last June, agreed with the IPCC. In particular, it found that the IPCC's conclusion that increased greenhouse gases are causing climate change "accurately reflects the current thinking of the scientific community." It went on to note that, despite various uncertainties, "there is general agreement that the observed warming is real and particularly strong within the past twenty years." In a previous report in 2000, the National Academy of Sciences specifically examined the discrepancy cited by Whitten between the temperature trends at the earth's surface and in the upper atmosphere and concluded that this disparity "in no way invalidates the conclusion that surface temperature has been rising" ("Reconciling Observations of Global Temperature", 2000). Moreover, in its estimate of global warming, the IPCC expressly takes into account the urban heat island effect that Whitten notes.

Sky High:

I read Conrad Crane's "Sky High: Illusions of Air Power" (Fall 2001) as an Army polemicist's effort to disguise a serious issue as a blanket attack on a sister Service upon the eve of the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review*. Crane's real conclusion—don't devote QDR resources to airpower-centric strategies—rests upon two arguments: first, that technology associated with precision weapons and targeting does not work as advertised; and second, that airpower is not "decisive" and primarily achieves results through the slaughter of civilians and the destruction of dual-use infrastructure. Following this, Crane warns of the grave dangers in expanding this "unethical" policy tool in the future, which by implication violates the "laws of war."

The first argument is humbug: no airpower advocate claims that precision technology is error free and bloodless. To ignore the magnitude of improvement or of airpower's utility, however, is to bury your head in fifty years of sand. Crane lists the problems of using airpower in Kosovo, but never cites an estimate of civilian casualties. Even Human Rights Watch claims no more than 500 civilian deaths. Instead, Crane associates U.S. methods and technology with the Russian carnage in Chechnya.

Crane's second argument overstates the extent or duration of destruction to targets and, worse, drags up aged quotes equating current theories to those of Douhet. By Crane's definition, any dual-use target is illegal, but this is not supported by international law. Crane also knows that targeting strategic infrastructure is not the only role of airpower in coercion.

And what, by the way, was the alternative in Kosovo? Thousands of American soldiers slogging through Balkan mountains raining tons of artillery upon villages?

PAT A. PENTLAND
Alexandria, VA

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Conrad Crane, an Army employee, has an axe to grind. The NATO air campaign defeated Milosevic and liberated Kosovo. Crane cannot deal with that fact, so he denigrates airpower by alleging that it was used in a questionable fashion. Yet, he is unable to cite a single example where NATO aircraft broke the law. On the contrary, NATO exceeded the law's requirements in order to minimize casualties and collateral damage. As a result, this war was one of the most humane, discriminate and bloodless in history.

He also refers to destruction and death in past wars caused by airpower, but he ignores the far greater carnage wrecked by surface forces. Over fifty million people died in World War II and

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over 95 percent of them were shelled, shot or starved to death—not bombed. Land warfare is still deadly. According to UNICEF, landmines kill or maim 200 people worldwide each week, most of whom are children. Yet, the Army has resisted all efforts to comply with the international Mine Ban Treaty.

In October 1993—the last time the U.S. Army saw combat—our Rangers were trapped in the streets of Mogadishu. Eighteen Americans were killed. But in rescuing the nearly 100 others still pinned down, the Army slaughtered 500–1,000 Somali civilians. Participants in this action talk of riding through the streets shooting everything that moved and spraying buildings with bullets in the event someone inside might be a threat. Magnify that horrible image a hundred-fold and you have the vision of war that Crane wanted for Kosovo.

Crane plays cheerleader for the Army by tearing down others in the hope it will make his employer look better. Unfortunately, like an artillery barrage, he generates massive collateral damage. In this case the victims were truth and integrity.

COL. PHILLIP S. MEILINGER, (USAF, ret.)
Potomac Falls, VA

Crane replies:

Disregarding the personal attacks, I have basically been accused of having an Army "axe to grind." Dr. Pentland is a former fighter pilot and professor at Air University, and Col. Meilinger has been a spokesman for the U.S. Air Force for many years, so I suspect there are a number of other Service sharpening stones being used in this discussion. My intent was not to advocate any single arm, but instead to avoid past mistakes by generating a learned debate about the proper role and utility of airpower, a utility that is optimized when used as part of a balanced joint force.

I hope these letters were written before current air operations in Afghanistan had started, and that both of my critics would now be objective enough to admit that the campaign there has highlighted many of the points I made in my article. Pentagon briefers and many media pundits have again displayed inflated expectations about what airpower can accomplish on its own. Though Afghanistan features a primitive economic and industrial infrastructure with few fixed targets of value, there have been enough errant bombs and inevitable collateral damage to cause numerous civilian casualties and fuel the Taliban's propaganda effort. Diplomatic efforts to hold the anti-terrorism coalition together have been made more difficult by the usual international outcry against American bombing. I would like to flatter myself that the growing number of commentators questioning the efficacy of airpower in Afghanistan, and emphasizing the importance of adequate ground forces, all read my article; but I expect that they were observant enough of the truth and had enough integrity to come to such conclusions on their own. As with most military campaigns, the optimum results in Afghanistan will come from an orchestrated synergy of air and ground power in joint and combined operations. □

Errata

In the Fall 2001 issue, Yossi Klein Halevi's essay, "The Asymmetry of Pity", dated Yasir Arafat's Johannesburg speech as having been given in 1995. It was 1994. In the box on page 151, the source of the second excerpt was dropped. It should have read "Lionel Shriver, *Wall Street Journal*, August 1, 2001."

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What Victory Means

Conrad Black

THE CONGRESS and people of the United States have given President Bush an unambiguous mandate both to punish the authors of the crimes of September 11 and to root out and destroy organized terrorism throughout the world. While the risk involved in fulfilling that mandate is great, the opportunity thus created is even greater. Ever since 1941, when Franklin D. Roosevelt pledged that America would avoid appeasement (in January), and when he promised that "this form of treachery will never again endanger us" (after Pearl Harbor), no country has dared to attack the United States overtly. Many applaud, more or less audibly, when the United States suffers any setback, but no state chooses to confront the United States directly. Indeed, all now unctuously proclaim their innocence of the events of September 11.

This constitutes immense progress since 1941. Japan and Germany were powerful and fearless nations, even though criminally misgoverned. The great efforts of a Grand Alliance were required to subdue them. The current terrorist enemy is typified by a platitudinous ne'er-do-well scion of a wealthy Saudi family, supported by the world's most contemptible regimes, promoting the massacre of innocents from an Afghan cave. These enemies are not nations, possessed of the sinews of war and commanding the adherence of millions of dedicated citizens. They present the combination, rarely encountered heretofore, of evil, education and fanaticism. Yet they are neither brave nor numerous. There cannot be an unlimited number of voluntary and relatively sophisticated suicide candidates. Security measures can close off most of the opportunities for such programmed robots to do real damage to the West, and these groups cannot function without the assistance of states. Elusive though they are, they command no real loyalty and, ultimately, the universal aversion to confrontation with the United States makes them very vulnerable.

But they have added to a pattern of mostly unrequited damage done to the United States. Vietnam, Iran-Contra, Beirut, Saddam Hussein's survival of the Gulf War, Somalia, the bombing of the Saudi barracks, East African embassies, and the U.S.S. *Cole*, and Kosovo's incitement of the irresponsible notion of a cause worth killing but not dying for—all of this confirmed in their views those who want to believe that the United States is a paper tiger. An officially unsponsored terrorist attack is the first step back toward renewed assaults on the scale, and with the lack of anonymity, of Pearl Harbor.

Conrad (Lord) Black is chairman of Hollinger International, Inc., and serves as chairman of the editorial board of *The National Interest*.

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Seen in that light, the present campaign is in large part a contest to reestablish the equilibrium that existed in the world from 1945 to 1965, when the world's greatest power—as Roosevelt promised in 1941—was too formidable and dangerous an adversary to be attacked, even indirectly by apparently anonymous and stateless fanatics.

The United States must never be trigger-happy and must never again enter a war without full constitutional consideration, as it did in Vietnam. Even with reasonable legalities observed and a clear consensus obtained, it should never commit its forces, much less conscript forces, unless the legitimate national interest justifies it. The surest way to avoid suffering the provocations that could lead to war, as has been recognized since Roman times, lies in seizing this opportunity to rebuild the full power and credibility of American deterrence. The world must learn again that the United States, when severely antagonized, is to be feared; that it grinds its mortal enemies to powder as it did sixty years ago; that the widespread view in extreme Islamic circles that it is cowardly, decadent, and easily intimidated by the thought of casualties is false. America's real and illusory friends should not be allowed to impose any geographic or other limits on America's war on terrorism. It is good tactics for the United States to concentrate on one country at a time, but the elimination of state-sponsored terrorism will probably require treatment of several countries in terms no gentler than what at time of writing is being meted out in Afghanistan.

It must be said in this regard that the war did not start off well. It appeared to replicate the less hopeful features of Desert Storm and Kosovo. There was apparently mindless coalition-building, failure to take out the head of the Taliban in the early days when the opportunity presented itself, seeming reluctance to use substantial ground forces, and ambiguity over what to do after Afghanistan once something worthwhile is achieved there. The unwaveringly determined stance of the President and some of his colleagues, and the evident determination of public and congressional opinion, were all that sustained optimism three weeks after the bombing began that we were not in for half-measures of a familiar pattern.

This is not only a war against terrorism, however. It is also a war against the spurious moral relativism that demands proof equal to what a refined domestic criminal justice system would require before taking any military action. Such relativism equates the modest collateral damage that U.S. attackers try hard to avoid with seizing aircraft and smashing them with no warning into buildings full of innocent civilians. This sort of casuistry must be exposed as the cowardice, malice, and hypocrisy that it is. These sentiments are not just audible in the Arab media. They are almost unavoidable on the BBC, in the *Guardian* and other leftist and anti-American British newspapers, and are widespread in the continental European media. This is a Manichaean contest between imperfect good and unambiguous evil and, fortunately, the good possess overwhelming strength and the wicked are relatively weak. President Bush's assertion of September 11 that no distinction would be made between terrorists and the states that assist them must be enforced. All legitimately suspect states must either undergo the grace of spontaneous or assisted, but permanently verified, conversion, or receive unsustainable punishment for their complicity until their support for terrorism durably ceases.

In pursuit of such a goal, the United States should not expend the energy of a single serious individual in analyzing whether the world likes it or not. Throughout the world there is a division between the nativists and the broadly

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Western but generally American emulators. The United States must be officially neutral in any such *kulturkampf*. But as it adheres to its best traditions, it should be conscious of pleasing its admirers and giving pause to its adversaries in other countries.

The whole world is obsessed with America's panache, economic might, and popular culture, and it takes note of its military power and high culture. Envy being the energetic force that it is, much of the world outside the United States, abetted by the carriers of the great liberal death wish within, want America to behave, in Richard Nixon's phrase, like "a pitiful helpless giant." If it does, the influence of lesser states and peoples is magnified, and the guilt and shame of the minority of Americans who are in fact anti-American is appeased. These forces, for the good of all civilized people, must not be appeased. They must be severely disabused.

The War for Islam

THE fundamental problem with the Arab world is that many Arabs believe that their people have been in retreat since the battle of Tours in 732, which led to their expulsion from France. Some believe that success can only be recovered by reverting to the militancy of early Islam, minus early and contemporary moderate Islam's respect for other "peoples of the book." What has now been unleashed is not a war against Islam; it is a war *for* Islam, for the salvation of a humane and tolerant civilization. Both the secular extremists such as Saddam Hussein, and the clerical militants who have usurped secular authority, as in Iran, must be humbled.

The comparatively brave moderate Muslims, especially in Arab countries, must be respectfully and generously helped. And the weak "allies", such as the Saudis, who will not have any offensive action launched by the Americans from their territory, and the Egyptians, who, despite receiving billions of American dollars in assistance every year, endlessly revile the United States in their state-controlled media, must be submitted to President Bush's litmus test: they are "for us or against us."

Those regimes owe their survival to the United States. If they are unable to command the adherence of their own countrymen from the distractions of the extremists, they will fall eventually with or without American support. And fall they might. That is why the task of promoting progressive government, power-sharing, and responsible behavior in the Arab world will be easier the more crushing is the American victory over those extremists. At the same time, various forms of the American assistance to which these countries have become so accustomed that they imagine it to be unconditional will be indispensable as well.

The United States has need of local intelligence and proximate staging areas. Beyond that, it has in this conflict no military need of allies at all, and the unseemly and indiscriminate pursuit of coalition-building seemed at the beginning to become an end in itself. The administration wisely declined most offers of contributions of manpower, presumably to avoid a Kosovo fiasco, where in exchange for a few technicians or quartermasters or support troops a veto on the conduct of the war was extracted.

The United States, as its President made clear on October 7, is grateful for the support of its friends, but it asks no one to fight its battles for it. The Secretary of State should not have been proudly reporting to the press on September 12 that he had been speaking to "Chairman Arafat" and the rabidly anti-American Egyptian foreign minister. The British foreign secretary's demeaning visit to

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Tehran was in the same category. With such a coalition of potential supporters, including some of the world's most accomplished supporters of terrorism, declared enemies are almost superfluous.

Arafat could join a genuine coalition, even after the murder of the Israeli tourism minister, if he moved decisively toward a permanent resolution that deals with the fundamental problem in the Arab-Israeli dispute, which is how to share the land between two legitimate claimants to it. Britain, in the darkest moments of World War I, incited ambitions to the same territory at the same time in both the Jews and the Palestinians. Contrary to some Arab claims, it did not sell the same real estate simultaneously to two different buyers, but it did encourage competing bids. As President Bush has acknowledged, two states must exist in space where there is barely room for one.

But that cannot happen until the Palestinians stop pretending that the Jews are not an indigenous people, and that the Palestinians are the protagonists in an epic poem that will end with the departure of the Jews in the footsteps of the Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders, Turks and British before them, with a small number of Jews perhaps permitted to remain as a timorous minority. The Palestinians must accept the legitimacy of the concept of a Jewish state, as the majority of Israelis (conditional on it being reciprocal) have accepted the concept of a Palestinian state.

A line approximately twenty miles from the Mediterranean must be drawn as the boundary of the West Bank, as Israel cannot go back to being nine miles wide, as it was prior to the 1967 war—a war initiated by the Arabs and won by Israel. The Israeli settlements beyond that line and in Gaza should be surrendered in exchange for Palestinian renunciation of a practically unlimited right of return. The miserable wretches that the Arab powers have kept festering in refugee camps for over fifty years should then begin moving at once into what will be vacated former Israeli settlements. For more than half a century, the Arab leaders have distracted the Arab masses with the plight of these refugees, rejecting any effort to help them, in most cases in order to draw attention away from their own misgovernment. In a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, a generous aid package could be arranged to help the refugees, provided it was administered honestly and not simply trousered by Arafat and his cronies—as has been the case with hundreds of millions of dollars up to now.

But only a decisive American victory in the present conflict with terrorism will create the conditions in which such a resolution could become imminent. There are now too many Arabs who believe the West is in retreat and that the Americans are fundamentally weak, using their weaponry as a substitute for moral purpose and physical courage. Because they want to believe this, they also believe that with escalated terrorist attrition, the United States will abandon any support for Israel. They think the United States can be bullied into a craven plea for an end to terrorist harassment—to the opprobrium of the old international Left, the anti-Semites, the forces of envy, and all the ancient wellsprings of anti-Americanism. All those who believe this, or anything resembling it, must be convincingly disabused for a just peace to become possible.

The theory, widely professed in Europe and the Middle East, that Israel is the core of the present crisis, is nonsense. The terrorists' greatest contempt is reserved for their own weak or Westernized fellow Arabs. Israel was only brought into the matter by the prime suspects in their television propaganda after the fact. Israel presents neither the principal problem, which is general Arab feelings of under-

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achievement, nor the solution. Israel is not even really a major symptom of those feelings, as the dissatisfaction would remain even if Israel vanished. But it is a sort of last straw to discontented Arabs, and one that they are not yet convinced is permanent and irreversible.

Jewish spokesmen in Israel and abroad, who claim that Israel plays no role in this crisis and that the target of the terrorists, after moderate and Westernized Arabs, is the entire West, overstate the matter slightly. Were Israel not an issue, the terrorists would probably have attacked New York and Washington years later, after completing the purge of reasonable secular Muslim leaders that started nearly fifty years ago but crested with the toppling of the Shah of Iran and the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat. But the basic point, of the solidarity of civilized people—including most Muslims and including Israel—against this form of evil, must be maintained against the quibblers who claim that September 11 was a comprehensible gesture against support for Israel, globalization, abuses of capitalism, and miscellaneous other perceived American shortcomings.

An adequately convincing defeat of the extremist Islamic forces in the present conflict might convince the Arabs of the durability of Israel. Arafat was momentarily frightened by Hamas in October. If the American military performance is purposeful enough, he may grasp that a permanent resolution, crafted along the lines represented by the correlation of forces on the ground in the contested territory, may be his best course.

The corrupt and short-sighted ruling house of Saudi Arabia should learn that it has more to fear from the United States, if that country is provoked, than from those who blew up the American barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996. Syria, a puny and primitive country, should retire from Lebanon, where it has no legitimate right and where it has been sponsoring terrorism on a prodigious scale for more than two decades. It must shut down and send packing the 15 U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations to which it now gives shelter and encouragement. Saddam Hussein must be driven from office or humbled into permanent compliance with UN requirements for the abandonment of his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. And Iran must detect the necessity of ceasing to incite Hizballah to outrages and of promoting terrorist activity generally.

If the United States pursues any goals less ambitious than these, and they are certainly attainable to so powerful a country as galvanized as it was by the atrocities of September 11, its actions will be indecisive. Even a success against the Taliban and the terrorist cave-dwellers of Afghanistan will be only a palliative, as the expulsion of Saddam from Kuwait has proved to be. If the American people and government wish to be spared such outrages in the future, as they rightly do, they will comprehensively defeat and destroy this enemy.

They must leave those states tempted to support terrorism (while retaining plausible deniability for their actions) in no doubt that backsliding will lead to instant and lethal consequences for them. Anything less will not really be a victory and will not ensure that the victims of September 11 died for something worthy of such a great sacrifice. The authors and supporters of the events of September 11 should, in Winston Churchill's words to the U.S. Congress at the end of 1941, be "taught a lesson which they and the world will never forget."

THIS IS NOT only a secular problem, of course. No serious person wants a cultural war between militant Islam on one side and tolerant Muslims, the West, and most of southern and eastern Asia, on the other.

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(Such a struggle, though tragic, would lead inexorably to the crushing defeat of the Islamic radicals, but with all the problems coalitions create and too late to help many of the moderate Muslims.) But there is no irreconcilable difference between Islam and other cultures.

Respected Islamic scholars and theologians must debunk the heresy of the suicide murderers for Allah known as the "Sixth Pillar of Islam." The world ought not be subjected to the profanation of Western religious and moral leaders invoking God's mercy on the victims of September 11, while noisy Islamic usurpers sketch a lascivious eternity in paradise for the perpetrators of the monstrous crimes that made those people victims. The United States obviously cannot direct the behavior of Muslim theologians, but dealing severely with those influenced by these heretics would make the case of legitimate Islamic theologians more imperative, as well as more persuasive.

And the Islamic militants who constantly invoke their alleged proximity to divine Providence must be made to understand the meaning of religious pluralism. Other, senior religions have legitimacy also, as does religious skepticism. But the Islamic fanatics who claim to have a monopoly on true spirituality, despite the worldly evidence to the contrary, must be introduced to the dangers of intolerance. The Armed Forces of the United States, and any who join with them in the present crisis, have the privilege of demonstrating that the philosophical underpinnings of Western civilization are not an unrigorous jelly of hypocrisy, vulgarity, and feebleness. Without triumphalism or condescension, America's doubters and enemies must be taught that the intellectual and spiritual strength of the United States is of a piece with its military power, and not a void that sophisticated weaponry is employed to disguise.

The rout of America's Islamic enemies (defined as those who do not oppose the evil of terrorism), the exaltation of America's friends, the distribution of economic assistance generously in support of the deserving, and the encouragement of progressive regimes in countries liberated from current oppressors could reverse the profound Arab problem of perceived failure, masquerading behind misdirected religious fervor. But the discouragement of terrorism and the uplifting of the oppressed and misdirected should ultimately not be confined to Muslim countries. Cuba and North Korea will eventually have to account for their behavior and show cause why they could be trusted, failing which the full repertoire of persuasive and coercive techniques can be applied to them. This should be possible to sell to the United Nations, if not before its implementation, then after the benefits of its imposition are being enjoyed throughout the membership of the General Assembly.

The Great Powers and the Americas

FROM THE present crisis, better relations could and should result between the United States and Russia, China, and India. All three have behaved like great powers, recognizing at once, and without any sanctimony about Israel or the Third World, the intolerable nature and implications of the actions of September 11. The United States has no natural dispute with any of them and should pursue formalized, treaty-based bilateral relations with each. This is the first time that Russia, and especially China, have accepted the deployment of American forces so close to their own borders. Further constructive relations can be built from there, and President Bush's trip to China in October and President Putin's to the United States in November were a good start.

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There are indications that the Russians are prepared to redefine the ABM Treaty to permit the necessary testing for development of a missile defense. As the United States rightly pursues a defense against nuclear attack by minor powers, it should do so as cooperatively as possible with the Russians and Chinese. The United States is right not to accept a deliberate policy of vulnerability to nuclear attack, but it should not be beyond the wit of statesmen of legitimate great powers to distinguish that necessity from the strategic balance among themselves.

Russia's relationship with NATO will have to be defined, as will the post-Cold War purposes of NATO. Such definition has been tangled up in questions of relations between Europe and America, and Britain with both Europe and the United States. A successful prosecution of a far-flung war against terrorism will provide direction, as well as impetus, for such an elucidation. NATO should refine its mission statement to include unconventional threats outside the European theater, and seek parallel agreements with Russia to pursue common objectives together.

With India, and with Pakistan, whose leader has also behaved admirably, the United States may be able to assist in a reduction of tensions by assisting both countries to achieve economic progress, and by helping Pakistan establish credentials as, with Indonesia, one of the world's leading Muslim countries.

As long as the well-established arrangements with Taiwan are adhered to and China's trade practices conform to reasonable standards of fairness, there should be no bar to good relations with that country. But it is clear that China will eventually emerge from the bondage of underdevelopment in 25 or 30 years. There need not be any particular issue between the United States and China at that time, but they will be the world's two most important countries. When that happens, the United States should be sure that it is set at the head of a hemisphere with 80 to 90 percent of China's population, enjoying a higher living standard and generally higher economic growth rates than China. The avoidance of a needless rivalry between China and the United States would be assisted if the Americas constituted a well-knit economic growth zone. This would be an economic bloc, not a neo-colonial arrangement. The United States thus has a further compelling motivation to assist the principal countries of Latin America, as it has assisted Mexico, in developing sophisticated economic and political systems. Much has already been accomplished in Chile, Argentina and Brazil, and this progress must continue. America's leadership in such circumstances would be benign and uncontestable. Nothing could launch progress toward such a development so well as a decisive American success over all those who tolerated, sympathized with, or even secretly professed to understand the reasons for the enormities of September 11.

Assuming a satisfactory outcome of the terrorist crisis, which now seems relatively remote to Latin Americans, the prestige of the United States will be more transcendent than usual in its own hemisphere, where its pre-eminence has been unquestioned since the times of President Monroe 175 years ago (other than the three weeks of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962). The moral and material capacity for American leadership in the whole world, but especially in its own hemisphere, will be practically unlimited.

President Bush's excellent relationship with Mexican President Vicente Fox, the first really democratically elected Mexican leader, going back to when they were both governors of neighboring states, could be deployed to project the Mexican-American relationship ever far-

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ther into economically and politically compatible countries of the Americas. The achievement of this objective may require the brushing aside of Euro-Hispanicist notions of a greater role in pan-American affairs than is realistic, just as France's claim to some tutorial status in Quebec is, to say the least, presumptuous.

Despite the posturings of the faint-voiced detritus of Canadian nationalism, Canada is not really, by most criteria, an independent country. Eighty-five percent of Canada's foreign trade is with the United States, which comes to more than 42 percent of its entire GDP. This is a higher figure than the corresponding one for the state of California. It requires a skilled dialectician to tell a Canadian from an American from a northern state. In having opted, nearly forty years ago, without the issue ever having been put explicitly, for a political system to the Left of the United States, Canada doomed itself to lose an irreplaceable number of its talented people, while gathering ever more closely those of all walks of life dependent on government support. In that time, the Canadian currency has declined from par with the U.S. dollar to 62 cents. The comparative standard of living has descended almost half again as precipitously. The African-American community in the United States, for which Canada, like all foreigners, expressed great solicitude in the intense civil rights times of the 1960s, now enjoys a higher standard of living than Canada. Whether it wishes it explicitly or not, Canada will be steadily more closely integrated with the United States.

It is therefore in the Americas, more than in Europe, that an "ever closer union"—the language of the Maastricht agreement—is likely to emerge. In the present European Union of 15 countries, there are 11 official languages. In the Americas, there are only four such languages, and that is including French, which is spoken by barely one per cent of the total and is nowhere a principal national language. The United States, if led imaginatively, has an incomparable position from which to move the hemisphere forward, now that most of the Latin Americans have so obviously developed the ambition to be advanced countries in all respects. Nothing would, to use present jargon, be more empowering to the United States in leading such a movement than a resounding victory over the forces of chaos.

Europe

NOR COULD anything be better designed than a resounding victory over terrorism to cure those Europeans who believe that if they all stand on each others' shoulders they can be a rival, rather than an ally, of the United States. President Bush was right to praise the solidarity of the British, French and Germans on October 7, and many Europeans have undoubtedly grasped that Israel and the United States are not the ultimate target of the terrorists; the whole West is.

The remarks of the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and some other European countries too, have been splendid. NATO was commendably swift in recognizing September 11 as an Article 5 attack upon all NATO states. But this admirable state of solidarity did not confer the right to define the terrorist enemy narrowly. Some Europeans may have to learn that alliance with the United States is not a permit to exercise a right of veto over American responses to acts of war directed against it, in exchange for expressions of moral support, token comradeship-in-arms, and counsels of excessive moderation.

The recent and present applicants for membership in NATO know that to be an American ally is a privilege. It may be that the present crisis, if managed well from

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Washington, will remind some allies who had forgotten it of that fact.

It is forty years since President Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, said that "Britain has lost an Empire but not found a role." This continues to be an arduous process. It is not for the United States to intervene in it, other than to cease its decades-long practice of trying to propel Britain headlong into Europe. This was an understandable project when Britain could put metal up the backs of the Europeans as cold warriors. But the agreed next step after British adherence to European Economic and Monetary Union would be a common European foreign and security policy.

If any such regime had been in existence since 1980, Britain could not have regained the Falklands, which in turn helped bring democracy to Argentina. The United States could not have used its air bases for the Libyan raid of 1986, and there would not have been 40,000 British servicemen in the Gulf War. Britain has been America's most reliable ally since Suez, as the opening phase of the terrorist crisis demonstrated. Britain should not, and is not, in any hurry to be subsumed into the pre-Thatcher European economic system and to surrender its unique relationship with the United States to a committee of European foreign ministers. The United States should be in no greater hurry to fire the deputy sheriff.

These are complicated questions that cannot be plumbed to their depths here, but the best circumstances for exploring them would be in the aftermath of a decisive victory over the common enemy, in which Britain will undoubtedly play its customary distinguished supporting role. In the meantime, the British should understand that the United States will facilitate the continuation of Britain's ancient role as an Atlanticist state if it wishes to play that role. Britain could be indispensable to maintaining European-American solidarity, promoting Euro-integration for those who seek it while retaining a high degree of national sovereignty for countries that wish that, all in the context of strengthening the trans-Atlantic commercial and security relationship.

Britain must not, and surely will not, interpret such a role as Harold Macmillan's self-serving claptrap about "a Greek Empire within the Roman Empire." Much less should it imagine itself in some Mephistophelean design to prevent America from being America through the transmission of pusillanimous advice about how to deal with international terrorists.

Obviously it is up to the individual European countries to integrate or retain their sovereignty as suits each of them. All Europe should understand that U.S. security assurances, and the power of the American economy to tug their relatively sluggish and socialistic systems forward (except for Britain's post-Thatcher economy), are best accessed through an Atlantic Alliance based on closer economic relations with the Americas. Europe must have the incentive to see itself as a powerful ally rather than a reflexive rival of the United States. Here, too, nothing could be more conducive to the acceptance of this perspective than successful American leadership in the battle against terrorism, which the European public recognizes as the common struggle of civilized people—even if elements of the ineffable European Left do not.

Energy and the Environment

IT MAY NOT be readily apparent, but the terrorism crisis we face may even provide a platform for making real progress on the issues of energy and the environment. Though most of its objectives are admirable, Kyoto, as written, is nonsense. The idea

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that the United States might have to pay $40 billion to (individuals in) the Russian government as a penalty for excessive energy use according to some pollution voucher trading system, while most of the world was being carried on America's back above an economic recession, is one conspicuous example of such nonsense.

The United States should long ago have reduced its dependence on foreign energy sources for strategic as well as environmental reasons. This will now have to be done by a combination of tax-based restraint, development of new domestic petroleum sources, expansion of dependable nuclear power (where there is much to learn from France), and of clean coal. The present level of importation of oil encourages geopolitical delusions as well as corruption in OPEC, and is an unsustainable American self-indulgence.

President Bush was right, if unnecessarily abrupt, in puncturing the moralistic balloon of Kyoto. A re-integration of Iran and Iraq into the world, and the development of a stable and broader-based government in Saudi Arabia, would expand the world's oil supply and render it more stable. So will a more sensible balance between environmentalists and the energy industry in the United States. So will the rapid application of more efficient and environmentally sound production techniques in Russia and other former components of the USSR. Meanwhile, the sooner we dispel the delusion of grandiosity that afflicts the leaders of some oil exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, the better. Richard Nixon spoke of energy self-sufficiency thirty years ago but no one was listening. (Many were too busy trying to depose him as President.) Americans should listen now. No person, and no circumstances, would attract the country's attention more successfully than this President, from the greatest oil-producing state and with a background in the industry, after successfully destroying America's mortal enemies in the chief oil-producing region of the world.

THE BURDEN of the foregoing is that there is now a unique opportunity to invigorate those who admire America, reward its friends, convert those who resent it, and destroy or intimidate its enemies. We have a rare chance to demonstrate righteous strength and intelligent generosity. If this opportunity is not seized, another one will only come again after a greater and bloodier outrage.

In crushing the evil that has assaulted America and all civilization, America and its genuine allies can demonstrate that the world is not governed on the basis that cowardice is accepted as wisdom, nor philistinism as Olympian serenity, and the spitefulness of the weak will not be mistaken for moral indignation. This is a high calling. □

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"Very, very important to the life of the United States, to the West, and, I am convinced, to freedom."

—Jeane J. Kirkpatrick



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"WEALTH does not resolve hatreds; a prosperous enemy may simply be one more capable of making war."

—Daniel Pipes

"IF IT IS NOT careful and wise, the United States could find itself enmeshed even deeper in the Middle East and Southwest Asia than it is today, and risk generating greater prospective dangers in the process of containing smaller near-term ones."

—Paul W. Schroeder

"WITHOUT TRIUMPHALISM or condescension, America's doubters and enemies must be taught that the intellectual and spiritual strength of the United States is of a piece with its military power, and not a void that sophisticated weaponry is employed to disguise."

—Conrad Black

"IN THE FUTURE, wartime justice will not depend on international law; as in ancient times, justice will depend upon the moral fiber of military commanders themselves."

—Robert D. Kaplan

"COULD IT be that the new Petersburg boy, Vladimir Putin, is contemplating a Petrine-like leap to lift Russia out of its present humiliation?"

—Martin Malia

"ANYONE who imagines that, left to its own devices, post-Saddam Iraq will become a democracy, or cease to seek weapons of mass destruction, or have qualitatively different relations with its neighbors, or be led by someone significantly less brutal than Saddam himself, has a difficult argument to make. There is simply no evidence for such a view."

—Ofra Bengio

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